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Authentication verifies the claim about the identity of an entity. Biometric
technologies measure unique personal characteristics which can be used to identify
individuals with a high degree of certainty and thus have the potential to certify the
connection between people and the systems they are authorized to use.
Using biometrics for authentication of people to systems provides convenience.
When authenticating to portable devices, such as smartphones and laptops, how-
ever, security problems may arise because this authentication usually takes place
in unsupervised environments (e.g., at home). Since a portable device can be eas-
ily stolen, an attacker with physical access to it can launch a powerful attack by
manipulating the data which is acquired and transmitted by the biometric scanner.
Furthermore, the biometric information has a low degree of secrecy as it can be
captured by an unintended recipient and even without user’s consent. Since the
biometric characteristics are difficult to change and cannot be revoked, their com-
promise may lead to more serious consequences than, for example, a compromise
of a password. Finally, regardless of all effort to keep user’s biometrics private, the
widespread use of biometric technologies are set to make the biometric information
essentially publicly available, with the face photos being public even today.
To counter some of these security threats, we have developed a technology
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for automated authentication of fingerprint scanners. Fingerprint scanners have
unique patterns that can be used to distinguish one scanner from another one.
The pattern, which we call scanner pattern, stems from the variability of device
characteristics at silicon level and is caused by imperfections of the conversion from
the input to the scanner (i.e., the object applied to it) to its output (i.e., the digital
image). The scanner pattern is a sufficiently unique, persistent, and unalterable
intrinsic characteristic of the fingerprint scanners even to those of exactly the same
technology, manufacturer, and model. Our technology is able to distinguish the
pattern of one scanner from the pattern of another scanner of exactly the same
model by extracting the pattern from a single image, acquired with each scanner.
In this way, the scanner pattern can be used to enhance the security of a bio-
metric system by authenticating the scanner, used to acquire a particular fingerprint
image, and thus detect attacks on the scanner, such as detecting an image containing
the fingerprint pattern of the legitimate user and acquired with the authentic finger-
print scanner replaced by another image that still contains the fingerprint pattern
of the legitimate user but has been acquired with another, unauthentic fingerprint
scanner. The technology uses the conventional authentication steps of enrolment
and verification, each of which can be implemented in a portable device, a desktop,
or a remote server. The technology is extremely accurate, computationally efficient,
robust in a wide range of conditions, does not require any hardware modifications,
and can be added (as a software add-on) to systems already manufactured and
placed into service. We have also implemented the technology in a demonstration
prototype for both area and swipe fingerprint scanners.
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Combining the biometric authentication with a scanner authentication leads to
a two-part authentication, which we call bipartite authentication, that verifies both
the identity of the user and the “identity” of the fingerprint scanner. Therefore, we
see the main, although not necessarily the ultimate, application of this technology
as a method to improve the security of portable devices with an additional layer.
Strong security is required to gain the confidence of the users in their devices as
secure universal terminals for online access to virtually all consumer services: from
bank applications to mobile commerce to access to health care anywhere and at any




2.1 Biometric Authentication and Biometric Systems
The objective of authentication of people is establishing their identity. The
three general methods for authentication are based on: (1) what you know, e.g.,
a password, (2) what you have, e.g., a token, and (3) what you are. In the third
method, the identification is based on person’s physiological or behavioral traits,
called collectively biometrics. Using biometrics for identification is not new — it
has been around for centuries. Today biometrics is also used for authentication to
systems and automated verification of identity.
The advantages of using biometrics for authentication over the first two meth-
ods are [Jain et al. 2006]:
• Biometrics cannot be lost or forgotten;
• Biometrics are difficult to copy, share, and distribute;
• Biometrics are difficult to forge;
• Biometric authentication requires presence of the person at the time and point
of authentication.
Unfortunately, today’s electronic technologies to great extent diminish these
advantages and even create other types of challenges.
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The conceptual diagram of a generic system that uses biometrics, as specified
by [ISO/IEC SD 11], is shown in Figure 2.1. Although the figure describes a typi-
cal biometric system for authentication, its subsystems and processes are common
for other applications that use biometrics. These conceptual subsystems need not
correspond to physical subsystems in a real biometric system.
Figure 2.1: Generic biometric system
The Data Capture Subsystem (see Figure 2.1) takes a signal/image of the
biometric identifier that the individual has presented to the biometric sensor and
produces a biometric sample. This sample may be further compressed and/or en-
crypted and transmitted to the Signal Processing Subsystem. The latter extracts
the distinguishing features from the sample, which may include segmentation, fea-
ture extraction, and quality control. In case of enrollment, it also creates one or
more templates that may require several presentations. The template can be stored
in the Storage Subsystem, within a biometric capture device, on a portable medium
(e.g., in a smartcard), or on a personal computer/local server. The Matching Sub-
system compares the features against one or more templates and outputs similarity
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scores that measure the degree of similarity between them. Based on the scores, on
a pre-defined threshold, and on the type of operation (verification or identification),
the Decision Subsystem produces a decision outcome. It is also possible to have
a multi-biometric system that uses different biometric identifiers (as samples and
templates), where the separate scores are combined and evaluated by the Decision
Subsystem.
A Secure Biometric System, as defined in [INCITS M1/06–0424], may also in-
clude defense against biometric sensor attacks, biometric sample modification and/or
injection attacks, a liveness detection to make sure that the captured biometric sam-
ple comes from a live person, etc.
The subsystems of a biometric system may be implemented in different phys-
ical systems: central/distributed (server), local (client), device (peripheral), and
on-token. Depending on the location of the template storage and the location of
the biometric match operations, [INCITS M1/06–0424] defines several architectural
configurations. Of interest for us are “store on device/match on device,” “store on
token, match on device,” and “store on token/match on token.”
Due to several factors (discussed in section 2.2.2), rarely are the feature sets
extracted from two biometric samples the same. The variability in the feature set of a
person is referred to as intra-class variation, and the variability between the features
sets of two different persons is referred to as inter-class variation [Jain et al. 2008].
Thus, a design objective is to find a feature set with small intra-class variation and
large inter-class variation.
The event when the similarity score between the feature sets taken from two
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different persons exceeds the threshold and the Decision Subsystem produces a pos-
itive decision (match) is referred to as false accept. The probability of this event is
termed False Accept Rate (FAR). On the other hand, the event when the similarity
score between the features sets taken from one and the same person is below the
threshold and the Decision Subsystem produces a negative decision (non-match) is
referred to as false reject. The probability of this event is termed False Reject Rate
(FRR). There is a specific and intrinsic tradeoff between FAR and FRR, and the
function between the two is the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC). The ROC
is a primary performance metric of every biometric system [Jain et al. 2008]. The
error rate when FAR = FRR is called Equal Error Rate (FRR).
2.2 Biometric Identifiers and Their Characteristics
2.2.1 Biometric Identifiers
A physiological and/or behavioral characteristic that is sufficiently universal,
distinct, permanent, collectable, and acceptable to be collected can be used as a
biometric identifier [Maltoni et al. 2003]. Besides that, it is important that the
biometric system, using this identifier, have high performance and be difficult to
circumvent.
The biometric identifier of interest to our research is the fingerprint, which
characteristics are summarized next. Other physiological biometric identifiers are
the face, iris, hand geometry, palm vein patterns, DNA, retinal scans, ear shape,
and body odor. Written signatures, voice, and typing patterns are typical behavioral
7
biometrics ([NIST SP 800–32] and [Jain et al. 2006]).
Fingerprints
There are several reasons for choosing the fingerprint as the biometrics of
primary interest in our research. The fingerprint systems have a very good balance
between the desirable properties for biometric identifiers and systems as described
above ([Maltoni et al. 2003, Jain et al. 2006]).
• Fingerprints are highly distinct and their pattern develops early in life;
• Fingerprint details are permanent. The features used by most matching al-
gorithms are minutiae – the points of ridge and valley endings, lakes, points,
and spurs;
• The use of fingerprints for identification of people is century-old long and quite
mature, although it has been first systematized for law enforcement;
• Live-scan scanners can acquire high-quality fingerprint images;
• Low cost and small-sized implementations are available. This is a very im-
portant condition for their wide deployment, especially in portable electronic
devices.
Nevertheless, changes in the environment (e.g., moisture), cuts and bruises,
and changes due to ageing still pose certain challenges to the fingerprint technologies.
Furthermore, the fingerprint algorithms are computationally intensive.
A typical fingerprint with its minutiae is shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Fingerprint and its minutiae
2.2.2 Characteristics of Biometrics
2.2.2.1 Biometric Variance
In contrast to a password or a PIN code, the biometric information is not exact
— it varies as a result of measuring a physical object (still or moving). Different
captures of the biometrics of the same individual produce different biometric samples
which, very often, produce different, however slightly, feature sets. The groups of
factors that render the biometric information not uniquely repeatable are three
[Jain et al. 2006]:
A. Inconsistent presentation: inconsistent user interaction with the sensor.
For example, the 3D finger is projected onto the 2D surface of the sensor, the
finger is not a solid object and therefore it gets deformed during this mapping,
and each biometric acquisition may capture different parts of the finger;
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B. Irreproducible presentation: changes in the biometric identifiers over time
which, for example, can be due to aging, wear-and-tear, injuries, and patho-
logical developments;
C. Imperfect image/representational acquisition such as imperfections and
noise in the biometric sensor, nonuniform contact, environmental conditions
(moisture, temperature, dirt), different illumination, imperfect feature extrac-
tion, etc.
The biometric variance results in imperfect user identification and authenti-
cation (FAR and FRR as discussed in Section 2.1).
2.2.2.2 Biometrics and Security
Besides its variance, using biometrics in security applications faces additional
challenges because the biometric information:
• has a low degree of secrecy, i.e., it is difficult to be kept strictly private.
[NIST SP 800–63] states that “biometrics do not constitute secrets suitable
for use in the conventional remote authentication protocols;”
• is not easily changeable. Unlike passwords and PIN codes, once compromised,
most biometrics cannot be changed (without surgical intervention) or be re-
voked;
• can be counterfeited. In unattended environments, an attacker can use models
of the genuine biometric identifier, can make several attempts, or can even
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physically violate the integrity of the biometric sensor in order to substitute
the legitimate information [INCITS M1/06–0424].
The low degree of secrecy of the biometric information was demonstrated in a
protest by the Chaos Computer Club (a hackers organization) against the increasing
use of biometrics. In the March 2008 edition of its magazine, the club published
the fingerprint of the German Minister of the Interior (Home Secretary) Wolfgang
Schäuble, warning that the fingerprints are not as safe as politicians claim and
that “they should not be part of any critical security application.” The hackers
further included a thin film that can be taped over someone’s finger to deceive
fingerprint readers with Schäuble’s fingerprint; they even created dummy fingers
from his fingerprint [Heise Online 2008].
Even when the enrolled biometric templates are encrypted and stored in secure
databases, function creep and owner abuse cannot be ignored as security threats.
Furthermore, illegal access to private information in such “secure databases” is be-
coming a serious problem. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse estimated that since 2005
only in the US, over 500 million records containing personal information such as
Social Security numbers, account numbers, and driver’s license numbers, have been
compromised (stolen or exposed) due to security breaches [PR Clearninghouse 2010].
Finally, an investigation [Robertson 2009] by The Associated Press revealed that
“banks and other companies that handle your information are not being nearly as
cautious as they could,” which results in gambling with your personal data once
you pay with a credit card. Under such circumstances, people’s mistrust in the abil-
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ity of systems and networks to protect their confidential information is completely
justified.
In summary, regardless of all effort to keep user’s biometrics private, the
widespread use of biometric technologies are set to make the biometric informa-
tion essentially publicly available, with the face photos being public even today.
Using biometric information for authentication, however, can provide several
advantages over the systems that use other means of user identification because:
• Biometric samples contain more information than a PIN or a password that
is does not need to be memorized and can be used for security purposes
[INCITS M1/06–0424];
• Biometric information cannot be “guessed” in a dictionary attack; even brute
force attacks are difficult;
• In conventional security systems, once the secret element is compromised, the
methods using username–passcode allow the attacker to receive full access
and cannot provide protection against repudiation and impersonating attacks
because binding the identity with the claimant is not possible
[INCITS M1/06–0424].
2.3 Biometric Scanners and Images
Since the biometric scanner plays the central role in our work, this section sum-
marizes the characteristics of the fingerprint scanners and the images they produce.
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The commercial fingerprint scanners directly sense the finger surface and acquire a
live-scan digital image. They are typically more user-friendly, smaller, and cheaper
than the scanners used for law enforcement and border control.
2.3.1 Fingerprint Scanners
A fingerprint scanner generally consists of (1) a sensor that reads the finger
surface, (2) an A/D converter that converts the reading to digital, and (3) interface
that connects the scanner to an external device. Here are the three families of
sensing techniques [Maltoni et al. 2003], which we hereby summarize.
Optical Sensing
(a) Frustrated Total Internal Reflection (FTIR). The finger surface is illuminated
by a bank of LEDs. The light gets reflected at the valleys (appearing bright)
and absorbed at the ridges (appearing dark) and is focused through lens onto
a CCD (or CMOS for lower cost) sensor. Because of their essentially 3D
operation, these scanners cannot be deceived by a spoofing printed image,
they also produce images with very high quality, but they may introduce
geometric distortion, have problems with dry fingers, and are difficult to be
miniaturized. Replacing their glass prism by a sheet prism reduces their size,
which, however, also reduces the quality of the acquired images. The scanners
using FTIR are the oldest and the most widely used today.
(b) Optical fibers. The reflected light from the finger surface is directly conveyed
through a micro-optical guides to an array of CCD or CMOS pixels without
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the need of prism and lens. This makes the scanner more compact, but it also
increases is cost as the pixel array has to cover the whole sensing area.
(c) Electro-optical. They have two layers: a light-emitting polymer and a photo-
diode array. In the places where the ridges touch the polymer, the potential is
different than under the valleys, thus the amount of light varies and represents
the finger pattern. The size of scanners is much smaller, but the images have
lower quality.
(d) Direct reading. A high-quality camera is directly focused on the fingertip, thus
the finger does not touch the surface. The challenge is obtaining well-focused
and high-contrast images since a mechanical support keeps the finger at a
uniform distance.
Solid-state Sensing
To reduce the size and cost of the optical scanners, in the solid-state scanners
the user touches directly the surface of the sensor. The ridge pattern is captured by
an array of sensor pixels by using one of the following effects.
(a) Capacitive. Micro-capacitive plates are embedded in a chip with the finger
being the other plate. When the finger is placed, the capacitors get charged
in function of the distance with the ridges and valleys producing different
capacitive patterns. Since measuring the charges on the micro-capacitors is
inaccurate, each sensor has a specific method for ensuring correct discrimi-
nation between ridges and valleys. A critical part of the capacitive sensors
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is the surface coating, and its thickness is determined as a tradeoff between
protection and ability to distinguish between ridges and valleys. Although the
capacitive sensors can adjust their parameters to compensate for non-ideal
skin conditions, their performance depends on the cleanness of the surface
(which requires frequent cleaning). Similarly to optical sensors, the capacitive
sensors cannot be deceived by printed images of fingerprints. Capacitive sen-
sors also work well with young, healthy, clean fingers, but their performance
may considerably degrade with dry, sweaty, or damaged fingers and for fingers
of elderly and people under stress and medication [Ratha and Bolle 2004].
(b) Thermal. As the ridges and valleys touch the sensor surface, a pyro-electric
material generates current based on the temperature differentials as the valleys
are away from the surface. The major problem is that, by reaching thermal
equilibrium, this difference shorty disappears.
(c) Electric field. An RF signal is transmitted by a drive ring, gets modulated by
the derma (subsurface of the skin) and is received by a matrix of antennas.
This captures the ridge pattern beneath the skin surface.
(d) Piezo-electric. The different distances of ridges and valleys result in different
mechanical pressure on pressure-sensitive sensors and produce different cur-




Acoustic pulses, sent to the fingertip, get reflected and are captured by the
receive sensor. The sound waves penetrate the skin surface and give partial echoes
at impedance change, thus imaging the skin subsurface and making these sensors
robust against dirt. These sensors produce images with good quality, but the scan-
ner is large and expensive and also slow (takes several seconds to acquire an image),
which makes them not very popular.
The most typical mode of fingerprint acquisition is when the finger touches
(without moving on) the scanner surface [Maltoni et al. 2003]; these scanners are
called area or touch scanners. This is simple but has several disadvantages: the
sensor may become dirty, a latent fingerprint may remain on the surface that may
impede the subsequent reading, and there are also hygienic concerns. Furthermore,
the size of the sensor area (which is large) is directly related to its cost.
The other mode is by swiping the finger over the sensor and is used in the
thermal and some optical scanners [Maltoni et al. 2003]; these scanners are called
swipe, slide, or sweep scanners. Swiping overcomes the major disadvantages of the
touching mode and can significantly reduce the cost as the sensor can have height of
only several pixels. The full image is reconstructed by software. The major problems
of this method is the training of the users to swipe their fingers properly and the
errors that result from reconstructing the image from its slices.
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2.3.2 Parameters of Fingerprint Images
The fingerprint image parameters of interest, as described in [FBI PIV 2006]
and [Maltoni et al. 2003], are:
• Resolution. The minimum (spatial) resolution for FBI-compliant scanners
is 500 dpi and it is typical for most commercial scanners today;
• Area. Area is an extremely important parameter as images with larger area
contain more information (ridges and valleys). The FBI specifies 1”x1” as the
minimum area that allows capturing sufficient part of the finger tip. However,
to reduce the cost and minimize the device size, the commercial scanners
typically capture considerably smaller area (one third to one half of that).
This may lead to increased FRR as the overlap between the reference template
and the match template is smaller;
• Depth. This is the number of bits per pixel. Almost all fingerprint scan-
ners capture only scales of gray. The FBI requires 8 bits/pixel, but some
commercial scanners use only 2 or 3 bits and then extrapolate to 8 bits.
• Geometric accuracy. This is the maximum geometric distortion and is
given as a percentage. Most optical fingerprint sensors introduce geometric
distortion.
• Image quality. This parameter cannot be defined precisely because it is
also related to the finger quality, e.g., too wet or too dry fingers cannot be
captured well by the scanners. In [FBI PIV 2006], the FBI has specified only
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MTF (Modulation Transfer Function) and SNR which reflect the fidelity of




In this chapter we formulate the problem with attack models and assumptions
and set forth the objectives and requirements for the solution.
3.1 Attack Models
The systems of interest for us are various portable devices that use fingerprint
authentication, e.g., mobile phones (cell phones and smartphones), PDAs, laptops,
hardware tokens, etc. The two main differences in the authentication to such devices
in comparison with other systems and scenarios is that (a) the authentication here
takes place in unsupervised environments and (b) portable devices are easily stolen
and physical attacks on them are possible. We have identified three groups of







Figure 3.1: Attacks in a portable device related to the biometric authentication
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1. Fake fingertip. The adversary provides physical reproductions, both as ar-
tificial fingers and as reproductions of fingerprint patterns, to the biometric
scanner but does not manipulate the acquired image (after the scanner);
2. Attack on the scanner. The adversary injects fingerprint images at the
output of the scanner (thus effectively bypassing it). This attack includes a
malicious replacement of the authentic scanner and a replay of a stolen image
of the authentic fingerprint;
3. Attack on the data storage. The adversary can access and manipulate the
information pertaining to the biometric authentication that is stored in the
system memory (e.g., in a RAM or on a hard disk). This includes overwriting
results of the work of the system processor(s).
The target of our work is (2) – an attack on the scanner. Countering it
essentially requires a verification of the authenticity of the scanner which acquired
a particular fingerprint image, a process that we call scanner authentication.
3.2 Assumptions
The general assumption is that the biometric information is not secret. We
further assume:
1. Possibly except for the biometric enrolment, the process of collecting biometric
samples will be not be supervised by an agent or an officer;
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2. The adversary has full physical access to all externals of the device, including
the biometric scanner;
3. The adversary can replace the authentic scanner by other scanner (i.e., discon-
nect it and connect the other scanner in its place) without this being detected
by the system by other means (other than our solution). The adversary can
also at will connect the authentic scanner back to the system;
4. The adversary has access to the output of the biometric scanner and can
replace the acquired digital signal, but cannot retrieve information from or
modify the contents of the data storage (which can be, for example, protected
by a TPM). The adversary also is unable to replace hardware components
other than the biometric scanner or modify the software running in the sys-
tem without this activity being detected by other means (e.g., with a TC
technology);
5. The adversary has complete information about the biometrics but cannot pro-
duce the authentic live finger to the scanner of this particular device. This
includes (a) possession of images of the same authentic finger but acquired
with a different scanner (including a scanner of another type), possibly in
ideal conditions and with very high resolution and (b) possession of extracted
features (e.g., minutiae) or any complete or partial information of the authen-
tic finger obtained from a latent fingerprint (i.e., retrieved from a solid surface)
or otherwise;
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6. The adversary is able to provide artificial fingers (e.g., made of clay or gela-
tine) and electronic reproductions obtained by synthesis or forging (including
modifying) extracted features of the authentic finger;
7. The adversary can produce to the scanner live biometrics of someone else who
is not the legitimate user of this device.
3.3 Objectives and Requirements
Our objectives and requirements from this technology are:
• Scanners of the same model. The scanner authentication has to be
able to distinguish between canners of exactly the same acquisition technology, man-
ufacturer, and model.
• Accuracy. Exact target error rates (FAR and FRR) are difficult to be
specified at this stage as this is a research project and they will depend on the
implementation constraints, such as time and memory; furthermore, the balance
between FAR and FRR depends on the specific ROC and generally is an application-
specific requirement. Nevertheless, as a generic metric and objective, we want to
achieve an EER below 1%.
• Efficiency. Since our goal is to use the technology in portable devices, the
computational (and to some extent memory) efficiency are of extreme importance.
We believe that the computational efficiency and speed are key for the adoption of
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such a technology because the scanner authentication is only one part of the au-
thentication process, which as a whole generally has to take very little time (about 1
second or even less) as to not annoy the user and thus discourage the use of the fin-
gerprint authentication altogether. The problem is that the conventional fingerprint
verification algorithms are typically very computationally intensive and take up con-
siderable part of the time allowance. In addition to the fingerprint authentication,
many companies also employ anti-spoof techniques (implemented in software and/or
hardware) to detect fake fingers (i.e., the other type of attack), which techniques
also add processing time. And finally, the problem can be particularly severe in
portable devices which are constrained both in computational power and in energy.
Therefore, the scanner authentication has to impose as little additional computa-
tional burden as possible. Although the time requirements for the scanner enrolment
can be relaxed (i.e., users could tolerate longer time to enroll their biometrics and
devices), the scanner verification should take very little time.
• Cost. A major system requirement is to use commercial off-the-shelf com-
ponents as portable devices are most likely to be equipped only with such compo-
nents. In particular, only general-purpose, low-cost fingerprint scanners may be
assumed as available, i.e., scanners that do not provide any advanced functional-
ity, such as very high resolution or high rate of frame capture. It can be assumed
that the fingerprint images these scanners acquire have resolution of 500 dpi and
represent sufficient part of the finger (for performing fingerprint verification). Next
to the cost of the scanners, of importance for us is also the cost of integration of
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the technology in biometric systems. History has shown that the more complex
a technology is, the higher is the cost of its implementation in products and test.
Therefore, simplicity is another central objective.
• Robustness. To ensure broad deployment of the technology, it needs
to be robust in a wide range of conditions – fingers with different patterns and
sizes, different fingertip pressure on the scanner platen, changes in the fingertip skin
(scratches, bruises, and wear), and environmental changes (temperature, moisture,
dirt/grease, etc.).
• Fixed-point implementations. Another important objective is to have
the algorithms implementable in precision-limited systems, in particular systems
that employ only fixed-point arithmetic, i.e., in FPGAs and general-purpose micro-
processors as floating-point coprocessors are usually not present in mobile phones.
Therefore, numerically intensive and potentially unstable algorithms have to be
avoided as implementing them in fixed-point arithmetic may prove particularly dif-
ficult and potentially unreliable.
• Deployment in existing systems. Since there are hundreds of millions
fingerprint scanners already sold to customers, an optional yet very desirable ob-
jective is to be able to add the technology (as an “add-on”) to systems already




4.1 Variability in Semiconductors and Devices
The central part of our study is what we call scanner pattern – the unique
patterns of fingerprint scanners that can be used to distinguish one scanner from
another one. We believe that the scanner pattern stems from the variability of
element characteristics at semiconductor level and is caused by imperfections of the
conversion from the input to the scanner (i.e., the object applied to it) to its output
(i.e., the digital image). For this reason, we first review the prior work on variability
in semiconductors and devices as it provides the basis from which, in first place, the
existence of a scanner pattern can be inferred.
4.1.1 Variability in Semiconductors
We start by summarizing studies on variability at semiconductor level (i.e.,
in transistors) because, regardless of its specific acquisition method, any fingerprint
scanner contains an array of minute sensor elements that can be the dominant factor
determining the scanner pattern.
The process parameter variations in semiconductors fall into two general cat-
egories: variations among chips (lot-to-lot, wafer-to-wafer, and interdie variations)
and intradie variations (due to gradient effects, random component variations, and
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across-field/across-chip linewidth variations) [Drennan 2002]. Lot-to-lot and wafer-
to-wafer variations affect all devices manufactured in a lot/from a wafer (e.g., over-
etching reduces the length of all transistors and process temperature and pressure
differences induce variations), and they result in systematic variations in the device
characteristics [Kinget 2005].
In the context of the analog design, mismatch is an intradie parameter vari-
ation and designates the difference in the electrical performance of two identical
devices on the same chip; the first order effects that cause mismatch are geometry
and bias [Drennan 2002]. This work also provides an overview, which we summarize
here, of the device mismatch in BiCMOS technologies. For perimeter-dependent
parameters such as the dimensions of a MOSFET gate and a BJT emitter, the
length variability (i.e., its statistical variance) is inversely proportional to the device
width and the width variability is inversely proportional to the device length. The
variability of the area-dependent parameters, e.g., the BJT base dopant and MOS-
FET gate oxide thickness and channel dopant, is inversely proportional to the area.
These geometric dependencies stem from the fundamental process parameters. The
second cause for variability is the device sensitivity to the process parameter vari-
ations. For instance, the MOSFET drain current variation in function of the gate
length is determined by the inverse dependence of the gate length variation from its
width and the inverse dependence of the device sensitivity from the gate length.
The same work also discusses the mismatch gradients which are “spatially de-
pendent, systematic changes in each process parameter across the die.” Gradients
superimpose with the random component variations and thus form the total vari-
26
ations. Depending on the distance between two devices on the die, the mismatch
may be dominated by the random component effect or by the gradient effect.
The difference between the two types of parameters – the process parameters
(the physically independent parameters) and the electrical parameters (the ones of
interest to the designer) – used in mismatch modeling of MOSFET transistors is
studied in [Drennan and McAndrew 2003]. As examples for process parameters, the
authors give the flatband voltage, mobility, substrate dopant concentration, length
and width offsets, and source/drain sheet resistance, and as examples for electrical
parameters – the drain current, input voltage and trans- and output conductances.
The authors also point out that the threshold voltage, however, is neither a process
nor an electrical parameter. They also note that in many instances of technology,
devices, geometry, and bias, the intradie parameter variations dominate the interdie
variations.
The authors further note that the local variations decrease with the increase in
the device size because the averaging takes place over a greater area. The global pro-
cess parameter variation, however, is independent from the length/width. The mis-
match is due mainly to local variations because in many cases (technology, device, ge-
ometry, and bias) the local variations dominate. Generally, all mismatch models are
based on the propagation of variance relationship [Drennan and McAndrew 2003]
derived from the dependence of an electrical parameter e from an independent pro-













In case of MOSFETs and most BJTs, pi are assumed to have normal distribu-
tion; for some BJTs, however, log-normal distributions are better suited for modeling
purposes. The same study also presents examples for the standard deviation of the
drain current of an NMOS transistor (0.25 µm CMOS technology) in function of
the bias (Vds), gate length, and geometry; for small values of the parameters, the
standard deviation is well above 1-2%.
Kinget in [Kinget 2005] studies the bandwidth-accuracy-power tradeoff in MOS-
FETs and BJTs, which is largely fixed and determined by technological parameters,
and the impact of the transistor mismatch on this design tradeoff at circuit level.
This tradeoff applies to a wide range of applications, in particular to A-to-D con-
verters, sensor arrays, and read-out electronics. To create mismatch models, the
author focuses on the dominant factors. For example, in MOSFETs, Kinget finds
out that the drain-source current or gate-source voltage mismatch is mainly caused
by the threshold voltage differences and the current factor differences, each having
a normal distribution with zero mean and variance which is a function of the device
area. The data presented in the paper shows that the proportionality constants for
the threshold voltage and for the current factor (that form their variances) decrease
from about 30 mV µm to about 5 mV µm and from about 3% µm to 1% µm, respec-
tively, when moving from 2.5 µm to 0.18 µm technology. In BJTs, the relative base
current mismatch and the relative collector current mismatch (the standard devi-
ation divided by the nominal) are inversely proportional to the emitter area with
proportionality constants in the range from 2% µm to 5% µm and from 1% µm
to 4% µm, respectively. The dominant factors for variations in BJTs are the base
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sheet resistance, the base-emitter current density, and the emitter size. When it
comes to circuit level, in another work [Kinget 2007], Kinget points out that the
offset of comparators depends on the matching of the gate-source voltage of the two
transistors in the differential input pair and the accuracy of the gain of amplifiers
with resistive feedback is determined by the matching of the resistor ratios.
Considering the attention which the variability at silicon level has received in
the public domain only, it is clear that this variability is a design problem. Obtaining
details about it for commercially available fingerprint scanners and studies that
quantify it on high level, however, has been difficult. Therefore, in the next section,
we summarize the work on variability in one type of image acquisition devices that
are most closely related to our problem: digital cameras.
4.1.2 Variability in Digital Cameras
The established term for the variability of interest for us in digital cameras is
“pattern noise,” which suggests temporal variations, but since the pattern noise is
a systematic distortion, this term is somewhat misleading. Pattern noise in digital
cameras is used to denote “any spatial pattern that does not change significantly
from frame to frame” [Holst 1996]. Generally, the pattern noise has two components:
fixed-pattern noise (FPN) and photo-response non-uniformity (PRNU). The FPN,
also called offset FPN, is the variation in the pixel-to-pixel values when the camera
sensor array is in the dark, and, therefore, the FPN is created by the dark current
differences. The FPN is generally due to variations in the detector size, doping
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density, and impurities; the FPN is additive and does not depend on the signal. The
PRNU is the variation in the pixel responsivity when the sensor array is illuminated.
The PRNU is generally caused by variations in the detector size, spectral response,
and coatings’ thickness; the PRNU is multiplicative and signal dependent. Both
the FPN and the PRNU are present in both CCD and CMOS image sensors; the
CMOS image sensors have even more sources of FPN because of the active readout
circuits [El Gamal and Eltoukhy 2005].
Besides the pattern noise that is invariant across frames, the photo image
sensors have temporal noise that changes from frame to frame and is independent
across the pixels in the array. The temporal noise includes photodetector shot noise,
pixel reset noise, readout circuit thermal and flicker noise, and quantization noise.
An early work on quantifying FPN in photomatrices is [Fry et al. 1970], where
the term “FPN” was introduced as the signal obtained under uniform or zero illumi-
nation of all photodiodes. The authors studied the variability and causes for them
in two methods for image acquisition and the corresponding circuits: voltage sam-
pling and recharge sampling. They created models of the variabilities considering
the typical contemporary tolerances. For example, for the voltage sampling circuit,
they found that the variability of the voltage readout depends on the variability
in the threshold voltages of the recharging switch and the amplifying transistors,
the gate-source capacitance mismatch (due to the gate-source misalignment, gate
metallization inaccuracy, etc.), the dark current mismatch of the photodiode, the
gain factor variations of the amplifying transistor, and the mismatch in the output
resistance of the saturated output switch transistor. The variations in the quan-
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tum efficiency at a particular wavelength and the diode junction capacitance had
relatively little contribution to the FPN.
In [El Gamal et al. 1998], the authors estimated the pattern noise in two types
of 0.35 µm CMOS image sensors (passive and active) as a sum of two uncorrelated
components – a column and a pixel component – each modeled as an isotropic
AR(1), representing the correlations among the neighboring pixels and columns.
They studied the readout signal paths and found that, for example in passive pixel
sensors, the pixel pattern noise is caused by the photodiode leakage, variations in
the photodiode area, channel charge injection, and capacitive coupling from the
overlap capacitance of the switch transistor. Since all pixels in a row share the same
output amplifier, the column pattern noise is caused by the offset in the integrating
amplifier, size variations in its integrating capacitor, and mismatches in the output
reset transistor, giving high spatial correlations. The proposed models, however,
cannot be used for camera identification but rather for measuring the quality of
a batch of sensors. The major problem with using these models for our purposes
is that they do not separately model FPN and PRNU (the authors use the terms
“offset FPN” and “gain FPN,” respectively). They also admit that characterizing
the PRNU with these models needs several levels of illumination, requiring a large
amount of data. In contrast, in CCD sensors the pattern noise can be modeled as a
spatial white noise process because it is mainly due to variations in the photodetector
area and the dark current, which are spatially uncorrelated, as all pixels share the
same output amplifier.
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4.1.3 Variability in Fingerprint Scanners
In this section, we summarize the work from which the existence of a pattern
in fingerprint scanners can be inferred. For optical and CMOS imaging fingerprint
scanners, some of the references presented in the previous section may also apply.
MITRE has developed test procedures [MITRE PIV 2006] for verifying the
image quality specifications for fingerprint scanners required by the FBI’s personal
identity verification program (PIV) [FBI PIV 2006], which program has been devel-
oped for the purpose of identifying federal employees and contractors when accessing
government facilities. Two controlled scanner characteristics provide evidence about
the existence of a scanner pattern: the gray level uniformity and the Spatial Fre-
quency Response (SFR). The other two characteristics, the geometric accuracy and
the input-output relation (i.e., the linearity of the conversion), are also indicative
for the inherently present imperfections in the conversion process but are difficult
to be measured for our purposes.
The gray level uniformity represents the (spatial) non-homogeneity of the con-
version, and as such it captures the variability of the sensor array elements (which
corresponds to the pattern noise in cameras). For testing is, the input is a uniform
gray level test signal (called a target). In this way, the test essentially quantifies
the difference between the pixel values of the acquired image and the constant pixel
values of the theoretical image that would be acquired if the scanner were perfect.
For example, the pixel-to-pixel uniformity test requires that 99% of the pixels in
fixed-sized areas do not vary from the average in more than 8 or 22 gray levels,
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depending on the darkness of the gray input target. Considering the range of 256
gray levels, the 22-level requirement allows 8.6% variation in the pixel values, which
is considerable. Another test, the small area uniformity test, measures the difference
in the average gray levels among different areas and allows a tolerance of 12 gray
levels (with light gray input target).Measuring the gray level uniformity is relatively
easy and potentially representative of the scanner pattern.
The SFR represents how rapid intensity changes (in space) the scanner can
capture, i.e., scanner’s ability to represent contrast. The SFR has a typical low-pass
filter shape: slow changes in the intensity of adjacent areas are scanned with correct
pixel values, while rapid changes result in adjacent pixels having close values. The
tolerances for the SFR are also considerable, which is another indication for the
level of imperfection of the acquisition process. Since the purpose of this test is to
measure the scanner SFR with a single input target, it is difficult to derive from
these requirements the allowed SFR variability across the whole sensor array. Nev-
ertheless, one can measure the SFRs of several image blocks and then use the SFR
variability (at various frequencies) across the image blocks to construct a scanner
pattern. The drawback of this approach is that SFR cannot be measured directly
during enrolment or authentication as it requires specifically designed input targets.
Finally, indirect evidence about the variability in fingerprint scanners is the
raw image incompatibility, which is a major source of interoperability problems,
i.e., the decrease in the performance of the matching algorithms when using one
fingerprint scanner for enrolment and another one for verification or identifica-
tion (see [Ross and Jain 2004] and [Yau et al. 2004], also the results of the fin-
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gerprint verification competitions, FVC). A study on the most important qual-
ity parameters (“operational quality”) of fingerprint scanners for the accuracy of
the matching algorithms is [Cappelli et al. 2008]. Methods that compensate for
the distortion from the fingerprint deformation are available, but very little work
(available in the public domain) has been done on compensating for the scanner-
specific distortion [Harris Interoperability]. One study that addresses this problem
is [Ross and Nadgir 2008] and proposes a nonlinear calibration scheme based on a
thin-plate spline model that creates an average deformation relationship between
the two scanners in question.
4.2 Security Applications of Variability
4.2.1 Identification and Authentication
The problem of associating a unique number with a particular device generally
has been solved by storing the number in a flash memory or in a mask ROM.
The major disadvantages of either method are the additional cost, the man-made
(randomness of the) number, usually generated during device manufacturing, and
the ability to record and track this number (by third parties). Moreover, flash
memories can be reprogrammed and thus the initially stored number cannot serve
as a non-alterable identifier.
Another work, [Loftstrom et al. 2000], proposes using the randomness of the
silicon process for that. As already discussed, the MOSFET voltage threshold de-
pends on the dopant atoms in the channel and is a major cause for the device
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mismatch. Because of this, an array of MOSFETs will have different drain cur-
rents that can be used to produce a sequence of random voltages, which can then
be translated into an identifying number. The sequence of voltages is unique and
repeatable because every transistor channel has different number of dopant atoms
(which is a major cause for device mismatch).
A downside of this approach is that having sufficiently large dopant variations
may require “process-induced, nonrandom fluctuations, such as gate length and
width fluctuation” [Maeda et al. 2003]. For this, the latter work proposes another
method – obtaining unique numbers by using polycrystalline silicon (poly-Si) thin-
film transistors (TFT). The device-to-device variations there are created by the
silicon grains present in the channel of the poly-Si TFTs; grain boundaries determine
a potential barrier that traps carriers, and only those of them that go over it become
current (called “thermionic emission current”). As the grain distribution is naturally
random, which produces different currents, and eventually forms a virtually unique
number that is non-alterable and non-duplicable. Although there is no additional
cost (as a separate device) since the grain variations exist naturally in the die, this
solution has hidden costs as incorporating it into fingerprint scanners will require
design effort and die area; it must also be compatible with the silicon technology
used for the image acquisition. And finally, it is not a solution for the millions
fingerprint scanners that have been already manufactured and placed into service.
Another solution for device identification (and authentication) is proposed in
[Gassend et al. 2004] and is based on measuring the circuit delays in a digital IC.
As in [Maeda et al. 2003], the integrated circuits are manufactured identically (i.e.,
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with identical logical functionality), but because of variations at silicon level, the
different delay characteristics produce different responses which are then captured
by an arbiter circuit, generating from them a unique binary string that is difficult
to be cloned. This method allows storing a secret on a chip that is more resilient to
invasive attacks than traditional techniques.
All of the methods above require additional die area and have two major
disadvantages. First, they all require additional hardware design effort that is spe-
cific for the particular silicon technology and may be difficult to be incorporated
in many fingerprint scanners. Their second, and more important, problem is that
these methods are not applicable to the fingerprint scanners that have already been
manufactured and even sold to customers because these methods cannot be used as
hardware, much less software, “upgrades” of existing systems.
4.2.2 Digital Forensics
The question whether the variability in digital cameras is sufficiently large
to identify a particular camera has also been answered affirmatively. The paper
[Sencar and Memon 2007] gives an overview of the recent research in digital foren-
sics in its three main areas: image source identification (including camera model
identification and individual camera identification), detection of synthetic images,
and detection of image forgeries. From them, the work most closely related to our
study is on identifying digital cameras and flatbed scanners from the digital images
acquired with them. The general approach that has been used has been on identi-
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fying unique characteristics, e.g., component imperfections, defects, or specifics in
the hardware and software processing.
The imperfections in the imaging sensor provide a typical uniqueness that is
relatively easy to extract. A pioneering work on identifying CCD video cameras us-
ing the FPN, caused by dark currents in the imaging sensor, is [Kurosawa et al. 1999].
The dark current noise is the difference between the pixel values when the sensor
is not exposed to light. By averaging many images (the authors propose using 100
frames), the FPN, which is additive, can be isolated and used because it was found to
be sufficiently unique. An interesting method, proposed in [Lukas et al. 2005] and
[Lukas et al. 2006] and reporting an identification accuracy of 100% for 9 cameras, is
based on a much stronger component of the pattern noise – the pixel non-uniformity
noise, which is a component of the PRNU (and thus multiplicative to the signal)
and is caused by the different sensitivity of the sensor elements. The image is first
denoised by a wavelet-based algorithm that extracts from the image a Gaussian
noise with specified variance. Then a noise residue is formed by subtracting the
denoised image from the original image. The denoising algorithm used, which is
actually borrowed from [Mihcak et al. 1999], is one of the weak points because it
extracts a noise residual that is assumed additive to the signal, while the pattern
noise (PRNU, in particular) in their model is multiplicative to the signal. Even
the authors concede that “the denoising filter does a sub-optimal job in extracting
the pattern noise.” The pattern noise obtained in this way is then compared with
the reference pattern noise, obtained in a similar way, using correlation – the typ-
ical method used for spread-spectrum watermark detection. This approach is not
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applicable to our problem because:
1. The assumed model of image acquisition is specific for digital cameras, and
although it may be similar to the image acquisition in optical fingerprint scan-
ners, our study showed that it significantly differs from that in solid-state
fingerprint scanners and that the scanner pattern cannot be assumed to have
a simple multiplicative (like PRNU) and/or additive (like FPN) relationship
with the fingerprint pattern;
2. The pixel non-uniformity noise is extracted from images with easy-to-process
textures (i.e., smooth images). The wavelet denoising filter “assumes that
the image in the wavelet domain is a non-stationary Gaussian signal and the
pattern noise is a stationary Gaussian signal,” which pattern noise, in addition,
is also i.i.d. However, the fingerprint pattern is a series of ridges and valleys
and thus appears more as a spatial pulse train or a spatial sinusoid. Therefore,
the smoothness assumption for the texture of the images also does not hold in
our case because the fingerprint pattern is intrinsically very different. Finally,
the statistical characteristics of the scanner pattern depend on the specific
type of fingerprint scanner and may have nonnegligible spatial correlation;
3. The proposed method for estimating the reference pattern noise requires many
(in the order of tens to a hundred, and at least 50) digital images, which makes
it completely inapplicable for biometric authentication. We believe that this
large number of images is necessary because considerable part of the signal
remain in the noise residual, which has to be compensated by averaging over
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many images.
4. Only two pairs of all 9 cameras tested were of the same model – the other
cameras were not only of different models, but also from different manufac-
turers.
Finally, the algorithm is also very complex and computationally intensive.
A further study and enhancement of the described work are proposed in
[Chen et al. 2008]. The sensor output model is made more accurate by incorporat-
ing gamma correction and color channel gain, but it still considers only the additive
FPN and the multiplicative PRNU. An approximation is proposed that simplifies
this model, although it also introduces implicit dependence between signal and noise.
The same wavelet-based denoising filter is used to remove the host signal from the
image. The identification is solved as a joint estimation-detection problem: the
PRNU is estimated using a maximum likelihood estimator and the PRNU is de-
tected using optimal test statistics. This allows reducing the number of necessary
images, but they are still in the order of tens, which again makes it inapplicable
to our problem. Furthermore, the requirement for smoothness of the images still
holds, and strong assumptions about stationarity and independence are also made.
A predictor of the test statistics is used to determine the unknown shaping factors
and distribution of the test statistics. Pre-processing for reducing the artifacts that
are systematically present in cameras of the same model but are not unique to the
sensor (e.g., color interpolation, row- and column-wise operation of the sensors, and
JPEG blockiness artifacts) is also proposed; this decreases the FAR and improves
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the robustness against compression. The results of the large-scale application of this
method were published in [Goljan et al. 2009], which reports a FRR of 0.0238 at
FAR of 2.4 ∗ 10−5.
An extension of [Lukas et al. 2006] to flatbed desktop scanners is proposed in
[Khanna et al. 2007]. The flatbed scanners employ a one-dimensional linear sensor
array, and the image is constructed by translating the scanner head over the image.
Thus, the row reference pattern noise can be extracted from a single image by av-
eraging. The authors used the already discussed wavelet-based denoising filter and
an anisotropic local polynomial estimator based on multiscale optimization, which
improved the results. In addition to the correlation detector for identification, they
also used SVM for classification by constructing two sets of features: (1) the sta-
tistical properties of the row pattern such as mean, median, standard deviation,
skewness, and kurtosis; and (2) the statistical properties of the correlations between
different rows. The SVM method gave much better results, averaging to 96% clas-
sification accuracy. Since the acquisition method of flatbed scanners is similar to
that of the swipe fingerprint scanners, this approach seems to be applicable to the
swipe fingerprint scanners. However, there is one major difference that can be a
particular challenge: in contrast to the constant speed of the scanner head of the
flatbed scanners, the speed of rolling the fingertip over the sensor cannot be made
constant because it is controlled by the user.
Here is the place to mention the only work on identifying biometric scanners
[Bartlow et al. 2009] that we are aware of because it uses exactly the same algorithm
as the one proposed in [Lukas et al. 2006] for identifying digital cameras. Barlow et
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al. applied the algorithm of [Lukas et al. 2006] to 16 optical and 4 capacitive finger-
print scanners. Although they used many images from several subjects, generalizing
their approach as a solution for fingerprint scanner identification is difficult because
the maximum number of scanners of the same technology, manufacturer, type, and
model was only 3 (optical scanners, in two of their sets). Two of the 3 capacitive
scanner brands used were from the same manufacturer, but of different models, and
only 2 of the 4 capacitive scanners were of the same model. Since the algorithm
of [Lukas et al. 2006] works for digital cameras, its high accuracy when applied to
optical scanners is not surprising. The highest accuracy reported for optical scan-
ners using a single image for computing the noise reference pattern was 99.65%;
however, most of the errors in the confusion matrix were among scanners of the
same (optical) model. In the other dataset they used, to achieve accuracy of 98%,
64 training images were needed; with a single training image, the accuracy dropped
to 85%. But the most problematic is their third dataset where even for optical
scanners (of the same model), there were many identification errors, and the overall
accuracy with a single training image dropped to 45%. Reasonable accuracy was
achieved with 128 training images, but even there, it was below 90%. Clearly, these
results cannot serve as proof for the ability of the algorithm of [Lukas et al. 2006]
to identify individual fingerprint scanners of the same model, especially when only
a single training image is available and within a large pool of scanners. A possible
explanation for this is that the image acquisition process in capacitive fingerprint
scanners is very different from that of optical scanners (and in digital cameras in this
respect), for which reason the assumption that the algorithm of [Lukas et al. 2006]
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can detect and extract photo-response nonuniformity noise in fingerprint scanners,
capacitive in particular, is not plausible.
Another approach, proposed in [Gou et al. 2007] and [Gou et al. 2009], char-
acterizes the pattern noise of flatbed scanners using three groups of features: (1)
the first and second moments of the log-absolute of the noise residual with several
denoising filters (averaging, Gaussian, median, and Weiner adaptive filter); (2) the
mean, variance, and the error due to fitting Gaussian distributions to high frequency
subband wavelet coefficients; and (3) the first two moments of the prediction error
applied to smooth regions. PCA is then applied to the resulting 60 features, and
then SVM with RBF kernel is used for classification, yielding accuracy of 90% for 7
scanner models.
The use of other types of imperfections in imaging sensors has also been tried
out with mixed success. For example, matching traces of defective pixels (hot,
cold, dead pixels, cluster defects, etc.) cannot be reliably used for identification
as most cameras today use techniques for detecting and compensating such defects.
Moreover, some cameras do not have defective pixels and the defective pixels cannot
be detected in any image. Sensor dust characteristics (e.g., dust and moisture
get attracted to the sensor once the lens is removed) have also been studied for
associating an image with a particular camera. Studies also have been done on
identifying cameras in cell phones using binary similarity measures, image-quality
measures, and higher order wavelet statistics [Celiktutan et al. 2008].
Although not directly related to identifying a particular camera, another gen-
eral problem is associating a digital image with a class of sources (e.g., the camera
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model or brand) with common characteristics. A novel idea for such camera clas-
sification is proposed in [Kharrazi et al. 2004]. From each image, a vector of 34
numerical features designed to detect the post-processing is extracted: the average
pixel value, RGB pairs correlation and energy ratio, distribution of the center of
mass, and wavelet coefficient statistics, and image quality metrics. A multiclass
SVM is then trained to classify the different cameras.
[Swaminathan et al. 2007] propose estimating from images the parameters and
algorithms used by different camera components, such as the color filter array and
the color interpolation, and using these estimates in an SVM-based classification to
determine the brand and model of the camera used to acquire a particular image.
[Filler et al. 2008] solve a similar camera-model classification problem but based on
PRNU. From the estimated PRNU, features, designed to reflect differences in the
color filter array, color interpolation, and the sensor signal transfer, are extracted
and input to an SVM classifier. The proposed features are the first central mo-
ments in each color channel, the cross-correlation between the color channels, the
block covariance, and the linear-pattern cross-correlation. The reported average
classification accuracy is about 91%.
There has also been effort to embed into the image a digital watermark (in-
visible or visible) that carries information about the digital camera which acquired
it. However, robust digital watermarking, i.e., one that cannot be easily detected,
removed, or copied, requires computational power that is typically not available
in fingerprint scanners, and, generally, comes at additional cost; this type of wa-
termarking has been limited to “secure cameras” [Blythe and Fridrich 2004] and
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[FotoNation Patent US’218] and definitely is not suited for the low-end fingerprint
scanners of our study. Furthermore, such watermarking cannot be applied to already






A fingerprint scanner essentially converts the biometric information, i.e., the
surface or subsurface of the skin of a fingertip, into one or several digital images. In
practice, this conversion process can never be perfect. The imperfections induced
by the fingerprint scanner in this process we classify into two general categories:
(a) imperfections that are persistent and largely time invariant, which we call scan-
ner pattern, and (b) imperfections that change rapidly over time, which we call
scanner noise.
The scanner pattern can be a function of many and diverse factors in the
scanner hardware and software, e.g., the specific sensing method, the used semi-
conductor technology, the chip layout, the circuit design, and the post-processing.
Furthermore, pinpointing the exact factors, much less quantifying them, is difficult
because such information is proprietary. Nevertheless, our general observation is
that the scanner pattern is mainly caused by non-idealities and variability in the
fingerprint sensor; however, the signal processing unit and even the interface unit









Figure 5.1: Block diagram of a fingerprint scanner
The intrinsic characteristics that cause the scanner pattern remain relatively
unchanged over time (by definition). Variations in these intrinsic characteristics,
however, may still exist and may be caused by environmental changes such as
changes in the temperature, air pressure, air humidity, and sensor surface mois-
ture; material aging; scratches, liquid permeability, and ESD impact on the sensor
surface, changes in the illumination (for optical scanners), etc. On the other hand,
the scanner noise is generally caused by non-idealities in the conversion process that
vary considerably within short periods of time (by definition). Typical examples for
scanner noise are the thermal noise (inherently present in any electronic circuit) and
the quantization noise (introduced by the A-to-D conversion).
An example for the combined effect of such imperfections, i.e., both the scanner
pattern and the scanner noise, is shown in Figure 5.2. Image A (shown on the left
side) is an image acquired with no object applied to the scanner platen. A small
rectangular block is enlarged and shown on the right side as image B. The three
adjacent pixels 1, 2, and 3 of image B have different scales of gray: pixel 1 is darker
than pixel 3 and pixel 2 is brighter than pixel 3.
Our primary objective is to estimate the scanner pattern without violating the
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Figure 5.2: Example for scanner imperfections
integrity of the fingerprint scanner by disassembling it, performing measurements
inside it, or applying any other intrusive methods, i.e., we have to estimate the
scanner pattern solely from digital images acquired with the fingerprint scanner.
Another objective is to demonstrate how the scanner pattern can be used to iden-
tify a particular scanner and, as such, to serve as a “fingerprint” of the fingerprint
scanner. We, however, opted to use the term “scanner pattern” instead of “scan-
ner fingerprint” as the latter may be confusing since the scanners of interest are
fingerprint scanners and the term “fingerprint scanner fingerprint” is awkward.
5.1.2 Bipartite Authentication
In the sections that follow, we demonstrate the uniqueness of the scanner
pattern and present the algorithms we have developed that are able to detect it and
use it to verify the authenticity of a fingerprint scanner from images, acquired with
it. In this section, we describe the framework of the scanner authentication.
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Hereby we introduce the term bipartite authentication to denote the combina-
tion of two authentications: a biometric authentication and a scanner authentica-
tion. Similarly to any authentication, the bipartite authentication consists of two
(sets of) operations, performed one after each other: (1) bipartite enrolment, con-
sisting of biometric enrolment and scanner enrolment, and (2) bipartite verification,
consisting of biometric verification and scanner verification.
The biometric authentication and the scanner authentication serve different
purposes. The purpose of the biometric authentication is to verify the authenticity
of person’s fingertip, while the purpose of the scanner authentication is to verify
the authenticity of the scanner with which a particular image has been acquired.
The scanner authentication can thus detect attacks on the scanner, e.g., a malicious
scanner replacement or a replay at the output of the scanner [Maltoni et al. 2003] of
a stolen image that still contains the fingerprint pattern of the legitimate user but has
been acquired with another, unauthentic fingerprint scanner. This type of attack
is becoming increasingly feasible in portable devices (e.g., PDAs, cell and smart
phones, and even laptops) because they can be easily stolen, giving the attacker
physical access to them and thus the ability to launch so powerful an attack.
The scanner authentication consists of:
• Scanner enrolment : estimating and recording the reference scanner pattern
of the legitimate, authentic fingerprint scanner. Similarly to the biometric
enrolment, several images (e.g., 3) can be used to more reliably estimate the
reference scanner pattern;
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• Scanner verification: estimating and comparing the query scanner pattern
with the reference scanner pattern and outputting a scanner match decision
if the two scanner patterns are sufficiently similar.
An example flow diagram of the process of bipartite verification is shown
in Figure 5.3 and needs little explanation. Certainly, the order of the biometric
verification and the scanner verification can be reversed: first the scanner is verified
and then the biometrics is verified. If the final decision is bipartite verification match,
then (it is highly probable that): (a) the fingerprint image contains the pattern of the
legitimate person and (b) the image has been acquired with the authentic fingerprint
scanner.
5.1.3 Scanner Authentication Scenarios
Ideally, both the biometric authentication and the scanner authentication have
to operate on one and the same (preferably single) image. Solving this problem
directly, however, proved to be difficult, so as first two steps, we solved simpler
problems. The three steps, described below as scenarios, the associated difficulty of
solving the corresponding problem, and the security level of each scenario, depending
on the image used for that (i.e., the applied object to the scanner platen), are given
in Table 5.1. A predetermined object is an object known a priori. Since it is known,
the difference (in general sense, not limited only to subtraction) between the image
acquired with the predetermined object and the theoretical image that would be






















Figure 5.3: Flow diagram of the bipartite verification
the image does not contain a fingerprint pattern). The predetermined object that
can serve such a purpose generally depends on the type of the scanner; for example,
for capacitive scanners, we found out that air, i.e., no object applied to the scanner
platen, is a perfect predetermined object because (a) most capacitive scanners can
acquire images with no fingertip pressed on their platen and (b) air is homogeneous
and as such it is the ideal input signal.
On the other hand, generally, a fingertip of a person is not known a priori (to
the level of detail to easily subtract it from an image with its fingerprint), and an
image acquired in this way is a composition of the fingerprint pattern, the scanner
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pattern, and the scanner noise. Finally, similarly to the biometric enrolment and
sometimes to the biometric verification, it is also possible to use more than one image
for the scanner enrolment and/or the scanner verification. Since the algorithms we
have developed are able to operate even with a single image for the scanner enrolment
and even with a single image for the scanner verification, the discussion that follows
considers only the case of a single image. However, using more than one image is
also possible, which may improve the authentication accuracy; these extensions of
the algorithms are discussed in the corresponding sections.
Applied object for Applied object for Problem Provided
Scenario scanner enrolment scanner verification difficulty security
A Predetermined Predetermined Low Weak
B Predetermined Fingertip Medium Medium
C Fingertip Fingertip High Strong
Table 5.1: Scanner authentication scenarios: problem difficulty & provided security
In Scenario A, both the scanner enrolment and the scanner verification use im-
ages acquired with a predetermined object. Thus, the images used for the biometric
enrolment and for the scanner enrolment are different: the image for the biometric
verification contains a query fingerprint, while the image for the scanner verification
is acquired with a predetermined object and contains no fingerprint. Similarly, the
images used for the biometric verification and for the scanner verification are also
different. The time interval between the two image acquisitions in either case can be
made very small (e.g., sufficient for lifting user’s fingertip or about a second) within
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which time a replacement of the scanner is unlikely to happen without being de-
tected by other, hardware-level methods. Detecting a replay of a stolen fingerprint
image can be done in a similar way.
The security that Scenario A provides, however, is weak as the images ac-
quired for the biometric enrolment (and verification) and for the scanner enrolment
(and verification) inherently will be different. Although for the biometric enrolment
we may assume that the user will not “cheat” his or her own system/device by
replacing the scanner between the biometric enrolment and the scanner enrolment,
this may not hold true for the biometric verification. However small the time dif-
ference between the biometric verification and the scanner verification is, there is
always an opportunity for an attacker to inject a fingerprint image acquired with
another scanner and then install the authentic scanner for scanner verification. Nev-
ertheless, Scenario A can be used in applications that do not require a high level of
security. Also, considering the simplicity of the implementation, this scenario looks
very promising in practice as a scanner replacement within very limited time period
(e.g., 1 or 2 seconds) can be detected by other methods.
In Scenario B, the scanner enrolment uses an image acquired with a predeter-
mined object, and therefore the images used for the biometric enrolment and for the
scanner enrolment are different. The biometric verification and the scanner verifica-
tion, however, use one and the same image, and thus for the scanner verification, the
scanner pattern is estimated from an image with a fingertip. This scenario provides
a higher level of security than Scenario A because the scanner cannot be replaced
between the biometric verification and the scanner verification. However, its secu-
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rity level is medium, yet it can still be used in applications that do not require a
high level of security.
In Scenario C, the biometric enrolment and the scanner enrolment use one
and the same image, which image is acquired with a fingertip applied to the scanner
pattern. The biometric verification and the scanner verification also use one and the
same image, which image is also acquired with a fingertip. This scenario provides
the strongest security.
5.1.4 Applications
The method for bipartite authentication can be used to improve the biometric
authentication of a user to a system by detecting attacks on the fingerprint scanner
that replace a digital image containing the fingerprint pattern of a legitimate user
and acquired with the authentic fingerprint scanner by a digital image that still
contains the fingerprint of the legitimate user but has been acquired with an unau-
thentic fingerprint scanner. This type of attack will become an important security
threat as the widespread use of the biometric technologies makes the biometric infor-
mation essentially publicly available. In particular, since the biometric information
has a low level of secrecy, an attacker may possess complete information about the
fingerprint of the legitimate user, including:
• Possession of digital images of the fingerprint of the legitimate user acquired
with an unauthentic fingerprint scanner, including images acquired in nearly
ideal conditions and with very high resolution;
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• Possession of any complete or partial information about user’s fingertip ob-
tained from a latent fingerprint, i.e., from an impression left by user’s fingertip
on a surface;
• Possession of fingerprint features (e.g., minutiae) extracted from user’s finger-
print image;
• Ability to artificially produce digital images that are synthesized from partial
or complete information about user’s fingerprint.
Incorporating methods for scanner authentication (and bipartite authentica-
tion in general) is suited for systems that operate in unsupervised/uncontrolled
(i.e., without the supervision of an agent or officer) environments. The methods are
particularly important for portable devices, such as PDAs, cell and smart phones,
wireless handheld devices, hardware tokens, and generally any mobile devices, in-
cluding laptops and netbooks, because these devices can be easily stolen, which gives
an attacker physical access to them and the opportunity to interfere with the infor-
mation flow between the fingerprint scanner and the system. This possibility exists
even in systems that have trusted computing functionality (e.g., equipped with a
Trusted Platform Module, TPM, that provides complete control over the software,
running in the system) since the attacker needs not modify the software in order
to achieve successful authentication; only replacement of the digital image may be
sufficient.
Another possible application of the scanner authentication is in hardware to-
kens. Many companies and organizations provide hardware tokens to their customers
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or employees for user authentication and for digital signing of their transactions, usu-
ally by using challenge-response security protocols over a network. Typically, the
customers authenticate themselves to the hardware token using a PIN code, a pass-
word, and/or a bank card. We envision that in some hardware tokens, fingerprint
authentication will be used instead as it provides convenience and saves time.
Generally, such increased security is required to gain the confidence of the
users in their devices as secure universal terminals for online access to virtually all
consumer services: from bank applications to mobile commerce to access to health
care anywhere and at any time, for access to medical records, etc.
Local Authentication
A novel paradigm for authentication is proposed in [Ivanov et al. 2010]. It
calls for splitting the authentication of a user to a network in two authentications,
shown in Figure 5.4: (1) the user authenticates to a portable device, which we call
local authentication, and then (2) the portable device authenticates to the network.
Figure 5.4: Local authentication: user-to-network authentication in two parts
The conventional methods for authentication of a user to a device are by using
a PIN code or a password. We propose to instead use biometric authentication
and fingerprint authentication in particular. By separating the authentication in
two, the biometric information of the user need not be sent over the network to be
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stored on a remote server, which would be out of the control of the user. Instead,
the biometric information is kept only in the device. The major challenge in this
approach is that the device is portable and the local authentication takes place in an
unsupervised environment. Thus, if an attacker steals the device and gains physical
access to it, the attacker can launch a very powerful attack. The second part, the
authentication of the device to the network can be implemented in different ways,
e.g., by physical layer authentication as proposed in [Yu et al. 2008].
The portable device is user’s personal property and in user’s possession all of
the time. In this way, the biometric information is kept only in the device, not in
a computer or a server on the network, and can be locked onto the device. The
locking can be implemented using special hardware (e.g., TPM) which ensures that
the stored information cannot be compromised because the hardware inherently
offers higher degree of security. Thus, the device essentially becomes “an extension”
of the user and can be carried by the user at all times. Moreover, this approach
requires little or no changes to the infrastructure, in particular, no modification of
the security protocols for authentication of a device to a network. It also relaxes the
expectations and assumptions about the trustworthiness of the user from the point
of view of the network. And finally, the local authentication is capable of “hiding”
the identity (e.g., the real name of the user) as it naturally shields the personal
information from being sent over the network (or can instead use an identification
number) without the need of additional network infrastructure, such as a trusted
third party.
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Besides the purely technical arguments, the local authentication also helps
gain the confidence of the users perceptually and psychologically. Users want to
use a technology they are comfortable with but do not want to understand how
it exactly works. For example, a patient knows that the biometric authentication
works in other authentication scenarios, e.g., when appearing in person in a doctor’s
office. Now the patient is using her biometrics locally to authenticate to her doctor,
which “brings” the doctor right “in front of her.” Therefore, in addition to the
technical guarantee about preserving the secrecy of the biometric information that
our approach gives, it also makes the user more readily accept, and therefore take




In this section, we present our initial research that served two important pur-
poses: (1) it demonstrated the uniqueness of the scanner pattern and (2) it gave
us insight into the image acquisition process in capacitive scanners, which process
we later studied in detail and developed signal models for it. Although the results
we obtained during this initial work are not significant from a statistical point of
view (because of the limited number of scanners and the limited number of images,
acquired with them), the results were sufficiently good to inspire and justify the
effort to develop the advanced algorithms.
5.2.1 Test Setup and Images Acquired with Air
At that stage, we used only five capacitive fingerprint scanners: Scanner 1
through Scanner 4 with UPEK area sensors and Scanner 5 with a Veridicom area
sensor; details about them are provided in the appendix, Section 6.1.
As a starting point for our study on identifying unique characteristics rep-
resentative for the scanners, we used the gray level uniformity test of MITRE
[MITRE PIV 2006]. Constructing an appropriate target and applying it properly
to the scanners, however, proved to be both difficult and expensive. Nevertheless,
applying no object at all served our purpose ideally because air is homogeneous and
adheres uniformly to the sensor platen. Furthermore, air is naturally detectable by
capacitive fingerprint scanners as it essentially represents air gaps (i.e., valleys) of
the fingertip skin. Finally, the sensors of both vendors (UPEK and Veridicom) are
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able to acquire images without any object applied to them.
With each of the five fingerprint scanners, we acquired 30 consecutive raw
images with no object applied to the scanners (i.e., with air). We then selected
one block of size 64x64 pixels (4,096 pixels in total) that has the same location
on each image with respect to its top left corner. Figure 5.5 shows three of the
blocks from the first image capture acquired with three different capacitive scanners.
Their histograms (on the right side of Figure5.5) show that the pixel values are not
constant and span a considerable range. Note that these images contain both the
scanner pattern and the scanner noise since no averaging has been done.
Figure 5.5: Blocks of size 64x64 pixels from images acquired with three of the
scanners and their histograms (on the right side)
The 2D DFTs of two of the image blocks are shown in Figure 5.6 (the image
59
sample means had been subtracted before computing the DFT). Observe that the
DFT of the image block of Scanner 2 has power nearly uniformly distributed in
frequency. The DFT of the image block of Scanner 5, in contrast, has considerable
part of its spectral power concentrated in the low frequency region and along the
two main frequency axes, showing correlation along the horizontal and the vertical
axes of the scanner platen.
5.2.2 Scanner Pattern Estimation from Images Acquired with Air
Next we observed that the pixel values of the same block change from one
image acquisition to another, proving that temporal scanner noise is present. The
overall pattern, however, remains consistent. To estimate the scanner pattern from
the acquired images, we assume that the scanner noise is additive:
g(i, j) = s(i, j) + n(i, j, t) (5.1)
where g(i, j) is the pixel value of the image at row index i and column index j,
s(i, j) is the scanner pattern, and n(i, j, t) is the scanner noise, where t denotes
time. We further assume that the scanner noise n(i, j, t) is a temporal zero-mean
noise. Therefore, averaging the pixel values g(i, j) for several image captures gives
an estimate of the scanner pattern. We averaged 3 image captures (similarly to the
typical 3 images used for enrolling the biometric information), which may result in
a considerable estimation error but is sufficiently accurate for illustration purposes.
The estimated in this way scanner patterns for 100 pixels (of column 60) for 3
scanners are shown in the first plot of Figure 5.7. The estimated pattern of Scanner 2
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Figure 5.6: 2D DFT magnitudes of the image blocks acquired with 2 of the scanners
exhibits significant variations along rows, while, still considerable and measurable,
the estimated patterns of the two other scanners show much less variability. To
quantify the deviations from the estimated scanner pattern across several image
captures (and thus the level of the scanner noise), we computed the relative error
for 30 image captures with respect to the estimated scanner pattern. The maximum
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magnitude of this relative error is shown in the second plot of Figure 5.7. Similarly,
the relative error of Scanner 2 pattern is high (well above 5% on average) and there
are several outliers. The relative error of Scanner 3 is mostly constrained within 2%
(with a few exceptions), while the relative error of Scanner 5 is generally very low
(yet at several pixels, it is considerable).














Estimated scanner pattern (from 3 image captures) for column 60 along rows 5 through 104 for 3 scanners
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Figure 5.7: Estimated scanner pattern (from 3 image captures) and the maxima of
the magnitude of the relative error for column 60 along rows 5 through 104 for 3
scanners and 30 image captures with each scanner
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5.2.3 Scanner Pattern Uniqueness
In order to study the uniqueness of the scanner pattern, we take the conven-
tional approach of matching a query to a reference, estimated during enrolment. We
use the estimated scanner pattern as defined in Section 5.2.2 as a reference scanner
pattern and the correlation coefficient as a measure of similarity and matching.
5.2.3.1 Correlation Matching
The correlation coefficient measures the strength of linear relationship between
two vectors:
corr(x,y) =
(x− x̄) · (y − ȳ)
‖x− x̄‖ ‖y − ȳ‖
, (5.2)
where x and y are vectors with elements the pixel values, representing, for example,
the reference scanner pattern and the query scanner pattern, and x̄ and ȳ are
vectors with (all constant) elements equal to the means of the elements of x and
y, respectively. The decision is match if the correlation coefficient is greater than a
predetermined threshold value.
The use of correlation for scanner pattern matching is justified because:
• Correlation, or matched filtering, is the optimal method, in sense of minimizing
the probability of detection error, for detecting signals (in communication
systems) in the presence of additive white Gaussian noise;
• Correlation is the conventional method for detecting digital watermarks
[Cox et al. 2006];
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• Correlation has already been used in a similar context, e.g., for identifying
digital cameras [Lukas et al. 2006];
• Being a simple and robust method, correlation requires little computational
power, which is very important for the applications;
• For the correlation to be the optimal method in our case as well, the scanner
noise has to be also spatially white, e.g., at a given time instant t0, for any
column j, the noise samples n(1, j, t0), n(2, j, t0), . . . have to be uncorrelated;
the same has also to hold true along rows. For the time being, we can consider
both of these two assumptions plausible; the detailed study is provided in
Section 5.4.
Despite the fact that our signals are two dimensional (i.e., images), we op-
erate on one-dimensional signals (i.e., column and row lines) because the output
signals of adjacent sensor elements in the sensor array may experience some depen-
dence, which may lead to (local) dependence both in the scanner pattern and in
the scanner noise (see Figure 5.6), either of which is undesirable for our purposes
and analysis. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that by increasing the
physical distance between two sensor elements, the dependence between their char-
acteristics will decrease. Therefore, for the same total number of pixels, a line of
pixels will exhibit less dependence among the pixels than a block of pixels. And
finally, one-dimensional signals are easier both to work with and to visualize.
It is important to note that a correlation coefficient with small magnitude only
implies little linear dependence, not little dependence in general.
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5.2.3.2 Types of Correlation Pairs
To quantify the uniqueness of the scanner pattern both within one and the
same scanner and between two different scanners, we devised four types of correlation
pairs, each one for comparing a reference line of pixels with another line of pixels
from the same scanner and from a different scanner. The reference line consists
of 100 pixels of column 60 (this column is chosen at random), containing rows 5
through 104 (not starting from row 1 to avoid edge effect artifacts in the image).

















Figure 5.8: Types of correlation pairs
A The query line consists of 100 pixels of column 60, containing rows 5 through
104, from images acquired with the same scanner. Thus, the correlation is
between the reference line and the same line from images captured with the
same scanner, and we call this type self correlation.
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B The query line consists of 100 pixels, again rows 5 through 104, of a column
from column 11 through 110 (100 columns). The query line can be from
an image acquired either with the same scanner, in which case column 60 is
excluded from the results, or with a different scanner, in which case column
60 is included.
C The query line consists of 100 pixels, containing rows 105 through 204, of a
column from column 11 through 110 (i.e., 100 columns in total). The query
line can be from an image acquired either with the same scanner or with a
different scanner.
D The query line consists of 100 pixels, columns 11 through 110, of a row from
row 5 through 204 (i.e., 200 rows in total). The query line can be from an
image acquired either with the same scanner or with a different scanner.
Ideally, the correlation coefficients of type A (self correlation) should be close
to 1, and we look for their minimum value as it provides an estimate about the lowest
level of self-similarity of the scanner pattern in the presence of scanner noise. The
correlation pairs of types B, C, and D we call cross correlations as they quantify
the dissimilarity between the reference line and other lines from the image, and
thus cross correlations quantify the uniqueness of the scanner pattern. Ideally,
cross correlation coefficients should be close to 0 because this implies that the two
compared lines (and scanner patterns) are linearly independent. We look for the
maximum cross correlation coefficient as it provides an estimate about the lowest
level of uniqueness of the scanner pattern. The difference between the minimum
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self correlation and the maximum cross correlation gives the smallest and thus the
worst case margin.
5.2.3.3 Results
In this section, we demonstrate that: (a) the scanner pattern is sufficiently
random within one and the same scanner and (b) the pattern of one scanner is
sufficiently different from the patterns of the other scanners, both of the same model
and of different models (and types).
Scanner Pattern Uniqueness within the Same Scanner
First, we computed the correlation coefficients, using Expression 5.5, between
column 60 of the estimated scanner pattern (being the reference pattern) and 100
columns from the same image for 30 image captures of Scanner 2. This corresponds
to type A (self correlation) and type B (cross correlation) of the correlation pairs.
The results, given in Figure 5.9, show significant differences between the self corre-
lation and the cross correlations. The same results are shown again in Figure 5.10,
where the correlation coefficients for the subsequent image captures are superim-
posed (i.e., Figure 5.9 viewed along the image captures). Figure 5.10 clearly shows
that the variations of the correlation coefficients (for each column) along different
image captures are small with respect to the difference between the self correlation
and the cross correlations. The correlation coefficients, again superimposed, for
type C correlation pairs are shown in Figure 5.11.
































Figure 5.9: Types A and B: correlation coefficients with respect to column 60 of the
estimated scanner pattern for 100 columns (11 through 110) for 30 image captures
with Scanner 2
(column 60) for all five scanners. The minimum self correlation and the maximum
cross correlation of the results are provided in Table 5.2 and show that all five scan-
ners have minimum self correlations of over 0.8. The maximum cross correlations
(types B, C, and D) are generally around 0.4 (with one exception: 0.463), which
provides a sufficient margin for reliable discrimination between the reference line
and the query line.
Scanner Pattern Uniqueness among Different Scanners
Having established that the scanner pattern is sufficiently unique within one
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Figure 5.10: Types A and B: correlation coefficients with respect to column 60 of
the estimated scanner pattern for 100 columns (11 through 110) for rows 5 through
104 for 30 image captures with Scanner 2, viewed along the image captures
and the same scanner, we then computed the correlation coefficients when the refer-
ence scanner and the query scanner are different. We again used column 60 (of each
scanner) as the reference line. Since the correlation is computed between patterns
of different scanners, there is no self correlation and thus all correlation coefficients
represent the dissimilarity between the reference pattern and the query pattern. The
maximum values of the correlation coefficients of types B, C, and D are shown in
Tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5. We observed that, with very few exceptions, the maximum
cross correlation varies in the range from 0.3 to 0.45.
Finally, we computed all correlations that we made for column 60 (chosen at
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Scanner 2: Correlation coefficients for 100 columns (11 through 110) for 30 image captures for












Figure 5.11: Type C: correlation coefficients with respect to column 60 of the esti-
mated scanner pattern for 100 columns (11 through 110) for rows 105 through 204
for 30 image captures with Scanner 2, viewed along the image captures
random) also for column 17 and column 85 (also chosen at random). The results are
summarized in Table 5.6. The rows “Max cross” correlation contain the maximum
of the cross correlations of type B, C, and D both within the same scanner and be-
tween different scanners, giving the absolute maximum cross correlation of all cross
correlations and representing the very worst case (among the studied scenarios).
Based on these results, we draw four conclusions:
1. For each scanner and each of the three columns, the minimum self correlation
and the maximum cross correlation are consistent;
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Correlation A (min) B (max) C (max) D (max)
Scanner 1 0.870 0.368 0.394 0.400
Scanner 2 0.901 0.463 0.353 0.347
Scanner 3 0.871 0.407 0.333 0.352
Scanner 4 0.836 0.421 0.374 0.418
Scanner 5 0.802 0.355 0.299 0.367
Table 5.2: Correlation coefficients for types A, B, C, and D correlation pairs with
respect to column 60 for one and the same scanner
Ref / Query Scanner 1 Scanner 2 Scanner 3 Scanner 4 Scanner 5
Scanner 1 0.368 0.495 0.395 0.392 0.309
Scanner 2 0.390 0.463 0.360 0.439 0.342
Scanner 3 0.324 0.308 0.407 0.288 0.408
Scanner 4 0.373 0.474 0.395 0.421 0.335
Scanner 5 0.307 0.295 0.324 0.346 0.355
Table 5.3: Correlation coefficients for type B correlation pairs (maximum values)
with respect to column 60 for all combinations of reference scanner and query scanner
2. Generally, with few exceptions, the larger the maximum cross correlation is,
the larger the minimum self correlation is, thus the margin between them
roughly remains the same;
3. There is no significant difference between the maximum cross correlations
within one and the same scanner and between different scanners;
4. Among all results, the absolute lowest self correlation is 0.802 and the absolute
highest cross-correlation is 0.527, giving a very worst case margin of about 0.27.
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Ref / Query Scanner 1 Scanner 2 Scanner 3 Scanner 4 Scanner 5
Scanner 1 0.394 0.303 0.331 0.332 0.432
Scanner 2 0.366 0.353 0.313 0.394 0.397
Scanner 3 0.345 0.341 0.333 0.329 0.333
Scanner 4 0.372 0.368 0.328 0.374 0.339
Scanner 5 0.299 0.352 0.313 0.335 0.299
Table 5.4: Correlation coefficients for type C correlation pairs (maximum values)
with respect to column 60 for all combinations of reference scanner and query scanner
Ref / Query Scanner 1 Scanner 2 Scanner 3 Scanner 4 Scanner 5
Scanner 1 0.400 0.364 0.339 0.450 0.309
Scanner 2 0.379 0.347 0.419 0.466 0.371
Scanner 3 0.304 0.379 0.352 0.367 0.323
Scanner 4 0.314 0.372 0.503 0.418 0.349
Scanner 5 0.401 0.368 0.385 0.404 0.367
Table 5.5: Correlation coefficients for type D correlation pairs (maximum values)
with respect to column 60 for all combinations of reference scanner and query scanner
It is also important to note (as we later found out) that: (a) because of
the dependence between adjacent pixels (in a column and in a row), the used line
segments of 100 pixels above actually have much fewer than 100 degrees of freedom,
and (b) the number 100 is roughly the minimum of pixels that should be used to
compute a correlation coefficient reliably.
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Correlation Scanner 1 Scanner 2 Scanner 3 Scanner 4 Scanner 5
Column 17
Min self 0.871 0.939 0.889 0.894 0.873
Max cross 0.383 0.488 0.461 0.527 0.384
Column 60
Min self 0.870 0.901 0.871 0.836 0.802
Max cross 0.495 0.466 0.408 0.503 0.404
Column 85
Min self 0.896 0.934 0.846 0.881 0.802
Max cross 0.471 0.458 0.386 0.450 0.482
Table 5.6: Minimum self correlation and maximum cross correlation for the 3
columns for the 5 different scanners
5.2.4 Scanner Authentication Scenarios
In this section, we present our initial research on the three scanner authenti-
cation scenarios using the test setup and the acquired images as described in Sec-
tions 5.2.1 and 5.2.3. The significance of the received results is not in the numbers,
but in the concept and the insight these results gave to us and eventually became
the cornerstone of the advanced algorithm development.
5.2.4.1 Scenario A
In Scenario A, the applied object is air, both for the scanner enrolment and
for the scanner verification. Since this scenario provides weak security, here below
we only prove the concept by using the simple correlation matching method and
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the limited data set, described in Section 5.2.3. Furthermore, we did not test the
method extensively with different types of scanners and data and did not optimize
the algorithm performance. Still, the perfect results (zero FAR and FRR with
considerable margin) makes us confident that the proposed solution is sufficiently
good, simple, and practical.
From the results presented in Section 5.2.3, obtained using the correlation
coefficient between the reference scanner pattern, estimated by averaging 3 consecu-
tive images, and the query scanner pattern, we computed example threshold values
that are the middle points between the minimum self correlation and the maximum
cross correlation, shown in Figure 5.12. We observed that a threshold of about
0.67 will be sufficiently good for Scanners 1 through 4 (with the UPEK sensors),
while for Scanner 5 (with the Veridicom sensor) a threshold of 0.63 would be more
appropriate.





























Figure 5.12: Correlation decision thresholds for columns 17, 60, and 85
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5.2.4.2 Scenario B
The difference here with respect to Scenario A is that here the scanner verifi-
cation uses the same image as the biometric verification. Thus, the pixel values are
composition of the fingerprint pattern, the scanner pattern, and noise. One approach
is to develop a method, possibly dependant on the particular sensing technology,
that separates the scanner pattern from the fingerprint pattern. At the initial stage
of our research, we developed an alternative approach that was not based on a de-
tailed study of the image acquisition process in the scanners but on the observation
that the regions of the image that (predominantly) contain only the scanner pattern
can be relatively easily isolated from the rest of the pixels and matched against the
scanner pattern estimated from the images acquired with a predetermined object
applied to the scanner (i.e., air). The pixels of interest are not influenced by the
fingertip skin or are influenced only to a relatively small degree. In capacitive sens-
ing, these pixels are in the regions with valleys – essentially, the valleys are air gaps
and as such, it is plausible to assume that the pixel values in these regions would
be close to the pixel values of the image acquired with no object applied (i.e., air).
The larger a valley is, the more room for air gap it provides, and thus the smaller is
the influence of the nearby ridges and of the valley bottom on the pixels under this
valley. Consequently, the closer these pixel values are to the pixel values of the true
scanner pattern estimated from images acquired with air.
One important clarification here: when referring to a valley (and later to a
valley threshold), we do not mean the whole valley (in the general meaning of the
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word, i.e., the area between two successive ridges), but only the parts of the valleys
that experience little or no influence from the fingertip skin. Depending on the
width and the depth of the whole valley, the valley according to our definition can
only be a fraction of the whole valley (i.e., be as small as only a few pixels). Thus,
the valley threshold (detailed later) determines the part of the valleys in which we
are interested in.
To illustrate the concept, we first present the statistics of the signals. Fig-
ure 5.13 shows two image blocks, having the same location on the scanner platen,
acquired with air and with a fingertip applied to the scanner, and their histograms
(8-bit grayscale: black is 0 and white is 255). We note that the histogram of the
image with a fingerprint consists of two regions roughly representing the ridges and
the valleys, respectively.
Figure 5.13: Image block and its histogram for Scanner 2 with air and fingerprint
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Figure 5.14 shows three image blocks acquired with a fingertip applied to the
scanner and their histograms. When analyzing the block images of Scanner 2 and
Scanner 3 and their histograms, one can notice that the entire histogram of Scanner
2 image has been equalized or matched (probably by the post-processing software),
while the histogram of Scanner 3 image appears to have been enhanced selectively:
the pixels with values in the region with ridges have been processed, but the pixels
in the valleys/scanner pattern region have been left intact.
Figure 5.14: Blocks from 3 images with fingerprints and their histograms
In the regions with valleys, the larger the value of a pixel is, the higher the
probability is that this pixel belongs to a valley region; the closer this pixel is to the
region of the ridges, the higher the probability is that its value is influenced by the
nearby ridges, and hence the more different is its value from the value of the same
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pixel in the image acquired with air. Therefore, as a first approximation, setting
a threshold and taking only the pixels with values above the threshold will select
those pixels that carry the scanner pattern acquired with air; the rest of the pixels
are to be masked as not useful. The results of applying this algorithm to row 100
of Scanner 2 (UPEK) for 100 pixels (starting from column 33 to avoid edge effects)
is shown in Figure 5.15. The first plot on the figure is the image acquired with air
and two images acquired with a fingertip. Then, the two images with fingerprint are
shifted down (to compensate for the constant offset in the different captures) and
then thresholded at level 115; the pixels with level below the threshold are set to
0. This, along with the image with air, is shown on the second plot (and enlarged
for better visibility). The third plot shows the relative error between the processed
images and the image acquired with air (the pixels in the masked regions are not
shown). Although quite noisy, the processed images resemble the image with air and
have a relative error of about 10%. We then applied the same algorithm to images
acquired with Scanner 5 (Veridicom), and the results were remarkably better (see
Figure 5.16); a threshold at 230 contains the relative error within 3%.
The small relative error for the Veridicom scanner supports an observation we
made later that the pixel values in a sufficiently large valley are close to that of the
same pixel from an image acquired with air (see Expressions 5.12 and 5.33). The
considerably worse results (over 3 times in terms of the relative error) for Scanner 2
(UPEK) in comparison with Scanner 5 (Veridicom) can be explained by the much
higher sensitivity of the UPEK scanners.
An important consideration is the number of pixels (in the valleys) that can
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Figure 5.15: Scenario B for Scanner 2: images with air and with fingerprint and the
relative errors
be used for scanner verification. This number depends on several factors: the finger-
print pattern (which is user dependent), the amount of impurities on the fingertip
skin (e.g., water, grease, and dirt), the particular capacitive sensing technology,
etc. Thus, image acquisitions at different time instants will have the valleys (of the
same fingertip) cover different regions of the scanner platen in a relatively random
way. Still, these regions are not completely random because proper positioning of
the fingertip on the scanner platen will limit the possible positions of the valleys;
79
Figure 5.16: Scenario B for Scanner 5: images with air and with fingerprint and the
relative errors
furthermore, the fingerprint pattern (of one fingertip) does not change significantly
over time.
Based on the idea to isolate the pixels from the valleys and use them for scanner
authentication, we developed and tested a set of algorithms, described as Scenario B
in this section and Scenario C described in the next section. However, since the
algorithms of this initial research were based on heuristics and were intended mainly
to test the concept, we did not put significant effort into optimizing the algorithm
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parameters and we did not perform extensive testing with other scanners than those
described in Section 5.2.1. Thus, with each of the five scanners (4 of UPEK and 1
of Veridicom):
• For the scanner enrollment, we used the 30 images acquired without ap-
plying any object to the scanner (i.e., with air) as detailed in 5.2.1;
• For the scanner verification, we additionally acquired 30 images for each
of the 10 fingertips of a single person. Thus, we tested the algorithm on 1,500
images with fingerprints (= 5 scanners * 10 fingertips * 30 images/fingertip),
some of which were acquired about half a year apart. The images with fin-
gerprints were used in the tests in the following order: from the left little (ll)
finger through the left thumb (lt) and then from the right thumb (rt) through
the right little (rl) finger (see Table 5.7). Although limited to the fingertips
of a single person, we believe that these images provide sufficient diversity
of fingerprint patterns and valley sizes. For example, thumbs typically have
much wider and deeper ridges and valleys than little fingers (of the hands of
one and the same person). Also typically, index fingers have narrower and
shallower ridges and valleys than thumbs, and wider than little fingers.
Both for the scanner enrolment and the scanner verification and for all images
(with air and with fingerprints), we used one and the same block of pixels (referred
to region of interest or ROI ) from each image. Each ROI is a block of 200 rows *
100 columns (20,000 pixels in total), selected 10 columns and 10 rows away from the
left and the top edges, respectively, in order to avoid edge effects. This block area
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Finger Abbreviation Finger Abbreviation
left little ll right thumb rt
left ring lr right index ri
left middle lm right middle rm
left index li right ring rr
left thumb lt right little rl
Table 5.7: Finger abbreviations and test order
was chosen as to ensure a sufficient number of pixels (in the valleys) that overlap,
giving a consistent performance of the algorithm. The block area is about 1/3 of the
image area of the UPEK scanners and 1/4 of image area of the Veridicom scanner.
The essence of the algorithm, both for the scanner enrolment and for the
scanner verification, is in selecting those pixels which experience little influence
from the ridges of the fingertips. The algorithm is heuristic and rudimentary, and its
parameters are not extensively optimizes because its objective is only to demonstrate
that the concept works, not to provide a real and practical solution. The first
plot of Figure 5.17 shows the histogram of an image block containing a fingerprint
pattern. The region with valleys and the grayscale levels on the most right side are
enlarged and shown on the second plot. The algorithm detects the maximum value
of the valley region (marked as “peak value”) and subtracts from it a predetermined
parameter value (the window size), yielding the valley threshold (see the second plot
of Figure 5.17). Because of the existence of dead and defective sensing cells, marked
as “outliers” on the same plot, which cells produce constant-value pixels that lie
outside (on the right side of) the region with the valleys and mislead finding the
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peak, the algorithm first detects the outlying pixels and excludes them from the
peak value search.









Histogram of a 200x100−pixel region of interest from a fingerprint image acquired with Scanner 1
Grayscale levels





















Figure 5.17: Histogram of a 200x100-pixel region of interest from a fingerprint image
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Scanner Enrolment
The scanner enrolment uses three images with air, taken consecutively, and
consists of two parts:
I. Computation of the threshold level for detecting the regions with valleys;
II. Computation of the decision threshold for the correlation coefficient, which
threshold is then used for the scanner verification.
I. Computation of the Valley Threshold
As already discussed and also shown in Figure 5.17 (which represents a his-
togram of a fingerprint image, but for an image with air, the second plot is similar),
the first step is isolating the clusters with outliers, which we do in 3 steps, described
below in the MATLAB language:
1. Find the distances (in grayscale levels) among the pixel values in the right
tail of the histogram of the ROI. The tail is defined as the last 10 non-zero
bins of the histogram. The distances are actually the differences between the
non-zero bins of the histogram: roi tail diff = diff(roi tail);
2. Find the maximum value of these distances. The assumption is that this max-
imum distance marks the separation between the region of the valleys and the
region of outliers: [max difference, max idx] = max(roi tail diff);
3. Compute the mean of the remaining distances that lie on the left (and thus
are before this maximum):
mean remaining = mean(roi tail diff(1:max idx-1));
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If the maximum value, found above, is over 4 times than that of the computed
mean, i.e., if max difference > 4*mean remaining then indicate that a
cluster with outliers is detected and mark these bins to be excluded from the
computation of the peak value of the region with valleys.
This algorithm detects only a single cluster of outliers, but our tests showed
that this is sufficient. However, it is relatively easy to isolate more than one cluster
by repeating the algorithm above after sequentially removing cluster after cluster.
We designed the algorithm by trial-and-error and tuned its parameters (in particular,
the coefficients 4 and 10) for the currently available data, and it works very well.
Once the desired clusters are isolated, the maximum of the remaining pixel
values is found and is marked as the “peak value.” The valley threshold then is
computed by subtracting the window size (how to choose it is explained in the next
section) from the peak value: valley threshold = peak value - window size.
Thus, the valley threshold is specific for each image (actually, it is even specific for
each ROI).
After computing the valley threshold, the pixels to be used for the enrolment
or for the verification are those whose values are above this valley threshold. In
this way, the outlying pixels that were excluded in the computation of the peak
value are included in the correlation computation and this is desirable because the
dead and/or defective sensing cells are unique and representative for the particular
scanner [Geradts et al. 2001]. Furthermore, since the pixel values that these nonop-
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erational sensing cells produce are constant (or nearly constant) for different image
acquisitions, they constitute reliable elements in the vector used in the correlation
computations.
II. Computation of the Decision Threshold
The scanner enrolment uses three images. First, we compute the valley thresh-
old for each image, which is specific for the image. The valleys of interest are isolated
based on these thresholds. The set of indices of these pixels in the original ROIs
are then intersected in pairs in order to take into account only the same sensing
cells/pixels. Next, the resulting ROI matrices are read columnwise, forming three
sets of paired vectors, whose three correlation coefficients (see Expression 5.5) are
computed: between images 1 and 2, between images 2 and 3, and between images
3 and 1. These correlation coefficients are then used to determine the decision
threshold.
If a vector of these 3 vectors has less than 200 elements, the corresponding
image is discarded and a new image (with air) is re-acquired. Over the course of
experiments, we observed that if the vectors have fewer that 200 elements, because
of noise and distortion, the correlation coefficient becomes unreliable, giving un-
acceptably high error rates. This problem is particularly severe for images with
fingerprints (i.e., the query image) as there the level of distortion from the fingertip
skin becomes significant. We chose the number 200 as a tradeoff between the reliable
computation and the availability of pixels, and it is relatively very low: only 1% of
the total number of pixels in the whole ROI (20,000). In case of images with air,
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the number of pixels in these vectors is in the order of 17,000 (i.e., almost all pixels
in the ROI), resulting in very reliable correlation coefficients. The high number of
available pixels is also due to the absence of distortion from the fingertip skin.
Finally, the three correlation coefficients are averaged and this average is mul-
tiplied by a scaling coefficient to produce a decision threshold that is used for making
a decision during the scanner verification step. The scaling coefficient is chosen em-
pirically as result of the tests, and the reasoning behind the choice is explained in
the next section.
Scanner Verification
The scanner verification uses as a query image an image acquired with a finger-
tip applied to the scanner. Next, the pixels in the valleys in this image are isolated
using the same algorithm for valley threshold computation, described in the previous
section, with the same parameter values (for the window size, outliers, etc.). The
algorithm produces a set of indices (i.e., a mask), which mask is then intersected (as
a set) with each of three masks of the images with air, determined in a similar way
during the scanner enrolment, giving the appropriately-sized vectors to compute the
three correlation coefficients. The three correlation coefficients are then averaged,
producing a single score that is compared with the decision threshold. If the score is
above the decision threshold, the decision is scanner verification match; otherwise,
the decision is scanner verification nonmatch.
If the number of common elements/pixels that overlap in the intersection of two
masks is smaller 200, the corresponding correlation is tagged as invalid and excluded
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from the average in the final score because it is unreliable, and the remaining two
correlation coefficients are averaged. If all three correlation coefficients are invalid,
the matching score is set to 0, giving a scanner verification nonmatch decision. In
Scenario B, very seldom is a correlation coefficient tagged as invalid because the
size of the masks of the images with air is very large, and thus the intersection mask
is also very large (about one order of magnitude larger than the minimum of 200
pixels or about 10% of the whole ROI).
I. Choice and Optimization of the Parameters
The two most important parameters that control the performance of the algo-
rithm are (i) the window size and (ii) the scaling coefficient. The model for the pixel
values in images acquired with air was discussed in Section 5.2.2 (see Expression
5.1). For images with fingerprints, we can model their pixel values in a very general
way as:
g(i, j) = d(s(i, j), f(i, j)) + n(i, j, t) (5.3)
where g(i, j) is the pixel value of the image at row index i and column index j, s(i, j)
is the scanner pattern and n(i, j, t) represents the scanner noise at time t, again
assumed to be a temporal zero-mean noise. f(i, j) is the fingerprint pattern, and
d(·) represents the “distortion” function that captures the influence of the fingertip
skin on the pixel values. By selecting regions with valleys carefully, as explained
earlier by thresholding, the distortion can be considerably reduced so that the pixel
values g(i, j) become almost equal to the scanner pattern s(i, j) (ignoring the noise).
Finally, since the ROI is “sampled” by selecting only pixels in the valleys, the
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dependence between the subsequent pixel values g(i, j) that come in as elements of
the vectors in computing the correlation coefficient also decreases because the pixels
in these vectors not necessarily pertain to adjacent sensing cells.
(i) Window Size
The size of the window that determines the valley threshold is the most critical
and sensitive parameter and was subject to considerable optimization and tests. Its
optimal value is a tradeoff between two factors:
• The distortion level introduced by the fingerprint pattern via the distortion
function d(·): the smaller the window size is, the smaller is the distortion from
the fingerprint, and thus the closer the pixel values g(i, j) are to the scanner
pattern s(i, j);
• The number of pixels for computing the correlation coefficient: the larger
the window size is, the larger is the number of pixels in the vector for com-
puting the correlation coefficient, and thus the more statistically reliable the
coefficient is.
If the window size is too small, more pixels in the selection (after thresholding)
have little distortion, but they also become very few in number and thus the cross
correlation becomes unreliable, giving rise to excessive FAR. On the other hand,
if the window size is too large, the distortion level becomes so big that the self
correlation becomes too low (because there is less scanner pattern contained in the
pixels that are being correlated), the gap between the self correlation and the cross
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correlation distributions closes in, giving rise to both higher FRR and higher FAR.
Thus, the window size, which depends on the type of the scanner, and the mini-
mum number of pixels for correlation computation (currently set to 200 for all five
scanners) are interdependent. The window size parameter is particularly sensitive
and its current values have been selected after careful tests and observations, and
the values we used are:
• For Scanners 1 and 2 (the FIPS-201 certified UPEK scanners): 55 grayscale
levels;
• For Scanners 3 and 4 (the regular UPEK scanners): 30 grayscale levels;
• For Scanner 5 (the Veridicom scanner): 18 grayscale levels.
The minimum number of pixels for computing the correlation is also important
but is not as critical as the window size.
(ii) Scaling Coefficient
Generally speaking, the scaling coefficient controls the tradeoff between the
FRR and the FAR. In the scanner enrolment, by averaging the 3 correlation coeffi-
cients for the 3 images acquired with air, we compute an estimate for the mean/center
of the distribution of the self correlation. We observed that the cross correlation co-
efficients are centered around 0. Thus, if the two distributions (self and cross) were
similar in type (and variance), the optimal point would be the middle point between
0 and the estimated mean of the self-correlation (during enrolment), giving a scaling
coefficient of 0.5. However, the scanner verification is performed by computing the
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correlation coefficient between the enrolled images acquired with air and a query
image with a fingerprint pattern in it, in which case, due to the distortion from
the fingerprint pattern, the self correlation is much smaller than the self correlation
computed during enrolment when no distortion from fingerprint pattern is present.
Furthermore, the self correlation distribution in the scanner verification is
much closer to 0 than the self correlation distribution in the scanner enrolment.
We also observed that the self correlation distribution is much wider than the cross
correlation distribution (see Figure 5.18). Hence it is clear that the middle point
between 0 and the estimated center of the self correlation distribution would not be
optimal as it would result in a high FRR. Without further quantifying the optimal
decision threshold accurately since our goal was to only illustrate the concept, the
tests we performed led us to choosing the following values for the scaling coefficient
for Scenario B: 0.20 for Scanners 1 through 4 (i.e., all four UPEK scanners) and
0.25 for Scanner 5 (the Veridicom scanner).
II. Results
The query images, all containing fingerprint patterns, that we used are 1,500:
30 images per finger for all 10 fingers acquired with all 5 scanners. We computed
the error rates individually for each 300 images per scanner (30 images * 10 fingers);
thus, an error rate of 0.3% in the table is equivalent to one decision error, 0.7%
– to two decision errors, etc. The first plot of Figure 5.18 shows the correlation
coefficients for Scanner 1. The x-axis represents the 10 fingers (from left little to
right little, see Table 5.7), each containing 30 images. To demonstrate the algorithm
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robustness for different enrolled images, we used four sets of enrolled images, each
containing three images with file indices, respectively, being (1,2, and 3), (4, 5, and
6), (10, 11, and 12), and (28, 29, and 30).
The most challenging proved to be the query images with little fingers (left
little ll and right little rl) because their valleys are both narrow and shallow. This
leads to (a) fewer number of pixels for computing the correlation because the valleys
are narrow and (b) higher level of distortion from the fingerprint pattern because
the valleys are shallow, thus yielding unreliable and small self correlation coefficients
(see Figure 5.18) that potentially can result into a high FRR. A reasonable decision
threshold is 0.17 for Scanners 1 through 4 (UPEK) and 0.23 for Scanner 5 (Veridi-
com). All results with these thresholds are given in Table 6.1 in the appendix. In
summary, for scanners 1, 2, 3, and 5, the results are perfect: both the FAR and the
FRR in all cases are zero. The only non-zero false error rates are for Scanner 4 (a
non-FIPS compliant UPEK scanner): the FRR is in the range of 1 to 2%, which is
due to errors with the right little finger, and the FAR when matched against Scanner
5 (Veridicom) is around 1% (maximum of 1.3%), which is due to errors with the
two little fingers.
5.2.4.3 Scenario C
In Scenario C, images with fingerprints are used for the scanner enrolment (as
well as for the scanner verification). The Scenario C solution employs the same al-
gorithms as Scenario B, described in the previous section. The values of the window
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Scenario B: self−correlation of Scanner 1, its cross−correlations to Scanners 2 through 5, and the decision threshold
for 10 fingers: from left little (ll) through left thumb (lt) and from right thumb (rt) through right little (rl)     
Enrolment: 3 images acquired with air;  queries: 30 fingerprint images for each of the 10 fingers
 
 










Scenario B: histograms of the self−correlation of Scanner 1 and its cross−correlations to Scanners 2 through 5










Figure 5.18: Scenario B correlations and their histograms for Scanner 1
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size for each scanner type are the same as in Scenario, but the minimum number of
pixels for computing the correlation and the scaling coefficient are different.
In this scenario, we observed that the number of pixels used for computing
the correlation can be much smaller than that in Scenario B, especially for the cross
correlations, falling from about 2,000 in Scenario B down to about 200 to 400, which
is only 1% to 2% of all pixels in the ROI (20,000). This made difficult meeting the
requirement for a minimum of 200 overlapping pixels that constitute the vectors for
computing the correlation. Generally, this would not be a problem if a larger part
of the image (not the current one fourth to one third of it) is used as an ROI, but
in order to be consistent with Scenario B, we preserved the ROI size and decreased
the minimum number of pixels for the enrolment to 170, which (a) is not much less
than 200 and (b) is reached only on two occasions. Since the three images with
fingerprints are from the same fingertip and thus are close enough to each other
to ensure reliable computation of the correlation coefficient, this decrease in the
minimum number of pixels is not a problem.
The scaling coefficient for determining the decision threshold for the UPEK
scanners (1 through 4) is doubled: from 0.2 in Scenario B to 0.4 in Scenario C. The
need for this can be explained with the higher sensitivity of the UPEK scanners,
and since the enrolment uses images with fingerprints, the correlation coefficients
computed during enrolment are smaller than in Scenario B because of the distortion
introduced by the fingerprint pattern. To compensate for the weaker correlation,
we increase the scaling coefficient for the decision threshold. The scaling coefficient
for Scanner 5 (Veridicom), however, is not changed.
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We tested the Scenario C algorithm much more extensively, using enrolment
images with 5 different fingers: left little, left middle, left thumb, right index, and
right ring finger, which, we believe, provides sufficient diversity as it covers all 5
types of fingers and both the left and the right hand. For enrolment images, we
again used four different sets of files (for each of the 5 fingers listed above) with
indices (1,2, and 3), (4, 5, and 6), (10, 11, and 12), and (28, 29, and 30). The query
images are the images with all other fingers, not only images of the same finger used
for enrolment.
The results for Scanner 1 using images with a left little finger for enrolment are
shown in Figure 5.19. Comparing the plots with those of Figure 5.18 (Scenario B),
we observed that the average self correlation is smaller and thus the margin between
the self correlation and the cross correlation is smaller. Still, both the FRR and FAR
are zero. The results for Scanner 1 for all 5 fingers are shown in Table 5.8, from
which it is visible that most of the FRR and FAR are zero. The maximum FRR is
0.7% (meaning 2 errors in 300 tests), and the maximum FAR is 2%. These decision
errors occurred because of the images with the little fingers.
The detailed results for the other four scanners we include in the appendix,
Section 6.3, and here we only summarize them:
• For Scanner 2, the FRR increases to 2.3%, while the FAR is zero (see Ta-
ble 6.2 in the appendix). If this algorithm would be used in practice in the
contemplated security application, we believe that the FAR should be mini-
mized (and ideally be 0 as in this case), while the FRR of a couple of percents
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Figure 5.19: Scenario C correlations and their histograms for Scanner 1
would be tolerable;
• For Scanner 3 (the non-FIPS compliant UPEK scanner), the results, shown
in Table 6.3 in the appendix, are noticeably worse. The FAR jumps to 6%
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Query scanner −→ Scnr 1 Scnr 2 Scnr 3 Scnr 4 Scnr 5
Indices of the files
used for enrolment ⇓ FRR, % FAR, % FAR, % FAR, % FAR, %
Left little finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0.7 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0 0 0
Left middle finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0 0 0
Left thumb finger
1, 2, and 3 0.3 0 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0.7 0 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0 0 0
Right index finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0.3 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 2.0 0 0 0
Right ring finger
1, 2, and 3 0 1.3 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.8: Scenario C results: FAR and FRR for Scanner 1 (parameters 55/0.40)
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on one occasion and this is with a scanner of a different type (the FIPS cer-
tified Scanner 1). The FAR with the scanner of the same type, Scanner 4,
however, is still small – about 2%. Also, in most cases the FAR is again zero.
Unfortunately, the FRR is here is again high and peaks at 6.3%;
• For Scanner 4, the FRR, shown in Table 6.4 in the appendix, is also com-
parable to that of Scanner 3, but the FAR is much better, with a maximum
of 1.7%;
• For Scanner 5, the results, shown in Table 6.5 in the appendix, are also very
good: maximum 1.3% for the FAR and maximum 1.7% for the FRR.
It is important to note that the high FAR and FRR in the results above are for
the case when the scanner enrolment uses images with one finger, while the scanner
verification uses (one) image with another finger; nevertheless, they are still very
good. When one and the same finger is used both for the scanner enrolment and
for the scanner verification, the results are nearly perfect.
5.2.4.4 Scanner Authentication Scenarios: Discussion
The first and the most important conclusion from the excellent results in
Scenario A and the very good results in Scenarios B and C is the choice of the cor-
relation (coefficient) for scanner pattern matching. Correlation is a robust method
for estimating the similarity between signals in the presence of high level of noise
and distortion with unknown characteristics, but in order to be reliable, correlation
requires vectors with large sizes. Our application is very well suited for this because
98
it operates on images and thus data samples with large sizes are available.
Nevertheless, since the characteristics of the noise and especially of the dis-
tortion caused by the fingertip skin were difficult to be estimated and quantified at
this early stage of our research, the algorithms of Scenarios B and C occasionally
produce high levels of decision errors. As the major cause for this we identified
the unreliable estimate for the mean of the distribution of the self correlation, par-
ticularly in Scenario C where the enrolled images contain fingerprints. Since the
distribution of the cross correlation is usually and typically centered around 0, im-
proving the accuracy of the estimate for the mean of the self correlation is sufficient
to significantly improve the detection performance.
A major challenge for the algorithms of Scenarios B and C were the little fin-
gers, and generally, fingers which have shallow and narrow valleys. From a practical
point of view, however, this would not be a big problem because the index finger,
the middle finger, and occasionally the thumb are typically used in fingerprint au-
thentications. When such fingers are used for the scanner enrolment, the results are
nearly perfect.
Although not fully optimized and tested on a large number of scanners and
fingers, these early algorithms for scanner authentication in Scenarios A, B, and C
are important because of several reasons:
1. The approach is applicable to any type of capacitive scanners and does not
require knowledge of the specific acquisition technology being used. We also
believe that this method can be extended to other types of scanners, using, for
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example, RF imaging. The only requirement is the sensing method to provide
pixels that are little influenced by the fingertip skin or not influenced at all;
2. The algorithms have very low complexity. Computing the correlation coeffi-
cient with the chosen ROI takes a couple of thousand integer multiplications-
and-additions (in the worst case), the whole processing is very simple and does
not require any kind of filtering or transforms. The rest of the operations are
comparisons, integer searches, and indexing. This fulfills the objective for a
low-complexity implementation;
3. The algorithms are inherently random because the attacker has no knowledge
about the parts of the enrolled images that will be used for scanner pattern
matching (the attacker has control only on the query image);
4. Arguably, however, the most important benefit for us from developing the
algorithms for the three scenarios was the qualitative understanding of the
process and the proof of the concept, both of which were indispensable for the
development of our advanced algorithms.
Besides the possible obvious performance improvements of the algorithm, such
as testing it on a large number of scanners and fingers to better optimize the pa-
rameters, one can use a more accurate detection of the regions with valleys by
incorporating already developed algorithms for that instead of the simple threshold-
based algorithm that does not take into account the fingerprint pattern (and the
shapes and continuity of the valleys). However, we opted not to perfect these early
algorithms because this approach has inherent limitations that, we believe, will be
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difficult to overcome. The most important is its general security weakness: the
simple way of isolating/extracting the scanner pattern from the composition of the
scanner pattern and the fingerprint pattern by using only a small part of the val-
leys creates a vulnerability as these pixels can be identified relatively easily by an
attacker and replaced without distorting the fingerprint pattern sufficiently so that
the biometric verification can result in a biometric non-match decision; thus, the
attack may pass undetected by the bipartite verification (see Figure 5.3).
5.2.5 Simple Algorithm Using Wavelets
The very good performance of the algorithms of Scenarios A, B, and C, de-
scribed in the previous sections, and the resulting conclusions were very important
for the development of another algorithm, disclosed in [Ivanov and Baras US’907]
and [Ivanov and Baras 2011], using more sophisticated signal processing. The algo-
rithm is still simple, yet extremely accurate, and is able to distinguish one fingerprint
scanner from another scanner of exactly the same manufacturer, type, and model
using only a single image, acquired with each scanner. The algorithm extracts scan-
ner patterns from the two images using wavelets, selects parts of these patterns,
and computes the correlation coefficient as a similarity score between them. Each
of the two images contain a fingerprint pattern in it and thus the algorithm falls
in the framework of Scenario C. We tested the algorithm on 2,160 images acquired
with 24 capacitive fingerprint scanners of exactly the same model (see the appendix,
Section 6.1), and based on the histograms, we computed a decision threshold and
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estimated the equal error rate (EER).
5.2.5.1 Algorithm
The algorithm does not assume any specific model for the scanner pattern
and the fingerprint pattern in the composite signal (i.e., the image pixels). Our
only two assumption are: (1) the scanner pattern is mainly caused by non-idealities
and variability in the sensing matrix and the subsequent signal processing within
the fingerprint scanner, and (2) the scanner pattern is revealed in the pixels that
experience little or no influence from the fingerprint pattern and therefore these
pixels need to be only located and used. The algorithm consists of 3 steps and uses
2D wavelets for scanner pattern extraction and correlation coefficient for matching.
Thus, it is similar to the algorithm of Scenario C described in the previous section
but uses less heuristics and more powerful signal processing.
The conceptual diagram of the sequence of signal processing modules is shown
in Figure 5.20. The signal g, the image, is processed to produce the signal d, the
scanner verification decision.
Figure 5.20: Conceptual diagram of the simple algorithm using wavelets
Let ge(i, j) and gq(i, j) be the pixel values at row i and column j of the two
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acquired images, where the subscript e (from enrolled) refers to one of the two
images and the subscript q (from query) to the other image. This referencing is
conditional because all processing is the same for each image.
1. Wavelet extraction. Each image is decomposed using 2D wavelets and then
reconstructed by setting the LL-subband coefficients to 0, yielding the signals
re(i, j) and rq(i, j). The biorthogonal wavelets with decomposition order 5
and reconstruction order 1 gave the best results, but other wavelets, e.g.,
Daubechies or symlets, both of order 2 (4-tap filter length), also work well.
2. Masking. We observed that selecting only some of the pixels based on the
magnitude of their values from re(i, j) and rq(i, j) is necessary. Therefore, the
signal se(i, j) (and similarly sq(i, j)) is constructed using:
se(i, j) =

re(i, j) if |re(i, j)| ≤ θ
NU otherwise
(5.4)
where NU denotes a mark that the corresponding pixel will not be used for
further processing. We achieved the best results with θ = 4, but 3 or 5 is also
possible.
3. Correlation matching. Similarly to Scenarios A, B, and C, here we also use
the correlation coefficient as a matching score:
corr(te, tq) =
(te − t̄e) · (tq − t̄q)
‖te − t̄e‖ ‖tq − t̄q‖
, (5.5)
where te and tq are vectors derived from se(i, j) and sq(i, j), respectively, by
taking only the common useful pixels (i.e., the pixels marked with NU are
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discarded) and then ordering the common useful pixels in vector form. t̄e
and t̄q are the means of the elements of vectors te and tq, respectively. The
decision d is 1, i.e., match, if corr(te, tq) is greater than a predetermined
decision threshold (discussed next); otherwise it is 0, i.e., nonmatch.
5.2.5.2 Results
We acquired raw images with 24 UPEK area scanners: u101 through u122,
u151, and u152 (see Section 6.1 in the appendix).
With each scanner, we acquired 30 images for three fingers: an index, a thumb,
and a little finger of one person, with each set having (24 · 30) = 720 images per
finger, giving a total of (3 · 720) = 2, 160 images for all 3 fingers. Each image has
360 · 256 pixels, with pixel values ranging from 0 to 255 (8 bits per pixel).
Images of one and the same finger
We first applied the algorithm to images with fingerprints of one and the
same finger, for which we chose the index finger because typically it is used for
biometric authentication. For ge(i, j) and gq(i, j), we chose each of the 720 images
in the set, yielding to 720 · (720 + 1)/2 = 259, 560 comparisons. The normalized
(integrating to 1) histograms of the self correlation coefficients (when the two images
were acquired with the same scanner) and cross correlation coefficients (when the
two images were acquired with two different scanners) are shown in Figure 5.21.
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Figure 5.21: Normalized histograms of the correlation coefficients when both ge(i, j)
and gq(i, j) are with index finger
Images of two different fingers
To demonstrate that the proposed algorithm does not depend on the finger,
next we applied it to a set of pairs of images where one of them contains one finger
and the other image contains a different finger. It is known that thumbs typically
have much wider ridges and valleys than little fingers (of the hands of one and the
same person). Also typically, index fingers have narrower ridges and valleys than
thumbs, and wider than little fingers. The histograms of the correlation coefficients
where ge(i, j) are images with the index finger and gq(i, j) are images with the thumb
are shown in Figure 5.22, and the results where ge(i, j) are images with the thumb
105
and gq(i, j) are with the little finger are shown in Figure 5.23. As in the case above
when both images are of the same finger, each set for a finger contains 720 images,
thus yielding (720 · 720) = 518, 400 comparisons in each case (because here the two
fingers are different). Since all processing is symmetric, the choice which finger is in
ge(i, j) and which in gq(i, j) is immaterial.
Figure 5.22: Normalized histograms of the correlation coefficients when ge(i, j) is
with index finger and gq(i, j) is with thumb
5.2.5.3 Decision threshold and error rate
No decision errors with a threshold chosen anywhere roughly between 0.1 and
0.2 were registered for any of the 1,296,360 comparisons, which is also visible from
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Figure 5.23: Normalized histograms of the correlation coefficients when ge(i, j) is
with thumb and gq(i, j) is with little finger
the clear separation of the histograms in the three figures and the large distance
between the centers of the two distributions (of the self and cross correlations). We
computed an estimate for the equal error rate (EER), when FAR = FRR, for the
third case (which is the worst one of the three) by fitting Gaussian PDFs (see Fig-
ure 5.23). The histogram with the cross correlation coefficients fits extremely well
with N(0.0145, 0.01242), and N(0.3646, 0.0442) well approximates the histogram
with the self correlation coefficients. Based on the fitted PDFs and the computed
decision threshold of 0.0915, the EER is 2.8 · 10−10.
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Although simple and extremely accurate, the algorithm using 2D wavelets
described above has several disadvantages. First, it requires a wavelet analysis of
two-dimensional signals (the images) and wavelet reconstruction, which may be too
computationally demanding in portable devices, especially if required to be com-
puted within a very short time period; the algorithm also uses all pixels in the
image, which also adds a considerable computational burden. Next, although op-
erating on images containing fingerprints, we observed that this algorithm relies
heavily on the areas of the image that are not covered by the fingerprint pattern,
e.g., close to the image edges. The problem is that the pixels in these areas can be
relatively easily detected and replaced by an attacker with pixels taken from another
image that has been acquired with the authentic scanner. Therefore, the wavelet
algorithm may fail to detect the doctored in this way image, leading to a security
breach. And finally, the robustness of the algorithm under different environment
conditions, e.g., wide range of temperature variations, moisture, and fingertip pres-
sure on the scanner, is unclear. To overcome or completely avoid these problems,
we developed the advanced algorithm, presented in Section 5.5.
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5.3 Image Acquisition and Signal Models
The actual function describing the relationship among the scanner pattern,
the scanner noise, and the fingerprint pattern (when present) can be very com-
plex. This function depends on the particular fingerprint sensing technology and
on the particular fingerprint scanner design and implementation, which are usually
proprietary. Furthermore, even if the exact function is known or determined, us-
ing it for estimating the scanner pattern may prove mathematically intractable or
require computationally intensive and extensive signal processing. However, this
function can be simplified into a composition of additive/subtractive terms, multi-
plicative/dividing terms, and combinations of them by taking into account only the
major contributing factors and by using approximations. This simple, approximate
model of the actual function we call signal model. We performed our analysis of
the actual scanner implementations (in particular at semiconductor level) only from
publicly available information and made certain assumptions about the dominant
factors which determine the scanner pattern. For this reason, it is difficult to provide
a rigorous proof for the validity of the models; instead, we can only judge about the
accuracy of the signal models indirectly: by comparing the processed images with
the expected resulting signals according to the models.
The first, and critical, part of the analysis is studying the sensing process,
i.e., the conversion from a ridge/valley into electrical signal. We studied the ca-
pacitive sensing technologies of two companies: Veridicom, which was one of the
first capacitive-sensing technology and was later acquired by Fujitsu, and of UPEK,
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whose scanners are the most widely used capacitive scanners.
5.3.1 UPEK Scanners
Our assumption is that the UPEK scanners most widely sold and also present
in our lab are designed as active capacitive feedback circuits with enhanced fin-
gerprint detection, as disclosed in [UPEK Patent US’381]. This assumption is sup-
ported by the success of the algorithms we developed and the microscopic pho-
tographs we took of the scanners (discussed later).
A major problem for all capacitive sensors developed by other companies before
UPEK had been their poor sensitivity in distinguishing between a ridge and a valley.
The technique UPEK developed significantly increased this sensitivity by combining
two effects: a plate effect and a fringing effect. Hereby we present the principle of
operation, a summary of the formulas as given in [UPEK Patent US’381], and our
analysis and models of pixel values in an image as a function of the scanner pattern
and fingerprint pattern.
Figure 5.24 shows two adjacent sensing cells and Figure 5.25 shows the equiv-
alent electrical circuit of one sensing cell. The input voltage change ∆Vin in Fig-
ure 5.24 is applied at terminal 99 which is in direct electrical contact with the body
of the person (e.g., their fingertip) and acts as an input capacitor by providing a
variable charge transfer and determines the plate effect. Cplate is the capacitance
being sensed between plate 24 (and 23) and the finger 18, and it varies depending
on the part of the skin present at that cell. In case of a ridge, Cplate is large (cell
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2a); in case of a valley, Cplate is small (cell 2b). Thus, it is convenient to represent
their relationship as: Cplate ridge = Cplate valley + ∆Cplate ridge.
Figure 5.24: UPEK scanner diagram (source: [UPEK Patent US’381])
Figure 5.25: UPEK scanner equivalent electrical circuit (source:
[UPEK Patent US’381])
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The fringing effect is exhibited by a change in the capacitance between plates
23 and 24. A ridge reduces the fringing capacitance Cfringe because a conductor
adjacent to the plates short circuits some of the field lines between the two plates.
If a valley is present, however, Cfringe is greater because a valley essentially is an air
gap. Thus, Cfringe valley = Cfringe ridge + ∆Cfringe valley. In the ideal case when the
skin in the valley is far enough from the plates 23 and 24, Cfringe valley is close to the
measured capacitance when no object is applied to the scanner platen, i.e., with air.
The effect of Cfringe is amplified by the differential amplifier 13 (which usually is
implemented as a high-gain inverter, see Figure 5.25) and behaves as (1 +G)Cfringe
at node 25 due to the Miller effect.
Therefore, the presence of a ridge creates two opposite effects in Cplate and
Cfringe: it increases Cplate and decreases Cfringe. A valley does exactly the oppo-
site: it decreases Cplate and increases Cfringe. Hence, Cplate ridge > Cplate valley and
Cfringe ridge < Cfringe valley. This change in opposite directions of the two types of
capacitances determines the enhanced sensitivity of the UPEK scanners and their
ability to well distinguish between a ridge and a valley. The parasitic capacitance
is modeled as Cp (see Figure 5.25). Using information from [UPEK Patent US’381],
we derived an expression for the change in the output voltage at terminal 17 (in the














Devising a signal model directly from Expression 5.6 and then developing
signal processing algorithms that separate the scanner pattern from the fingerprint
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pattern proved to be very difficult. Furthermore, since we did not have information
about the typical absolute or relative values (even on the order of magnitude), we
had to speculate/hypothesize, to make various approximations, assuming dominance
of certain terms over the other terms, and to study the accuracy of each one of the
models and its suitability for our purposes. The model that worked best and the
underlying assumptions in it are described next.
Taking into account that voltage ∆Vc, applied at terminal 21 (in Figures 5.24
and 5.25), is normally the inverse of ∆Vin, i.e., ∆Vc = -∆Vin, we rearrange Expres-
sion 5.6 as follows:
∆Vout = −
∆VinG(Cplate − Cf )












Next, we make the following assumptions for the terms in Expression 5.7:
• Cplate represents the fingerprint pattern and therefore it cannot be a constant.
However, it appears that Cplate is always much larger (at least one order of
magnitude) than Cf . Therefore, the term
Cf
Cplate
, both in the nominator and in
the denominator, can be neglected as it is much smaller than 1, the additive
constant present both in the nominator and in the denominator;
• A similar reasoning as of Cf also applies to Cp. Hence CpCplate in the denominator
can be neglected as it is much smaller than 1;
• G is the gain of the differential amplifier 13 in Figures 5.24 and 5.25, which
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gain is typically very large (several orders of magnitude larger than 1), and
therefore (1 + G) ≈ G. Furthermore, it is well known that making the gain
of a differential amplifier (and also of an opamp) precise and uniform across
all amplifiers, even in the same batch/die, is practically impossible. Finally,
each sensing cell has its own, dedicated amplifier. All this reasoning leads to
the credible assumption that the gain G is a sufficiently dominant and unique
factor for each sensing cell and let us believe that the scanner pattern is mainly
determined by the gain G. However, it is also possible that the scanner pattern
is simply (approximately) proportional to the gain G, not exactly equal to it.









As already explained above, the fingerprint pattern is represented by Cplate
and Cfringe, the value of either of which depends on the valley or ridge positioned
above this particular sensing cell. ∆Vin (and ∆Vc) is the excitation voltage, which,
although possibly noisy, is the same for all sensing cells. The excitation voltage
applied to each sensing cell may also depend on the physical location of the cell
with respect to the common voltage source, i.e., the chip layout. However, such
dependence most likely will result in a common change for a series of cells (e.g., in
a row or in a column), yielding to a gradient effect, but not influencing each sensor
cell in a unique way. Therefore, we can assume that ∆Vin (along with the minus
sign) is a common scaling constant that eventually is factored out in the conversion
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from the (analog) voltage ∆Vin into a (digital) pixel value. Finally, since this is
an active electronic circuit, it is reasonable to assume that ∆Vout contains also an
additive (thermal) noise and quantization noise (from the A-to-D conversion). Thus,
we transform Expression 5.8 into the following signal model, henceforth referred to
as Signal Model A:
g(i, j) =
s(i, j)
1 + s(i, j)f(i, j)
+ n(i, j, t) (5.9)
where g(i, j) are the pixel values of the image at row index i and column index
j, f(i, j) is the fingerprint pattern, s(i, j) is the scanner pattern, and n(i, j, t) is
the scanner noise, which also depends on the time t because the scanner noise is
time varying (by definition). All operations in Expression 5.9, i.e., the addition,
the multiplication, and the division, are element by element (i.e., pixel by pixel)
because our study led to the conclusion that the point spread function (PSF) of these
fingerprint scanners, viewed as a two-dimensional linear space-invariant system, can
be well approximated by a Dirac delta function. The range of g(i, j) is from 0 to 255
grayscale levels (8 bits/pixel), although some scanner implementations may produce
narrower range of values. An implicit assumption in Expression 5.9 is that the pixel
values g(i, j) as saved in a computer file are not further enhanced (or compressed)
by image processing algorithms in order to facilitate the biometric authentication,
or are enhanced (or compressed) but the scanner pattern information in them is not
substantially altered or destroyed.
To corroborate our claims, in Figure 5.26 below we show the schematics of
one possible implementation (taken from [UPEK Patent US’381]) where the volt-
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age ∆Vin is applied via electrode 92 and provides voltage to many sensing cells 2.
Figure 5.27 shows a top view of the scanner platen with two conducting cells: el-
ement 30, providing ∆Vin, and element 31, providing ground (the exact type of
electrical signal applied depends on the timing of the sensing operation and the
location of the cell).
Figure 5.26: UPEK scanner conductor (source: [UPEK Patent US’381])
Figure 5.27: UPEK scanner platen (source: [UPEK Patent US’381])
Finally, Figure 5.28 shows two microscopic photographs of the surface of the
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platen of a UPEK scanner, which photos we took specifically for our study. The
squares 1 are the sensing cells, and the stripe 2 is the conductor that provides ∆Vin.
On the right side of the same figure, one sensing cell is enlarged, and 4 and 5 point
to the two capacitive plates 23 and 24 of Figures 5.24 and 5.25.
Figure 5.28: Microscopic photos of UPEK scanner surface (left) and cell (right)
Details about the UPEK scanners used are provided in Section 6.1 in the
appendix.
5.3.2 Veridicom Scanners
In this section we discuss and summarize [Veridicom Patent US’620], which
we believe describes the design of their scanners. We have used only one Veridicom
scanner (referred in the text as “v1”) because at the time we started this research,
the scanner product line has already been discontinued, and therefore purchasing
more scanners of the type proved impossible. Details about this Veridicom scanner
are provided in Section 6.1 in the appendix.
Nevertheless, we did study the Veridicom scanners because: (a) their principle
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of operation is much simpler than that of UPEK, which gave us important initial
insight and ideas, and (b) the Veridicom scanners still have considerable market
share of already deployed capacitive scanners and therefore offer a large base for
application of our technology.
The Veridicom fingerprint sensing technology is based on determining the value
of the capacitance between a single metal plate 120 (see Figure 5.29, left), being
one of the electrodes, and the finger 160, serving as the other electrode. This
capacitance is inversely proportional to the distance between the plate and the finger
surface (C = εA/d), and thus it varies with the finger topography: the capacitance
Cridge between the plate 120 and the ridge 180 is greater than Cvalley, which is the
capacitance between the plate 120 and the valley 190, or Cridge > Cvalley. The depth
of a valley is typically about 100 µm. The metal plates have constant areas (A) and
are covered by an insulating material (SiO2, glass, or plastic) of several microns.
Figure 5.29: Veridicom scanner and principle of operation (source:
[Veridicom Patent US’620])
If Cf is the capacitance between the metal plate 120 and the finger surface
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160, then Cf is the serial combination of the capacitance Cfi between the plate 120
and the top of the insulator 140 (with insulator thickness di and dielectric constant
εi) and the capacitance Cfa between the top of the insulator 140 and the finger
160 (with distance da and dielectric constant εa), and therefore Cf = Cfi ‖ Cfa =
CfiCfa/(Cfi+Cfa). For a ridge that touches the insulator 140, da = 0, and therefore
Cf ridge = Cfi. For a valley, da >> di and thus Cf valley ≈ Cfa.
Each metal plate 120 has also a parasitic capacitance Cm to the grounded
substrate. Therefore, the equivalent capacitance to ground is Ceq = Cm +Cf , which
means that (variations in) Cf will be largely masked by the parasitic capacitance
Cm. This explains the lower sensitivity of the Veridicom scanners with respect to
the sensitivity of the UPEK scanners.
The principle of operation is shown on the right side of Figure 5.29. The
capacitance Ceq (460) is measured by precharging it to a predetermined voltage
Vi (400), then turning the switch 420, removing from the capacitance a fixed charge
∆q = Ic∆t by drawing a fixed current Ic over a fixed time interval ∆t, and finally
measuring the final voltage Vf across it. As noted further in the patent, “mapping
the voltage variation across the array of capacitors without converting to distances
provides a relative measurement of the capacitance variation and is sufficient to
create an image.” If ∆V = (Vi − Vf ) is the measured voltage difference, then





Figure 5.30 shows a detailed circuit diagram of a single sensor cell (within the
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square with the dashed line), the current source on the left-hand side of it, and the
read-out circuitry on the right. The current source contains three stages. The first
one (transistor 606 and resistor 602) is common for the entire chip, and it sets the
reference current IREF . The second stage (transistors 608 and 610) is replicated in
each column of the sensor array and mirrors the current IREF so that I0 is common
for all sensor cells in one column. Therefore, variations in I0 will affect in a similar
way all sensor cells in a column. The third stage (transistors 607 and 514, inside
the square) is replicated in each sensor cell, and the current Ic mirrors the current
I0 from the second stage (a ratio of 2:1 is used between the stages). Therefore,
variations in Ic will be local for each sensor cell and thus can determine the scanner
pattern. Furthermore, the scanner pattern in each column of sensor cells is expected
to exhibit correlation because all of the cells’ reference currents Ic mirror the single
current source I0 of that particular column.
Within each sensor cell (the square with the dashed line), the equivalent ca-
pacitance Ceq of the metal plate 500 has two components: capacitance Cf (508)
to the finger and parasitic capacitance Cm (502). During the measurement of Ceq,
the CMOS switch (between signals 524 and 532 and enabled by them) connects the
metal plate 500 to the charge input node. The switch transistor 514 is enabled by
the precharge signal 520 and thus precharges Ceq to VDD. Then the transistor 514
is turned off and the current Ic discharges Ceq. The voltage on the metal plate 500,
through the gate of transistor 512 and the switch transistor 516, enabled by the row
signal 530, becomes the output voltage VOUT (526). Therefore, all capacitances of
one row of metal plates are measured in parallel.
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Figure 5.30: Veridicom scanner sensor element schematics (source:
[Veridicom Patent US’620])
The read-out part (on the right-hand side of Figure 5.30) is common for a
column of sense cells in the array and contains two sample-and-hold circuits, each
one consisting of a sample-and-hold switch, a capacitor, and a source follower. The
first sample (of voltage) is stored immediately after precharging Ceq, and the second
sample is stored after a fixed interval of time ∆t. The sample values are scanned
differentially by enabling the column selection switches.
This construction of common-row and common-column components and sig-
nals suggests strong row-wise and column-wise correlations in the scanner pattern,
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which was indeed observed along the two main frequency axes in the 2D DFT of an
image acquired with air the Veridicom scanner (see Figure 5.6 in Section 5.2.2).
To model the relationship between the fingerprint and the scanner patterns,
we speculate the following:
• Since Ic is the value of the discharging current and is specific for each sensor
cell, it can determine the scanner pattern. Ic may also experience random
variations in time, i.e., to be noisy. The other term in the nominator of
Expression 5.10 is ∆t, the time interval between the openings of the first and
the second sample-and-hold output gates. ∆t is predetermined and fixed, but
the time for which the two transistor gates switch may be specific for each
sensor cell. Similarly, ∆t may also experience random variations in time, i.e.,
to be noisy. In sum, the combined term Ic∆t can form the scanner pattern.
• The capacitance between the metal plate and the finger surface is Cf =
Cfi ‖ Cfa, where Cfa is the capacitance between the top of the insulator
and the skin surface, and Cfi is the capacitance between the metal plate and
the surface of the insulator. Cfi is also sensor-cell specific and potentially
may form the scanner pattern, although its variations are probably small in
comparison with the variations of Cfa as the thickness of the insulator is well
controlled. Furthermore, separating Cfi from Cfa is difficult because they are
in series. For these reasons, we assume Cfi to be constant across the sensor
array, and then Cf represents only the fingerprint pattern.
• Cm is the parasitic capacitance to the grounded substrate, and therefore its
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value may be sensor-cell specific. Furthermore, variations of Cm across the area
of the scanner platen are very well possible to exist and to potentially form
gradient effects, which effects, however, are unlikely to contribute substantially
to the formation of unique differences among adjacent sensor cells that can
constitute a scanner pattern. Finally, from a physical construction perspective,
the relative variations of the parasitic capacitance Cm among adjacent sensor
cells are likely to be much smaller that the absolute value of Cm (which is
typically large). Thus, the sensor-cell specific variations of Cm can potentially
be neglected and Cm be assumed to be constant (barring possible gradient
effects) for all sensor cells.
• Since this is an active electronic circuit and also ∆V is quantized, there will
be also an additive noise.











It is not necessary to pinpoint which term in the nominator Ic∆t forms the
scanner pattern as the term that is constant will be factored out during the A-to-D
conversion, similarly to the term 1
Cm
. And finally, assuming that the pixel values of
the acquired image are proportional to ∆V , we arrive at Signal Model B:
g(i, j) =
s(i, j)
1 + f(i, j)
+ n(i, j, t) (5.12)
where, similarly to Signal Model A, g(i, j) are the pixel values of the image at row
index i and column index j, f(i, j) is the fingerprint pattern, s(i, j) is the scanner
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pattern, and n(i, j, t) is the scanner noise, which also depends on the time t because
the scanner noise is time varying (by definition). All operations in Expression 5.12
are again element by element (i.e., pixel by pixel) because the point spread func-
tion of the Veridicom scanner can also be approximated (with some caveats) by a
Dirac delta function. The range of g(i, j) is again from 0 to 255 grayscale levels (8
bits/pixel). And finally, the implicit assumption in Expression 5.12 again is that
the pixel values g(i, j), as saved in a computer file, are not further enhanced (or
compressed) by image processing algorithms in order to facilitate the biometric au-
thentication, or are enhanced (or compressed) but the scanner pattern information
in them is not substantially altered or destroyed.
A figure in the same patent [Veridicom Patent US’620] shows that when the
distance da between the metal plate and the skin surface, e.g., the depth of a valley,
is over 4 µm, Cf goes below 10 fF , thus it vanishes in Expression 5.11 and therefore
the term representing the fingerprint pattern in practice disappears. In addition,
from the same figure, it is also clear that for da ≥ 2 µm, Ceq (= Cm+Cf ) effectively
flattens out to about 200 fF ≈ Cm, i.e., the effect of the finger on it can be neglected,
and Ceq becomes as small as when no finger is present/applied to the scanner platen.
Therefore, the pixel value at a sufficiently large/deep valley will be approximately
equal to the pixel value of an image that is acquired with no object applied to the






Constructing a model for the composite signal of the two imperfections of the
fingerprint scanners, the scanner pattern and the scanner noise, as introduced in
Section 5.4.3, and the fingerprint pattern as well as characterizing these three signals
is critically important for the design of the advanced algorithms and optimizing their
parameters. The image shown in Figure 5.2 is an image acquired without any object
applied to the scanner, i.e., the fingerprint pattern is not present. The variations in
the pixel values across the image (enlarged as image B on the right in Figure 5.2)
are due both to the scanner pattern and to the scanner noise, and separating the
two when only a single image is available, even in this simple case, is not trivial.
We will show that this separation, in general, can be avoided for the purposes
of authenticating the scanner. Nevertheless, understanding the characteristics of
these two signals individually, as well as those of the fingerprint pattern, and then
quantifying them (for the purposes of the algorithm design), as accurately as feasible,
is important and is therefore discussed in this section.
We start by revisiting the general observation we made in Section 5.2.4.2.
Figure 5.31 shows blocks of pixels from two images acquired with one and the
same fingerprint scanner (Scanner u105, one of the FIPS-compliant capacitive area
scanners of UPEK). The first image was acquired with air and the second one –
with a fingertip. Since there is no fingerprint pattern in the image with air (in the
upper plots), the pixel nonuniformity can be due only to the combined effect of the
scanner pattern and the scanner noise. On the lower plot, the histogram can be
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split into two general regions: a region with ridges and a region with valleys. The
region with valleys contains the scanner pattern and scanner noise, and is roughly
similar to the histogram in the upper plot.
Image block of 64x64 pixels
fingerprint, u105















Image block of 64x64 pixels
air, u105
















  Scanner pattern
and scanner noise
Valleys: scanner pattern
     and scanner noise
Figure 5.31: Blocks and their histograms from images with air and a fingerprint
Another example for the case when the image contains only the scanner pattern
and the scanner noise is shown in Figure 5.32 (the scanner used is Scanner u116). At
first look, it seems that the histogram is bimodal: next to the dominating Mode 1,
there is another, smaller Mode 2. This suggests that the underlying process might
be a mixture of two different distributions or, if the distribution is only one, then
its parameters may be changing across the scanner area. Therefore, using a simple
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Gaussian model for it will be clearly inaccurate.
















Histogram of the pixels of image #136 acquired by Scanner u116 with air
Mode 1
Mode 2
Figure 5.32: Histogram of an image acquired by a UPEK area scanner with air
Nevertheless, our study showed that with some caveats, the scanner pattern
and the scanner noise can still be assumed to have Gaussian distributions. Once
we established this, the problem of the separation of the scanner pattern and the
fingerprint pattern (and the optimality of the proposed solution) became greatly
simplified. For verification of the normality assumption, we used the conventional
method of applying hypothesis tests for the underlying distribution:
H0 : Gaussian with unknown parameters H1 : otherwise. (5.14)
Since H0 is a composite hypothesis, the parameters of the Gaussian distribution
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have to be estimated from the data, which makes many hypothesis tests not suited
for our problem.
Because of the specifics of the scanner pattern and the scanner noise, our
study concluded that the hypothesis tests have to be both carefully selected and
carefully applied. For this reason, here below we provide a very brief summary
of several hypothesis tests, of their power (the probability to correctly reject the
null hypothesis), and some of their limitations. Generally, the hypothesis tests (for
normality) can be classified in three main groups/types:
1. χ2 Hypothesis Test
The Pearson χ2 goodness-of-fit test is presumably the oldest and the best
known hypothesis test [D’Agostino and Stephens 1986]. Its test statistic is the sum
of the squared differences between the observed frequencies and the expected (the-
oretical) frequencies (asserted by the null hypothesis), normalized by the expected
frequencies. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic asymptotically has a χ2
distribution.
The χ2 test, however, is (much) weaker than the other tests we discuss below.
Furthermore, since it inherently presumes that the sample is drawn from a discrete
distribution, applying it to continuous distributions makes the test even less accurate
as the data is artificially grouped into bins. This becomes a significant problem when
the number of bins is too small as a lot of information is lost due to the grouping.
In addition, there is a necessary minimum (i.e., 5) for the expected frequency per
bin.
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Nevertheless, the χ2 test is very well studied, can be applied to any null-
hypothesis distribution, and can be easily adapted (by decreasing the degrees of
freedom of the asymptotic sampling distribution) to test a composite hypothesis
(as our case is). Furthermore, it also provides an additional advantage for testing
grouped (categorical) data as the centers of the bins can predetermined. This is
particularly important for the scanner noise because the quantization is too coarse
for it. We use this by setting the centers of the bins to integers, being the grayscale
levels (from 0 to 255) of the image pixels, that span the signal range; we call this
test centered χ2. Finally, another advantage of the χ2 test (for us) is its insensitivity
to outliers as it inherently groups them in the outer bins.
As a computer program, we used the MATLAB implementation of the χ2
test (chi2gof.m), which, along with the other MATLAB hypothesis tests discussed
below, is available in the Statistics Toolbox of MATLAB.
2. EDF-based Hypothesis Tests
The empirical distribution function (EDF) is arguably the main “tool” we
used not only in the hypothesis tests, but also for studying other aspects of the
signal characteristics. A powerful group of hypothesis tests based on the EDF uses
the distance between the EDF and the CDF of the null hypothesis. Depending on
how the test statistic is computed from this distance, the tests in this group can
be further classified into two main subgroups: (a) the test statistic is a function of
the extremities in this difference, such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and (b) the
test statistic is a function of the average (integral), also potentially weighted, of this
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distance, such as the Cramer-von Mises and the Anderson-Darling tests.
From subgroup (a), the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, unfortunately, cannot be
used for a composite hypothesis. [Lilliefors 1967] extended the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test for normality when the mean and the variance are unknown by using Monte
Carlo simulations. In our tests, we used the MATLAB implementation of the Lil-
liefors test (lillietest.m).
For subgroup (b), our study on the topic concluded that the most powerful test
in this subgroup and for which we could find an implementation is the Anderson-
Darling test ([Anderson and Darling 1952] and [Anderson and Darling 1954]). It
is also a good omnibus test and is comparable in power to the Jarque-Bera test
(discussed below). The Anderson-Darling test also does not have problems with
outliers because it is EDF based.
This test is an extension of the Cramer-von Mises test that further incor-
porates a weighting function that places more weight on the tails of the distribu-
tion, thus making it more sensitive in the tails. It can also be used for a compos-
ite hypothesis. We found a free implementation of the test (AnDartest.m) from
[Trujillo-Ortiz et al. 2007], which we compared and verified with the methodology
for the test as described in [D’Agostino and Stephens 1986] before using it.
The main problem of the EDF-based tests is with discrete distributions, es-
pecially with signals that are quantized very coarsely. Nevertheless, the Anderson-
Darling test is one we used very extensively by applying it where the quantization
problem is not severe.
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3. Moment-based Hypothesis Tests
The test statistic in this group is a function of one or several statistical mo-
ments. The advantage of these tests over the EDF-based tests is that the former
do not suffer from the coarse quantization problem; however, as a downside, their
accuracy is very low in the presence of outliers. For this reason, we had to remove
the outliers before applying them to our signals.
For this group of tests, our study concluded that the most powerful one is the
Jarque-Bera test [Jarque and Bera 1987], which is specifically designed for alterna-
tives in the Pearson system of distributions. It is also claimed to be more powerful
than the Shapiro-Wilk and the Shapiro-Francia tests (again from the same group).
The Jarque-Bera test statistic is a function of the sum of the squared sample
skewness and the squared sample (excess) kurtosis. Under Gaussian null hypothe-
sis, it asymptotically has a χ2 distribution with two degrees of freedom. A problem
of this test is that for small sample sizes, the χ2 approximation is not sufficiently
accurate and the test often incorrectly rejects the null hypothesis. We used the
MATLAB implementation of the test (jbtest.m), which for small sample sizes (be-
low 2,000, which is our case) uses tables computed with Monte Carlo simulations.
Because of the specifics of the signals of interest for us, to study their charac-
teristics, we used those hypothesis tests which are more likely to give accurate results
for the particular signal in question. Furthermore, whenever possible, we also tried
to use more than one test – at least one test from each group, as a cross-check.
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5.4.1 Scanner Noise
With scanner noise we denote the combined effect of all time-varying factors
that result in short-term variations, i.e., from within several seconds to much faster,
in the pixel values of consecutively acquired images under exactly the same acqui-
sition conditions (e.g., when the fingertip applied to the scanner is not changed
in position, the force with which the fingertip is pressed to the scanner platen is
kept constant, and the skin moisture is unchanged) and under exactly the same
environmental conditions (e.g., without changes in the temperature, air humidity,
or air pressure). Examples for factors contributing to the scanner noise are the
thermal, shot, flicker, and so on noises that are present in any electronic circuit,
and the quantization noise, which is the distortion introduced by the conversion of
an analog signal into a digital signal. Other contributing noise sources may also
exist, but identifying and quantifying them without details about the specific scan-
ner implementation, which information is proprietary, is very difficult, and we have,
therefore, made no effort to do so. A plausible assumption is that the combined ef-
fect of all such factors is similar to the combined effect of many noise sources, which
is modeled as a (temporal additive) noise in, for example, communication systems.
Therefore, of importance for our study are the statistical characteristics only of this
aggregation of all short-term temporal noise sources.
Certainly, reproducing the exact same conditions in two consecutive image ac-
quisitions when the object applied to the scanner platen is a fingertip is impossible
and remains an abstraction we use only to define the scanner noise. However, it is
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still possible to ensure that the acquisition and environmental conditions in consecu-
tive image acquisitions are sufficiently similar with another object, a predetermined
one, whose application onto the scanner platen can naturally satisfy the similarity
requirement. Because of the specificity of the capacitive sensing, the predetermined
object that works best for both Signal Model A and Signal Model B (see Expres-
sions 5.9 and 5.12), is air, i.e., no object applied to the scanner platen. It is possible,
however, to use other predetermined objects, e.g., water. In case the predetermined
object is air, f(i, j) = 0, the expressions for both signal models greatly simplify, and
the pixel values at row index i and column index j for either signal model become:
g(po)(i, j) = s(i, j) + n(i, j, t) (5.15)
To study the characteristics of the scanner noise, we acquired 300 images with air
with each of the 22 UPEK area scanners (Scanners u101 through u122, without
u104 and u109, as well as u151 and u152; see the appendix, Section 6.1 for details),
in three groups, each group containing 100 images. The second group was acquired
about 1.5 years after the first group, and the third group – within a couple of days
after the second group. The images in each group were acquired consecutively,
immediately one after each other (with few exceptions in the first group where some
images were acquired over a period of a couple of days). The time interval between
two consecutive image acquisitions was at least 2 seconds: the time needed for
the sensor matrix to acquire the electrical signal and sample it out, then for the
image transfer over the USB interface, and finally to be saved as a bitmap file in
the computer. However, no attempt was made to keep the time interval between
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two consecutive image acquisitions constant; thus, only the minimum time period
between the consecutive image acquisitions is 2 seconds. All images per scanner
in a group were acquired within several minutes, and it is therefore reasonable
to assume that the scanner pattern remained constant within each group of 100
images. The scanner pattern of each scanner, however, did change from one group
to another, mainly because of temperature, humidity, and air pressure differences
on the different days of acquisition. Besides these factors, another major factor,
however, may have created even larger variations in the values of certain pixels or
even areas of pixels in the acquired images – the impurities on the scanner platen. We
put a considerable effort into carefully cleaning the scanner platen when acquiring
images with air; however, small particles (including dust) remained, particularly in
the areas close to the edges of the platen where cleaning was difficult. The presence of
such impurities can make the estimation of the scanner pattern and characterization
of the scanner noise considerably inaccurate. However hard we tried to limit the
impact of the impurities, they are still present and even noticeable in some of the
images.
We also acquired 300 images with air with the Veridicom/Fujitsu scanner (v1,
see the appendix, Section 6.1). However, most of these 300 images were acquired
within a five-day period (one group per day). Also, the minimum time interval
between two consecutive image acquisitions for this scanner was considerably larger
– about 10 seconds – due to limitations of the acquisition software and the hardware
interface to the computer.
Since it is not possible to determine exactly the time t in Expression 5.15, we
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instead denote with an index the corresponding pixel value and scanner noise. Thus,
if k is the k-th image with air acquired with a particular scanner in this sequence of




k (i, j) = s(i, j) + nk(i, j) (5.16)
Our initial observation and working assumption was that the scanner noise has
a Gaussian distribution. However, the later, detailed study showed that the validity
of this assumption is difficult to be verified accurately, and for some of the pixels it
may not hold true. Furthermore, the scanner noise, as a time-varying factor that
changes the pixel values of the images acquired with air (see Expression 5.15), is
presumably mainly a temporal process and thus its temporal characteristics need to
be quantified. However, the advanced algorithms estimate the scanner pattern from
a single image and therefore they need to take into account primarily the spatial
characteristics of the scanner noise, i.e., the characteristics across a single image
at a given time instant. Because of the specificity of the acquisition process on
hardware level (see Section 5.3), the temporal and the spatial characteristics of the
scanner noise are not necessarily the same. Therefore, we studied them separately.
Before proceeding, however, we first discuss the impact of the signal quantization
on the hypothesis tests because the problem the quantization creates is significantly
more pronounced for the scanner noise for than it is the scanner pattern (and it is,
therefore, easier to study for the scanner noise).
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5.4.2 Quantization and Signal Amplitude Distribution
Unfortunately, the only signal available to our study was the amplitude-quantized
(and space-sampled) version of the analog, nonquantized signal acquired by the sen-
sor elements. As already explained, the scale resolution of the fingerprint scanners,
which for capacitive scanners is at most 8 bits/pixel, is designed to facilitate the
fingerprint recognition but is not sufficiently fine for high-accuracy estimation of
the scanner pattern and especially for characterizing the scanner noise. With 8
bits/pixel, the range of the pixel values in an image is from 0 to 255; the step size
is 1. The typical scanner noise variance, estimated from such images, is around 2
for Signal Model A and around 1 for Signal Model B. With such small values of
the standard deviation (from 1 to 1.4), one can expect that so coarse quantization
significantly alters the nonquantized scanner noise. Although the variance of the
scanner pattern (as estimated from the image pixels) is much larger than that of
the scanner noise (typically about 10 to 15 times larger), this coarse quantization
may also affect the much stronger scanner pattern and its accurate estimation.
When quantizing so coarsely a nonquantized signal with a Gaussian distribu-
tion, the distribution of the resultant quantized signal, even very approximately,
is not necessarily Gaussian. The conventionally assumed probability distribution
of the error, introduced by this conversion, between the nonquantized signal and
its quantized version is uniform; this error is also modeled as a noise added to the
signal being quantized and is called quantization “noise.” This model, however, is
sufficiently accurate when (a) the signal being quantized is sufficiently random and
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(b) the quantization step is sufficiently small (with respect to the signal dynamic
range). The quantization of a periodic (or pseudo-periodic) signal results in a peri-
odic distortion (called spurious tones); the quantization with a large step size results
in significant changes in the signal amplitude distribution, which is discussed next.
Performing hypothesis tests on coarsely quantized signals may produce inaccu-
rate results, but we observed that by running carefully selected hypothesis tests and
taking into account the specifics of their operation, we can draw conclusions about
the (possible) characteristics of the nonquantized signal that becomes the scanner
noise, as we define and can estimate from the images. For example, it is reasonable
to expect that hypothesis tests based on EDF metrics that do not inherently parti-
tion the EDF into bins will often reject the null hypothesis for the quantized signal
even when the nonquantized signal is Gaussian. Since studying theoretically the
effects of quantization on the signal probability distribution was beyond the scope
of this thesis and quantifying them precisely was not necessary for developing the
advanced algorithms, we studied the process only by simulations. These simula-
tions, one of which we illustrate next, gave us insight on which hypothesis tests are
more likely to be less affected by the quantization and how to use them in order to
study the scanner noise by mitigating the quantization artifacts.
We generated toy signals with Gaussian distribution with the (built-in) MAT-
LAB function randn(), which generates a sequence of normally distributed num-
bers using a pseudorandom generator. The toy nonquantized signal is one such
sequence of 100 numbers with Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance
equal to 2 (which is representative for Signal Model A); in MATLAB code this is:
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randn(100,1)*sqrt(2). For quantization, we assumed truncation (the MATLAB
function floor()) as this is the most typical quantization used in analog-to-digital
converters (we don’t have information about the converter used in the UPEK or
Veridicom scanners). The time sequences of one such simulation are shown in Fig-
ure 5.33.























Figure 5.33: Quantization of a toy signal: time sequences
Figure 5.34 shows the EDF of the nonquantized signal, together with the fitted
to it Gaussian CDF (with mean 0.0632 and variance 1.7475, the MLE estimates from
the nonquantized signal) and the EDF of the quantized signal, together with the
fitted to it Gaussian CDF (with mean -0.46 and variance 1.8267, the MLE estimates
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from the quantized signal); the true Gaussian CDF with mean 0 and variance 2 is
also shown.




















EDFs of the nonquantized and quantized signals 
and CDFs of the fitted Gaussians to them, along with the true Gaussian
 
 
EDF of the nonquantized signal
Gaussian CDF fitted to the nonquantized signal
Gaussian CDF with the true parameters
EDF of the quantized signal
Gaussian CDF fitted to the quantized signal




Fitted to the nonquantized signal:
Gaussian N(0.0632, 1.7475)
Figure 5.34: Quantization of a toy signal: EDFs and fitted CDFs
It is clear that the EDF of the nonquantized signal is extremely close to the
true Gaussian CDF. In fact, even the two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (with
mean and variance of the true Gaussian CDF) fails to reject the null hypothesis at
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0.05 significance level; actually, the p-value of the test is quite large (0.8393) and
thus there is extremely little evidence to reject the null hypothesis. In contrast,
the same test for the EDF of the quantized signal gives a p-value of 0.01188, thus
rejecting the null hypothesis at 0.05 significance level and narrowly failing to reject
the null hypothesis at 0.01 significance level. (The latter test was run for a null
hypothesis with mean -0.5 as to compensate for the offset in the mean introduced
by the truncation, which is 1
2
of the step size). Running the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test on other toy signals produced p-values well below 0.01, but we decided to provide
this example as an evidence that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test may sometimes fail
to reject the null hypothesis at a significance level that is not sufficiently small.
Nevertheless, our conclusion is that it also reasonable to believe that any EDF-
based hypothesis test from both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Cramer-von Mises
group will very likely reject the null hypothesis for the quantized signal (the results
of other tests are shown later).
Figure 5.35 shows the same distributions, but on a normal probability plot,
where is easier to judge by eye as the EDFs are compared with straight lines. This
figure gave us the idea that a hypothesis test that groups the signal values in bins
centered at the integer numbers may not suffer from the quantization problem; a
test that can be easily adapted in this way is the χ2 test.
We also generated another set of toy signals with a smaller variance, equal to
1, which is intended to represent Signal Model B (although the scanner noise there
has peculiar behavior). Here the quantization problem is much more severe as the
quantized signal effectively occupies only 5 levels: -2, -1, 0, 1, and 2.
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Probability plots of the nonquantized signal, the quantized signal, 
the true Gaussian, and fitted Gaussians to the nonquantized and quantized signal
The true Gaussian N(0, 2)
Fitted to the quantized signal:
Gaussian N(−0.46, 1.8267)
Nonquantized signal
Fitted to the nonquantized signal:
Gaussian N(0.0632, 1.7475)
Quantized signal
Figure 5.35: Quantization of a toy signal: normal probability plots
To study the applicability of the hypothesis tests for testing the quantized
signal, we ran several of the tests on the already discussed nonquantized signal with
variance 2 and on its quantized version, and on another such pair of signals from
the second set, with variance 1. The p-values of the tests are shown in Table 5.9.
Each test estimates the parameters of the Gaussian distribution from the signal. All
tests fail to reject the null hypothesis for the nonquantized signal even at 0.5 signif-
icance level (when the p-value is beyond the largest tabulated value, the MATLAB
141
implementations of the Jarque-Bera and Lilliefors tests return p-values of 0.5).
Variance=1 Variance=1 Variance=2 Variance=2
Hypothesis test Nonquantized Quantized Nonquantized Quantized
χ2 0.8477 4.935e-20 0.6201 1.024e-08
χ2 centered N/A 0.6005 N/A 0.9563
Jarque-Bera > 0.5 > 0.5 > 0.5 > 0.5
Lilliefors > 0.5 < 0.001 > 0.5 < 0.001
Anderson-Darling 0.7732 1.414e-10 0.8313 9.584e-06
Table 5.9: Quantization of toy signals: p-values of several hypothesis tests
As expected, the EDF-based Lilliefors and Anderson-Darling tests reject the
null hypothesis for both quantized signals even at 0.001 significance level (the MAT-
LAB implementation of the Lilliefors test returns a p-value of 0.001 when the p-value
is smaller than the smallest tabulated value). The regular χ2 test also rejects the
null hypothesis for both quantized signals with overwhelming evidence; however,
the centered χ2 test fails to reject the null hypothesis with p-values well above 0.5
for both quantized signals. Furthermore, the moment-based Jarque-Bera test also
fails to reject the null hypothesis for both quantized signals with p-values above 0.5,
thus making it also a good candidate for hypothesis testing of the actual signals,
the scanner noise and scanner pattern. Therefore, for signal characterization, we
focused on using the centered χ2 and the Jarque-Bera tests, while running the other
tests for comparison.
Note: the documentation of the function chi2gof.m describes that “[the] bins
in either tail with an expected count less than 5 are pooled with neighboring bins
until the count in each extreme bin is at least 5.” Thus, it is possible that there is
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no bin at each and every integer number in the tails if testing a quantized signal
when calling the function with an option that sets the centers of the bins (case “χ2
centered” in Table 5.9 above).
A possible question that may arise is why we focus on hypothesis tests only
for normality. The reason is this: the study of the fingerprint scanner acquisition
hardware along with the conventionally known characteristics of variability and
noise in electronic devices strongly suggested that our signals of interest in the
analog domain have Gaussian distributions, making the Gaussian distribution a
strong candidate for the null hypothesis. The coarse quantization, however, may
distort these signals upon conversion so that the signals that we measure and can
estimate from the digital images may appear as produced by non-Gaussian sources.
In order to avoid possible artifacts of the hypothesis tests when used with so coarse
quantization, we examined the operation of the tests and selected those of them
that are likely to produce the most truthful results. If the Gaussian assumption,
barring the quantization problem, holds true for a significantly large portion of the
signals, we can use the conventional theory of signal processing to design simple,
optimal, and robust algorithms. Assuming and modeling non-Gaussian signals only
because of the coarse quantization problem is not only much less tractable and
more difficult, but it may have also led to unnecessarily complex and potentially
non-robust algorithms.
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5.4.2.1 Scanner Noise: Temporal Characteristics
Before quantifying the temporal characteristics of the scanner noise, we present
one example specifically chosen to illustrate the noise process in time. As already
explained, it was very difficult to ensure image acquisitions at precise, regular time
intervals, so we put no effort to achieve this. Therefore, the image index in a group
cannot be considered as a time stamp of the acquisition event, but only as a sequence
index. The pixel values g
(po)
k (143, 108) (see Expression 5.16) of the pixel at row 143
and column 108 of Scanner u106 for the sequence of images are shown in Figure 5.36.
The three groups of 100 images, each acquired with air, are:
• Group 1 – images 1 through 100: acquired consecutively within about 5 min-
utes; thus, the time between each two consecutive images is about 3 seconds;
• Group 2 – images 101 through 200: acquired consecutively within about
30 minutes. This group of images was acquired about 1 year and 8 months
after those in Group 1;
• Group 3 – images 201 through 300: acquired consecutively within about
4 minutes. This group of images was acquired 3 days after those in Group 2.
Since the scanner noise is zero mean (by assumption) and that the scanner pat-
tern does not change within short periods of time (by definition), the pixel value
variations within each group represent the scanner noise. Therefore, by subtracting
the sample mean (of each group) from the pixel values within that group, we could
have presented (in Figure 5.36) only the scanner noise. We, however, decided to
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Pixel values of the pixel at row 143 and column 108 
of Scanner u106 for three groups, each of 100 images, with air
 
 
Group 1: images     1...100
Group 2: images 101...200
Group 3: images 201...300
Figure 5.36: Temporal values of pixel (143,108) of Scanner u106 for the 3 groups
present the pixel values without subtracting the sample mean and then study the
signal characteristics by analyzing the pixel values as they are in the images because
in this way we do not introduce artifacts that may possibly impact the hypothesis
tests. The temporal characteristics, computed separately for each group of images,
of are shown in Table 5.10.
The first observation in Table 5.10 is that the sample mean of Group 1 is very
different from the sample means of Group 2 and Group 3 – the difference is about
2 grayscale levels and thus about 14 times larger than the standard error of the




Signal Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
characteristics images 1. . . 100 images 101. . . 200 images 201. . . 300
Sample mean 204.39 202.54 202.41
Sample variance 2.018 1.907 1.254
Hypothesis tests p-values p-values p-values
χ2 centered 0.4702 0.4859 0.4062
Jarque-Bera 0.0095 0.2907 > 0.5
Lilliefors < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Anderson-Darling 9.691e-07 2.710e-06 1.529e-08
Table 5.10: Temporal characteristics of the values of pixel (143,108) of Scanner u106
0.141 (the sample variance is also shown in Table 5.10). This large difference can
be attributed to one reason: a variation of the scanner pattern (at this particular
pixel), which variation was probably caused by substantially different environmental
conditions in the different days (about 1 year and 8 months apart from each other).
This observation also led to the conclusion that care must be taken when combining
quantities from different groups and images. On the other hand, the difference
between the sample means of Group 2 and Group 3 is 0.13 and thus is within the
standard error of the sample mean. This fact appears to come logically as Group 3
was acquired only 3 days after Group 2, and it is reasonable to believe that the
environmental conditions did not change significantly in the meantime.
The second observation from Table 5.10 is that the sample variances (and
thus the power of the scanner noise) of Group 1 and Group 2 are considerably
different from the sample variance of Group 3, despite the fact that the sample
means of Group 2 and Group 3 are very close. One possible explanation is that the
temperature, air humidity, or air pressure difference between these two acquisition
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days was sufficiently large to change the scanner noise, yet sufficiently small to not
have much impact on the scanner pattern. For example, a temperature drop of
1 degree Celcius (between Group 2 and Group 3) might have been sufficient to
decrease the scanner noise variance (and power) from 1.907 to 1.254, yet insufficient
to change significantly the scanner pattern, decreasing it only slightly from 202.54 to
202.41. This is consistent with our observation (discussed later) that a temperature
drop decreases the scanner pattern; it is also well known that a temperature drop
typically decreases the noise in electronic circuits. Another explanation for this,
however, may be that this difference in the sample means was due solely to the
standard error, in which case a possible temperature drop very little affected the
scanner pattern.
The EDF-based Lilliefors and Anderson-Darling tests (see Table 5.10) both
overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis for this signal, which essentially is the
(quantized) scanner noise. This is expected and the reason for it was already ex-
plained; therefore, we will not use anymore these two tests for scanner noise char-
acterization. The p-values of the centered χ2 test for all three groups are very
large (over 0.4) and fail to reject the null hypothesis, implying that the (quantized)
scanner noise for this particular pixel most likely has a Gaussian distribution; the
p-values are also relatively close to each other. The moment-based Jarque-Bera
test also fails to reject the null hypothesis for Group 2 and Group 3, corroborating
the Gaussian assumption for the scanner noise. The Jarque-Bera test for Group 1,
however, narrowly rejects the null hypothesis even at 0.01 significance level.
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The EDFs, the CDFs of the fitted Gaussians, and the normal probability plots
of the pixel values of the three groups of images are shown in Figure 5.37. One can
notice the remarkable difference between the EDFs (the upper plot) of Group 1 on
one side and of Group 2 and Group 3 on the other. We also made an experiment by
removing the two largest values of the signal of Group 1, shown in the lower plot,
“Trimmed values” (this problem is discussed later). The fitted Gaussian to the
trimmed in this way signal shows a better fit to the EDF. Furthermore, running the
Jarque-Bera test on the trimmed signal results in failure to reject the null hypothesis
with a p-value reported to be larger than 0.5, concurring with the Jarque-Bera test
results for Group 2 and Group 3 and therefore suggesting that the signal, except for
the trimmed values, may be truly Gaussian and that these two pixel values of 209
(out of 300 pixels in all three groups) are outliers. Indeed, the odds of occurrence of
an observation with value as extreme as this one (209) under a Gaussian assumption
are 1 in 1/Q((209 − 204.39)/
√
2.018) ≈ 1704 observations (the sample mean and
variance are taken from Table 5.10, Group 1). In contrast, the second extreme pixel
value of 209 occurred (within the same Group 1!) mere 14 observations after the
first extreme (see Figure 5.36); furthermore, similar extreme values are not present
in Group 2 and Group 3. All this corroborates the hypothesis that the cause for
these extreme values may be a very different, bursty noise component that is present
in the aggregate scanner noise.
Certainly, the presence of such a bursty noise in the scanner noise is not
something that can be overlooked and thus be assumed that the scanner noise in time
has a Gaussian distribution as it may lead to instability of the algorithms for scanner
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EDFs of the pixel values of the 3 groups of images and CDFs of fitted Gaussians to them 
Pixel row 143 and column 108 of Scanner u106 for 3 groups, each of 100 images, with air 




















Probability plots of the pixel values for Group 1 and a fitted Gaussian to it
Group 1: images 1...100
Fitted Gaussian to the original signal
Fitted Gaussian to the trimmed signal
Signal
Trimmed values
Group 2: images 101...200
Group 3: images 201...300
Figure 5.37: EDFs and probability plots of the temporal values of pixel (143,108)
pattern estimation (because the scanner pattern and scanner noise essentially cannot
be separated if a single image is used, as it will become clear later). Nevertheless,
the advanced algorithms are sufficiently robust to accommodate this bursty noise.
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Since we wanted to quantify as accurately as possible the temporal charac-
teristics of the scanner noise, excluding this bursty component, and thus verify the
validity of the general Gaussian assumption, we used a rudimentary method to de-
tect and exclude such outliers from the hypothesis tests because, as already shown,
outliers can severely affect the hypothesis tests, in particular the Jarque-Bera test
which is moment based. For this detection, before applying the hypothesis test,
we exclude (“trim”) the pixels with values farther than ±3s̄ away from the sample
mean, where s̄ is the sample standard deviation. We believe that this trimming
leads to negligible impact on the test accuracy for a truly Gaussian noise as only
about 0.27% of such noise observations will be excluded from the test.
In addition, besides the outliers, there exist also pixels that are defective (called
“dead pixels”) and do not operate properly (probably due to hardware malfunction),
producing a constant value (typically 253), even when the applied object is a fin-
gertip at different positions. Obviously, such pixels have to also be excluded from
the hypothesis tests. It is important to note, however, that these dead pixels have
peculiar behavior as once in a while their value may change; this erratic behavior is
difficult to be detected automatically and consequently excluded from the hypothe-
sis tests with the routines we wrote and thus may have produced inaccuracy in the
hypothesis tests.
The EDFs of the p-values of the centered χ2 and the Jarque-Bera tests with no
trimming and with the 3σ trimming are shown in Figure 5.38 (the trimming of dead
pixels is always active). Each p-value in the figure is the result of a hypothesis test
over the sample of 100 pixel values g
(po)
k (i, j) (see Expression 5.16) of the images
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in one of the three groups, each of 100 images. Each point on the EDF curve
represents the percentage of pixels whose p-values are smaller than the p-value of
this point. For example, at p-value of 0.05, the EDF curve of the centered χ2 test
with no trimming has value 0.483, which means that 48.3% of the pixels have the
null hypothesis rejected by the centered χ2 test (when no trimming is done) at 0.05
significance level, i.e., the p-value on the abscissa, because their p-values are smaller
than 0.05. The EDF curves shown in the figure are those which have the largest EDF
value (at a given p-value) among the three groups of images (i.e., the highest of the
three curves), thus providing the worst-case percentage of pixels for which the null
hypothesis gets rejected at the corresponding level of significance. The total number
of pixels of an image (for the UPEK area scanners used) is (360 ∗ 256) = 92, 160.
Figure 5.38 shows only the p-values from 0 to 0.1 as only these levels of signif-
icance are of potential interest for us and particularly the significance levels of 0.01
and 0.05 (the dash-dotted grid lines). For either one of these two significance levels,
both tests with no trimming reject the null hypothesis for a substantial percentage
of the pixels, with the Jarque-Bera test rejecting well above 50% of the pixels. This
result is not surprising because the moment-based Jarque-Bera test is sensitive to
outliers. Trimming the outliers at 3σ significantly reduces the percentage of rejected
pixels to about 10% to 12% at 0.01 significance level and to about 25% at 0.05 sig-
nificance level. It is also remarkable that with this trimming, the EDF curves of
the two hypothesis tests, albeit of very different types, are very close to each other.
In contrast with the case when no trimming is done, the two EDF curves are far
apart. To study the effect of the trimming level, we increased it from 3σ to 4σ, in
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EDFs of the p−values of the centered χ2 and Jarque−Bera tests 









              Hypothesis tests
Red solid lines:      Jarque−Bera
Blue dashed lines:  χ2 centered
Figure 5.38: EDFs of the p-values of the centered χ2 and Jarque-Bera tests for the
temporal scanner noise, Scanner u106
which case the EDF curves were essentially the same as for the case of no trimming,
indirectly indicating that most outliers are from 3σ to 4σ away (roughly) from the
mean.
Since the Jarque-Bera test appears to be more conservative than the centered
χ2 test (see Figure 5.38), to generalize these observations for all scanners, we ran
the Jarque-Bera test on all 3 groups of images for all scanners. We recorded the
percentage of pixels for which the null hypothesis is rejected at 0.01 and 0.05 levels
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of significance and then took the maximum percentage (as the worst case) among
the percentages for the three groups, at each significance level. The results for the
UPEK scanners, provided in the appendix, Table 6.7, show that the scanner noise
distribution in time cannot be assumed to be Gaussian at 0.01 significance level for
about 7.5% to 13% of the pixels and for about 18% to 28% of the pixels at 0.05
significance level, the more conservative significance level.
For the Veridicom scanner, however, the results are considerably different.
Here the scanner noise (in time) varies so little relatively to the quantization step
that for most pixels, their values occupy only 2 or 3 levels. With so high a level of
“quantization noise,” it is expected that the Gaussian hypothesis for the nonquan-
tized scanner noise (in time) cannot be verified truthfully as the number of levels
are insufficient for accurate hypothesis testing. For example, the χ2 composite test
requires at least 4 bins as then it has the lowest degree of freedom, which is 1 (the
degree of the asymptotic distribution is the number of bins–1–the number of parame-
ters to be estimated from the data); thus, the χ2 test essentially cannot be used here.
The problem is compounded by the presence of outliers with very high amplitudes,
which we also observed here. Nevertheless, we ran the Jarque-Bera test on Scanner
v1 and computed that for about 26% of the pixels at 0.01 significance level and
for about 51% of the pixels at 0.05 significance level, the scanner noise cannot be
assumed to have a Gaussian distribution, which are roughly twice the percentages
as for the UPEK scanners. The details are also provided in the appendix, Table 6.7.
The presence of outliers in the scanner noise of the UPEK scanners is consid-
erable, especially close to the edges and in the bottom about 100 rows of the images.
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In Figure 5.39, the upper plot shows the pixel values of the pixel at row 355 and
column 1 of Scanner u106 for the 100 images in Group 1; the lower plot shows the
EDF of the pixel values. The extreme value of 240 is clearly an outlier. To illustrate
how much different it is from the rest of the signal, we computed several statistics.
First, the sample mean is 216.59, very close to the median 216, which implies that
the effect of the outlier (in this group of 100 pixels) on the sample mean is limited.
The sample variance, however, is significant – 6.85. Computing the sample mean
and the sample variance without the outlier gives 216.35 and 1.2717, respectively,
and even though the sample mean in the two cases is similar, the sample variance
with the outlier is over 5 times larger than without it. Running the centered χ2
and the Jarque-Bera tests on the signal with the outlier, without surprise, rejects
the null hypothesis (the p-value of the centered χ2 test is 3.31e-18). When the out-
lier is removed, the p-value of the centered χ2 test increases to 0.0211 and that of
the Jarque-Bera – to 0.0201, thus very close to that of the centered χ2 test; both
tests reject the null hypothesis at 0.05 significance level, but fail to reject it at 0.01
significance level.
The existence of outliers in the scanner noise is important and has to be
considered in the algorithm design, but our advanced algorithms are robust against
them. Furthermore, we neither need nor use information about the likelihood of
appearance of outliers in different areas of the image (and the scanner). Nevertheless,
to illustrate how different the magnitude of the outliers can be in different parts of
the image, we developed a simple metric for comparison. For the values of a pixel
in the group of 100 images, the ratio between the maximum absolute deviation (in
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Pixel values of the pixel at row 355 and column 1 
of Scanner u106 for Group 1, 100 images with air















EDF of the pixel values
Figure 5.39: Temporal values and their EDF of the pixel (355,1), located on the
platen edge of Scanner u106, for 100 images
either direction, positive or negative) from the median and the median provides
a relatively accurate basis for comparison. For example, this ratio for the signal,
shown in Figure 5.39, with the outlier present is 0.1111, while after removing it, the
ratio drops to 0.0185, which is 6 times smaller. These ratios for all pixels of three
columns of the same Scanner u106 are shown in Figure 5.40. The three columns
are:
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• Column 1 (at the image edge): the ratios are predominantly well above 0.02.
The mean of the ratios is 0.0302;
• Column 10 (close to the image edge): the ratios are noticeably smaller than
those of Column 1. Their mean decreases 0.0251;
• Column 100 (about in the middle of the image): with the exception of the
last 100 rows, almost all ratios are 0.015 and smaller. The mean of the ratios
further decreases to 0.0151, which is half of the mean of Column 1 ratios.
Estimation of the Variance of the Scanner Noise in Time
In addition to its amplitude distribution, the other most important charac-
teristic of the scanner noise is its variance. Since the scanner pattern does not
change in short periods of time (by definition), the sample variance of the values
of a pixel across all images, acquired with air, in a group will provide the sample
variance of the scanner noise (see Expression 5.16). From the preceding discussion,
it is clear that the outliers play a significant role in the sample variance and may
increase it considerably if not removed before computing it. On the other hand,
the outliers may have different probability of occurrence in the different areas of
the scanners (and images); therefore, it is very difficult, if even possible, to remove
these outliers from the composite signal while extracting the scanner pattern from
it. For this reason, completely neglecting the impact that the outliers have on the
signal will be incorrect. Since the scanner noise variance, although indirectly, is an
input parameter to the advanced algorithms, we computed an estimate of it. We
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Figure 5.40: Ratios between the maximum deviation and the median for 3 columns
of Scanner u106
have to emphasize, however, that the advanced algorithms do not use the scanner
noise variance separately and, therefore, it is not required that it is estimated very
accurately. Furthermore, as discussed further, the scanner noise variance depends
also on the particular scanner; we also observed that the scanner noise variance also
depends on the temperature and other environmental factors.
In the process of looking for a sufficiently accurate estimate, we observed that
only a small percentage of the pixels (of a given scanner) produce noise observations
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with large-valued outliers. Figure 5.41 shows the EDFs (for one scanner of UPEK
and one scanner of Veridicom) of the sample variances of all pixels of a scanner,
computed within one group of 100 images (for the other two groups, the EDFs
are essentially the same). For Scanner u106 (UPEK), although some of the pixels
have variance well above 10, the variance of 71% of the pixels is below 2 and of
92% of the pixels – below 3, which appears to be the “knee” point of the curve,
suggesting that the outliers are pronounced only in the remaining about 8% of the
pixels. Thus, not surprisingly, when averaging the sample variances of all pixels for
this particular group, the average sample variance is only 1.8724. The EDFs for
three other scanners of UPEK (u113, u122, and u151) are practically the same (not
shown in the figure) and differ slightly only in the numbers: the percentage of pixels
with sample variances below 2 is in the range from 72% to 75%, and below 3 – in
the range from 91% to 93%. The EDF for Scanner v1 (Veridicom) is similar, with
about 81% of the pixels having variance below 1 and about 91% – variance below
2.5; the average sample variance across all pixels of the scanner is 0.8903.
Considering all discussed above, as a sufficiently good estimate that takes into
account the stated limitations, we decided that the conventional sample variance
will be accurate enough. Therefore, we first computed the sample variance for each
pixel of a given scanner separately for each of the 3 groups. Then we averaged the
variances for all pixels per scanner and per group; these three variances per scanner
and per group were next averaged to compute the average variance per scanner.
Finally, all average variances per scanner were averaged across all scanners and this
is the average scanner noise variance in time that we assume for each signal model.
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EDFs of the sample variances per pixel for all pixels per scanner, 





Figure 5.41: EDFs of the sample variances of the temporal scanner noise for 2
scanners
The detailed results are provided in Table 6.6 in the appendix, and in summary:
• Signal Model A (UPEK scanners): the sample variance per scanner ranges
from 1.392 to 2.035, with average variance across all scanners 1.785;
• Signal Model B (Veridicom scanner): the sample variance for the scanner we
have is 0.885.
Finally, to characterize the scanner noise in time, besides the probability dis-
tribution, we also need to study, at least, how much correlated in time the ob-
servations are. This, unfortunately, is not possible with our setup (hardware and
software) and the currently acquired images because the time interval between two
consecutive image acquisitions varies and cannot be controlled sufficiently precisely
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in order to render an accurate estimation of the temporal autocorrelation function
of the scanner noise. The reason we did not put any further effort in quantifying the
temporal correlation of the scanner noise is because it is not important – since the
advanced algorithms use a single image to estimate the scanner pattern, of greater
importance is not the temporal, but the spatial correlation, and generally the spatial
characteristics, of the scanner noise, which is discussed in the next section.
5.4.2.2 Scanner Noise: Spatial Characteristics
Quantifying the scanner noise in time domain is important, but its charac-
teristics in space, i.e., across the scanner platen area in a single image, are even
more important as our objective is to estimate the scanner pattern from a single
image. The upper plot of Figure 5.42 shows an image with air; it is visible that
the area with largest row indices (close to 360) and especially close to the edges
are consistently brighter than the other areas, suggesting that even with a perfect
predetermined object (air), there are gradient effects and other anomalies in the
pixel values. This is shown in the lower plot: for the row indices above about 250
for column 120 (roughly the middle column in the image), the pixel values exhibit
an upward trend. On the other hand, for the edge column 1, the trend is downward
and present across most rows.
For this reason, computing the sample mean along each column and sub-
tracting it from the pixels in a column will not yield an accurate estimate of the
scanner noise (nor of the scanner pattern). However, by averaging many pixel values
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An image acquired with air by Scanner u106 (rotated on 90 Deg to match the lower plot)

































Figure 5.42: Image acquired with air by Scanner u106 and two columns of it
g(po)(i, j) (see Expression 5.16) from images acquired with air sequentially by one
and the same scanner, we can compute the best estimate of the scanner pattern
s(i, j) because the sample mean over time of the scanner noise n(i, j, t) at each pixel
will tend to 0 (the law of large numbers) as with respect to time, the scanner noise
is (assumed) a zero-mean random process. Thus, if g
(po)
k (i, j) is the pixel value of
the k-th image acquired with a particular scanner, then the estimate of the scanner








k (i, j) (5.17)
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It is important to note that this scanner pattern estimate is only valid for the
particular group of images it is estimated from (and for the date and time at which
these images were acquired); therefore, K in Expression 5.21 in our case is 100. As
already discussed in Section 5.4.2.1, by averaging 100 images, the standard error of
the sample mean is about sqrt(sample variance/sample size) ≈
√
2/100 ≈ 0.141,
which believe is sufficiently low (the last expression uses 2 as the worst-case scanner
noise variance in time domain). Finally, the scanner noise estimate at each pixel
(and for each image) is (Expression 5.18):
n̂k(i, j) = g
(po)
k (i, j)− ŝ(i, j) (5.18)
The upper plot of Figure 5.43 shows one column in an image acquired with
air and the scanner pattern estimate, and the lower plot shows the scanner noise
estimate computed by subtracting the former two. An important observation can
be made here: it seems that the scanner noise estimate does not occupy a discrete,
finite set of values, i.e., the effect of quantization seems to be absent. This can be
explained with the fact that the scanner pattern estimate is an average and thus,
unlike the pixel values in an image, it is not over a discrete set of values. This is
also visible from Figure 5.44, which shows the EDFs of the scanner noise estimate
for two columns (column 120 is the same as in Figure 5.43). It is also important to
note (a) the very close similarity between the two EDFs and (b) the outliers that
are present in both curves: the very small negative values in column 120 and the
very large positive values in column 1.
To compare the EDF of the scanner noise estimate with the Gaussian distri-
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Pixel values of an image with air and scanner pattern estimate 
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Scanner noise estimate from the pixel values and the scanner pattern estimate 
for column 120 above
Sample mean: 0.019          Sample variance: 1.987
Figure 5.43: Scanner pattern and scanner noise estimates from an image with air
bution, in Figure 5.45 we show the probability plot for column 120 and a Gaussian
distribution fitted to it. The extremely tight fit in the middle of the EDF is truly
remarkable. The outliers beyond 3σ (= 4.228) on both sides around the sample
mean (which is very close to 0) are also visible – the two smallest (negative) values
and the largest (positive) value. What is peculiar, however, are the values between
2σ (= 2.819) and 3σ (= 4.228), again on both sides of the sample mean, both circled
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EDFs of the scanner noise estimates from the pixel values of an image with air





Figure 5.44: EDFs of the spatial scanner noise estimates for two columns (u106)
in the figure, that deviate too much from the Gaussian fit and contribute to heavy
tails. (Note: here we use the term “heavy tails” very loosely, in a sense that these
tails are above the tails of the Gaussian distribution, which is of importance for us,
not that these tails are asymptotically above any decaying exponent). We could not
identify the cause for these heavy tails, but considering the otherwise very good fit
to the Gaussian distribution and that they are typically beyond ±2σ, we believe
they are not of a concern.
Nevertheless, we quantified this deviation from the Gaussian distribution as a
164




0.1   
0.25  
0.5   
0.75  












Normal probability plot for the scanner noise estimate                
for column 120, Scanner u106, and a Gaussian distribution fitted to it
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1σ:   1.409
2σ:   2.819
3σ:   4.228 
Figure 5.45: Normal probability plot of the scanner noise estimate for column 120
percentage of the columns (in an image) for which the null hypothesis can be rejected
by running four hypothesis tests. Figure 5.46 shows the EDFs of the p-values of
these tests performed on the scanner noise estimate for all columns of a single image
(with air); the 3σ trimming removes the outliers from the data. The χ2 test, which
is the least powerful of the four tests, rejects the smallest percentage of the columns
– 5.4% and 16.4% of the columns at 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels, respectively.
As the observations in the tails are grouped in the two outer bins, thus effectively
make the χ2 test insensitive to the tails, which in turn suggests that if ignoring the
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heavy tails, the scanner noise estimates along columns are overwhelmingly Gaussian.
Here we did not use the centered χ2 test because the scanner noise estimates are
not explicitly quantized (as explained earlier) and therefore forcing the centers of
the bins is not necessary (and may even decrease the accuracy of the test).
The next more powerful test, the Lilliefors test, which is essentially a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test with estimated distribution parameters, rejects 7.8% and 21.9% per-
cent of the columns at 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels, respectively, with both
percentages being relatively close to those of the χ2 test. This suggests that the
effect of quantization, although implicitly still present in the scanner noise estimate,
does not have significant impact on this EDF-based hypothesis test and hence the
latter may be used here. Known to have higher sensitivity in the tails than the
Lilliefors/Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the Anderson-Darling test apparently detects
the heavy tails and rejects 2 to 3 times more columns than the χ2 test: 15.6% and
36.7% for the 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels, respectively.
Finally, the moment-based Jarque-Bera test rejects the largest percentage of
columns – 22.7% and 42.2% for the 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels, respectively,
most probably because of the effect of the heavy tails on the sample kurtosis (and
also possibly on the sample skewness) and thus significantly increasing the Jarque-
Bera test statistic. Because of this and because the Jarque-Bera test is known as
one of the most powerful tests, we chose it as one of the tests for the scanner noise
estimate; as a second test, we chose χ2 as it is arguably the most liberal test and
is least sensitive to heavy tails (and outliers). These two tests, in some sense, give
the upper and the lower bound on the percentage of columns for which a Gaussian
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assumption would be inaccurate.












EDFs of the p−values of several hypothesis tests, trimming at ±3σ, 



















Figure 5.46: EDFs of the p-values of 4 hypothesis tests for the spatial scanner noise
The EDF values of the p-values of the Jarque-Bera and the χ2 tests at 0.01 and
0.05 significance levels for the scanner noise estimate on all columns for 100 images
acquired with air (in one group) by Scanner u106 are shown in Figure 5.47; the 3σ
trimming rule is used to exclude outliers from the samples. We also computed an
average EDF value of the p-values for each test at each significance level (also shown
in the figure) as an average measure; the EDF values appear to vary considerably
and using their minima or maxima may clearly lead to inaccurate conclusions. These
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averages corroborate our earlier observation that the Jarque-Bera test rejects about
3 times more columns than the χ2 test at 0.01 significance level and about 2 times
more columns at 0.05 significance level.
















EDFs of the p−values at 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels for the χ2 and Jarque−Bera tests 


































EDF of Jarque−Bera p−values
at 0.05 significance level
Average: 0.230
Average: 0.098 EDF of χ2 p−values at
0.01 significance level
EDF of Jarque−Bera p−values
at 0.01 significance level
EDF of χ2 p−values at
0.05 significance level
Figure 5.47: EDFs of the p-values at 0.01 and 0.05 significance for χ2 & Jarque-Bera
Next, we ran the χ2 and Jarque-Bera tests on all scanners and for all three
groups of images, computed the average EDF values of the p-values at 0.01 and
0.05 significance levels for each group of 100 images, and took the maximum of the
three averages (as the worst case) as representative for each scanner. The results
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are shown in Table 6.9 and Table 6.10 in the appendix, Section 6.4.2.3. For the
UPEK scanners, based on the χ2 test, the percentage of columns for which the null
hypothesis can be rejected ranges from 7.0% to 14.4% at 0.01 significance level and
from 17.5% to 29.6% at 0.05 significance level; both ranges are very similar to the
ranges of the percentage of pixels for which the much more conservative Jarque-Bera
test rejects the null hypothesis for the scanner noise in time at the same significance
levels (see Section 5.4.2.1). The Jarque-Bera test for the scanner noise estimate
in space along columns, however, rejects much larger percentage of columns, from
15.4% to 36.2% at 0.01 significance level and from 32.8% to 56.4% at 0.05 significance
level. As already discussed, we believe this high percentage of rejection is due to
heavy tails, which are detected by the Jarque-Bera test (but not by the χ2 test),
and they are not of a concern because the percentage of pixels for which the scanner
noise deviates from normality are beyond ±2σ or only about 4-5%.
For the Veridicom scanner, the χ2 test rejects the null hypothesis for 16.2%
and 28.9% of the columns at 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels, respectively, which
is comparable to the percentages for the UPEK scanners. However, the percentage
of columns for which the Jarque-Bera test rejects the null hypothesis here are well
above those for the UPEK scanners – 51.5% and 64.8% at 0.01 and 0.05 significance
levels, respectively, which we attribute to the much coarser quantization of the
scanner noise for the Veridicom scanner.
Estimation of the Variance of the Scanner Noise in Space
For the scanner noise variance in space, we computed the sample variance for
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the scanner noise estimate along each column and averaged it for all columns in an
image. We chose to compute the variance along one dimension instead of for two
dimensions because the advanced algorithms process one-dimensional sequence of
pixels (e.g., columns or rows). Furthermore, the difference between the computation
of the sample variance in the two cases (one and two dimensions) is in the sample
mean, subtracted from the value of the scanner noise estimate at each pixel. The
sample mean of the scanner noise estimate when computed along one dimension is
typically very close to zero, but it is larger in magnitude than the typical sample
mean computed across all pixels (two-dimensionally), thus leading to a slightly larger
sample variance in the one-dimensional case. We choose columns over rows because:
• We observed that on average the sample variance computed along columns is
consistently higher than the variance computed along rows, thus providing a
more conservative estimate for the actual scanner noise variance;
• The absolute relative error between the two types of computation (along
columns and along rows) for a single image is below 1%;
• The preferred mode of operation of the advanced algorithms is columnwise.
Next, after computing the scanner noise sample variance per image, we aver-
aged these variances for all 100 images in each of group (and per scanner). Then we
averaged these three sample variances for each scanner, and finally, all these average
variances per scanner we averaged across all scanners, yielding the average scanner
noise variance in space. The detailed results are provided in the appendix, Table
6.8, and in summary:
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• Signal Model A (UPEK scanners): the sample variance per scanner ranges
from 1.343 to 1.991, with average variance across all scanners 1.735;
• Signal Model B (Veridicom scanner): the sample variance for the scanner we
have is 0.869.
Both average sample variances are very close to the averages for the scanner noise
estimate in time (see Section 5.4.2.1).
In conclusion, the distribution of the scanner noise both in time and in space,
although overall close to Gaussian, exhibits considerable deviations from normality,
which can be due to heavy tails, outliers, and coarse quantization. Even when
these effects are factored out from the hypothesis tests, the percentage of pixels or
columns for which the Gaussian assumption can be rejected is not negligible. For this
reason, we chose methods and designed algorithms that are robust against significant
violations of the Gaussian assumption. A confirmation that these deviations are not
a problem for our advanced algorithms is their excellent performance. If the signals
were truly Gaussian, the algorithms would be optimal, which is desired, but of
greater importance for us it that the algorithms are robust (and also implementable).
5.4.3 Scanner Pattern
Because of the presence of the scanner noise, which is a time-varying random
process, it is only possible to compute an estimate of the scanner pattern. Such an
estimate can be computed from a single image or, preferably, from multiple images
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acquired with a predetermined object, i.e., not with a fingertip of a person, applied
to the scanner platen. These images have to be acquired within a short time period
(within several minutes to several tens of minutes).
As already discussed, by averaging many pixel values g(po)(i, j) (see Expres-
sions 5.15 and 5.16) acquired sequentially with one and the same fingerprint scanner
we obtained the best estimate of the scanner pattern s(i, j) because the average over
time of the scanner noise n(i, j, t) at each pixel will tend to 0 (the law of large num-
bers as with respect to time; the scanner noise is a zero-mean random process).
Thus, if g
(po)
k (i, j) is the pixel value of the k-th image acquired with a particular
fingerprint scanner, then the estimate of the scanner pattern ŝ(i, j) at row index i








k (i, j) (5.19)
where K is the number of images used for averaging. K can be as small as 10, but,
to improve the accuracy of the estimate, we acquired 3 groups of images, each group
containing 100 images. The time interval between acquiring Group 1 and Group 2
images was significant (about 1 year and 8 months), the time between acquiring
Group 2 and Group 3 images – small (about a couple of days).
The histogram of the scanner pattern estimate from Group 1 images for column
100 of Scanner u103 is shown in Figure 5.48. Besides the main lobe, the histogram
shows also a “spread” in the values, which suggests that assuming the distribution
of the scanner pattern (in its absolute values) to be Gaussian will be incorrect.
The upper plot of Figure 5.49 shows the scanner pattern estimates, for one
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Histogram of the scanner pattern estimate 
from Group 1 images for column 100, Scanner u103
Spread
Figure 5.48: Histogram of the scanner pattern estimate for 1 column, Scanner u103
and the same column (100) of one and the same scanner (u103), computed from the
three groups of images. Two important observations can be made from it:
1. Variable mean. Well visible is the downward trend in the scanner pattern
estimates from the first rows to rows of about 200. After that, in the last
about 100 rows, the trend reverses, turning steeply upwards and leading to
increase by about 40 (from about 190 to over 230). These types of trends are
most probably due to gradient effects in the semiconductor elements across
the area of the chip. The practical implication for us is that, assuming the
scanner pattern is a random process/field, its mean changes (so the process
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is nonstationary). This can also explain the spread in the histogram in Fig-
ure 5.48.
2. Offset. Another observation in the same plot is that, although apparently
very similar, the three estimates are slightly different; even their sample means
(shown in the upper left corner) differ with about 0.9 from each other. Two
of the differences between the estimates are shown in the lower plot on the
same figure. The difference between Group 1 and Group 2 estimates is indeed
about 1 for most of the rows (and is consistently larger than 0), which can
be attributed to the significant time period between the days the two groups
of images were acquired, during which the scanner pattern could have indeed
changed. It is surprising, however, the about-twice larger difference between
Group 1 and Group 3 estimates in comparison with the difference between
Group 1 and Group 2, despite the fact that Group 2 and Group 3 images were
acquired within 3 days (also visible from the difference between their means
on the upper plot). It is also important to note that, although relatively
consistent, these differences are not constant for all pixels (as row indices in
the figure), and that these variations in the differences are too large to be
attributed solely to the inaccuracy in the scanner pattern estimate due to the
presence of the scanner noise. For our practical purposes, however, we can call
this effect “offset” and can assume it is relatively constant for all pixels in an
image.
In sum, because of the variable mean and this (nonconstant) offset, even within
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short time periods, the absolute value of the scanner pattern (estimate) may create
problems for the signal processing and clearly cannot be used as a persistent char-
acteristic of the scanner. (The temperature dependence is another problem which
similarly leads to an offset; it is discussed later in this section).






















Scanner pattern estimates for column 100 from the 3 groups of 100 images each,
all images are acquired with air, Scanner u103
 
 














Differences between the scanner pattern estimates       
among the groups of images which they are estimated from
 
 
Difference Group 1 − Group 2
Difference Group 1 − Group 3
Estimate from Group 1
Estimate from Group 2
Estimate from Group 3
Mean of Group 1:   198.62
Mean of Group 2:   197.74
Mean of Group 3:   196.83
Figure 5.49: Scanner pattern estimates for column 100 from the 3 groups of images
(100 images each; each image acquired with air) and their differences, Scanner u103
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All these observations led us to the idea to view the scanner pattern as having
two components (parts):
a. One component that slowly varies in space but may (considerably) change over
time in the long term and also under different environmental conditions and
other factors. This component is essentially the mean µs(i, j) of the scanner
pattern. Our objective is to remove µs(i, j) from consideration for the scanner
authentication because it is not reproducible and cannot serve as a persistent
characteristic of each scanner;
b. A second component that rapidly varies in space but is relatively invariant in
time (in both the short and the long term) and under different environmental
conditions. This variable part sv(i, j) of the scanner pattern is reproducible
and can serve as a persistent characteristic of each scanner. Therefore, our
objective is to estimate sv(i, j) and use it to authenticate the scanners.
Thus, the scanner pattern at pixel (i, j) is the sum of these two components:
s(i, j) = µs(i, j) + sv(i, j) (5.20)
We observed that by filtering the scanner pattern estimate ŝ(i, j) (see Expres-
sion 5.21), for example, with a (possibly noncausal) moving-average filter and then
subtracting it from ŝ(i, j), we can obtain an estimate of its variable part ŝv(i, j):
ŝv(i, j) = ŝ(i, j)−F{ŝ(i, j)}, (5.21)
where F{.} denotes the moving-average filtering. This variable part ŝv(i, j) of the
scanner pattern estimate is sufficiently persistent and can be used to identify the
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scanner. The moving-average filter, in effect, computes the local (sample) mean
(estimate) of the scanner pattern, and by subtracting this local mean from the
scanner pattern, we obtain the variable part of the scanner pattern; this whole
operation is essentially high-pass filtering. Using low-pass filters F{.} other than a
moving-average filter is also possible, but we chose the moving-average filter because
its filtering is sufficient for our purposes and because it is extremely simple. On
the other hand, it is certainly possible to instead use directly a high-pass. The
filter F{.} we selected and use for illustration throughout this section is a 11-tap
noncausal moving average filter (with 5 zeroes at 2π/11 ∗ [1 2 3 4 5]). The filter
is one dimensional and works column-wise on the pixels; for the pixels close to the
ends of the column (and signal), we pad the signal with its replicas symmetrically
about the first and last pixels (the replica padding is explained later).
These variable parts ŝv(i, j), computed using this 11-tap moving-average filter
along columns, of the three scanner pattern estimates ŝ(i, j) of Figure 5.49 are
shown in Figure 5.50. The scale of the upper plot in Figure 5.49 is much larger than
that of the upper plot in Figure 5.50, yet the three variable parts ŝv(i, j) almost
completely overlap. The two differences between them, shown in the lower plot
of the same figure, rarely go beyond ±0.5 (in absolute units). The corresponding
correlation coefficients are 0.99842 and 0.99778, either one of which is 1 for all
practical purposes. Thus, with a simple moving-average filtering, we eliminated
both the variable mean and the offset problems, obtaining essentially a persistent
and reproducible representation of the scanner pattern.
In studying the statistical characteristics of the scanner pattern, we used the
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Variable part of the scanner pattern estimate for column 100 after 
11−tap moving−average filtering  from the 3 groups of 100 images each, 























Differences between the above variable parts of the scanner pattern estimates
among the groups of images which they are estimated from 
and the corresponding correlation coefficients
 
 
Difference Group 1 − Group 2
Difference Group 1 − Group 3
Correlation coefficients between:
Group 1 and Group 2:  0.99842
Group 1 and Group 3:  0.99778
Figure 5.50: Variable parts, obtained with a 11-tap moving-average filter, of the
scanner pattern in Figure 5.49 and their differences and correlation coefficients
same approach as for the scanner noise. Figure 5.51 shows the EDF of the variable
part of the scanner pattern estimate for column 100 (of Scanner u103, computed
from Group 2 images) by using a 11-tap moving-average filter; this is the same signal
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shown in the upper plot of Figure 5.50. A Gaussian CDF is fitted to it using as
parameters the sample mean and the sample variance, shown in the lower plot. As
visible from both plots, the distribution is very close to Gaussian.
To quantify the Gaussian hypothesis, we ran four tests (χ2, Jarque-Bera, Lil-
liefors, and Anderson-Darling), the p-values of all of which, shown in the upper
plot, are larger than 0.35 and thus well above 0.05, therefore failing to reject the
null hypothesis. While the large p-values of the χ2 and Jarque-Bera tests are to be
expected in case of so good visual fit, it is surprising that the EDF-based Lilliefors
and especially the Anderson-Darling test also fail to reject the null hypothesis. This
suggests that the quantization, which was a serious problem for these tests when
performed on the scanner noise, here appears to have very limited impact. One of
the reasons for this is that the range of the variable part of the scanner pattern
is sufficiently large with respect to the quantization step. However, there are two
more veiled reasons: (1) the signal under test is the variable part of the scanner
pattern, which means after the moving average filtering, and (2) it stems from the
scanner pattern estimate, which means after averaging 100 images (in the group).
Therefore, it is no surprise that after these two operations, no distinct quantization
levels are present.
While studying this variable part of the scanner pattern, we also observed that
although rare, it do sometimes contain outliers beyond ±3σ. Figure 5.51 shows one
such outlier, the only one in this particular signal; the outlier is only slightly farther
than 3σ away from the sample mean. Because of such outliers, we also use the
“3σ trimming” when performing hypothesis tests on the scanner pattern. (Note:
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none of the four hypothesis tests in the previous paragraph trimmed any outliers,
yet they all failed to reject the null hypothesis.)




















EDF of the variable part of the scanner pattern estimate for column 100 after 
11−tap moving−average filtering, Group 2, Scanner u103, and a Gaussian CDF fitted to it
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Sample mean:         0.003
Sample variance:  10.400
1σ:   3.225
2σ:   6.450
3σ:   9.675
Hypothesis tests
and their p−values
χ2:                            0.455
Jarque−Bera:           >0.5
Lilliefors:                  0.352
Anderson−Darling:  0.424
Outlier beyond 3σ
Figure 5.51: EDF of the variable part of the scanner pattern estimate for column
100, a Gaussian CDF fit to it, and hypothesis tests (Group 2, Scanner u103)
We quantified the deviation from the Gaussian distribution as the percentage
of columns for which the null hypothesis can be rejected. Figure 5.52 shows the
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EDFs of the p-values of four hypothesis tests performed on the variable part ŝv(i, j)
of the scanner pattern, estimated from the images in Group 1, for all columns; the
3σ trimming removes the outliers from the sample. We look at the EDFs at 0.01 and
0.05 significance levels. The χ2 and the Lilliefors tests reject a very similar percent-
age of columns: χ2 rejects 1.6% and 4.7% at each significance level, respectively, and
Lilliefors – 1.2% and 4.7%, respectively. Since we know that the χ2 test is relatively
weak and that the EDF-based Lilliefors test is weaker than the Anderson-Darling
test, we will not use any one of the former two. The similarly EDF-based Anderson-
Darling test is known to be more sensitive in the tails; here it rejects 1.2% and 6.6%
of the columns at the two significance levels, respectively. For this reason, we chose
the Anderson-Darling test as the worst case guidance. Somewhat surprisingly, the
moment-based Jarque-Bera rejects a much smaller percentage of columns: 1.6% at
0.05 significance level and rejects no columns at 0.01 significance level. This sug-
gests that the sample skewness and kurtosis of an overwhelming number of columns
is in line with the Gaussian distribution; this can also be inferred from the appar-
ent absence of heavy tails (see Figure 5.51). Therefore, we use Jarque-Bera test as
another, liberal test for normality. These two tests, in some sense, give the upper
and the lower bound on the percentage of columns for which a Gaussian assumption
would be inaccurate.
Next, we ran the Jarque-Bera and the Anderson-Darling tests on all scanners
and computed the p-value for each column of the variable part sv(i, j), computed
with an 11-tap moving-average filter, of the scanner pattern as estimated from each
group of images. Then we followed our standard procedure: computed the EDFs of
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EDFs of the p−values of several hypothesis tests, trimming at ±3σ, 
for the variable part of the scanner pattern estimate, computed  







Figure 5.52: EDFs of the p-values of four hypothesis tests along all columns for the
variable part of the scanner pattern estimate, Scanner u103
the p-values at 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels for each of the 3 groups and took the
maximum of the three (as the worst case) as representative for each scanner. The
results are shown in the appendix, Tables 6.12 and 6.13. The Jarque-Bera test, for
either scanner type, fails to reject the null hypothesis for hardly any column: rejected
are at most 0.4% of the columns (which is 1 column out of all 256 columns) at 0.01
significance level and at most 3.5% of the columns at 0.05 significance level; for the
Veridicom scanner, the percentage is even lower: 1.6%. This essentially means that
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the sample skewness and kurtosis are in line with those of a Gaussian distribution.
The percentage of columns rejected by the Anderson-Darling test for the UPEK
scanners is somewhat larger, but still very low: at most 2.3% at 0.01 significance
level and in the range from 3.9% to 8.2% at 0.05 significance level. For the Veridicom
scanner, the percentages are 2.3% and 5.5% at 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels,
respectively. This was expected as we already saw the absence of heavy tails; what
is surprising, however, is that for the scanner pattern, the quantization step is
sufficiently small as to not influence the test statistic, both for the UPEK and the
Veridicom scanners.
One important consideration, which will become clear in the discussion of
the advanced algorithms, is that since the advanced algorithms use a single image
(even containing a fingerprint pattern), the signal processing modules “see” not only
the “clean” scanner pattern, but the combination of the scanner pattern and the
scanner noise (along the fingerprint pattern where present). Moreover, separating
the variable part sv(i, j) of the scanner pattern from the scanner noise nk(i, j) is
virtually impossible as both have zero-mean approximately Gaussian distributions
and, therefore, their sum has also a (zero-mean) approximately Gaussian distribu-
tion. Thus, in essence, the advanced algorithms estimate and use (for matching) the
composite signal: the variable part of the scanner pattern and the scanner noise:
sv(i, j) + nk(i, j).
For this reason, we ran the Jarque-Bera and the Anderson-Darling tests also on
the variable part (i.e., sv(i, j)+nk(i, j) ) of the pixel values g
(po)(i, j) along columns,
computed with an 11-tap moving average filter, for each image in each group of
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images (similarly to the temporal scanner noise analysis). Then we computed the
EDFs of the p-values at 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels for each image and averaged
these EDFs within each group of 100 images. Finally, we took the maximum of the
three averages (as the worst case) as representative for each scanner. The results
are shown in the appendix, Tables 6.15 and 6.16. There are small differences (per
scanner) with respect to the results for the case only with the variable part of the
scanner pattern, but for practical purposes the conclusion is the same: with very
high confidence, the distribution can be assumed Gaussian. In summary, for the
Jarque-Bera for the UPEK scanners, there is no difference at 0.01 significance level;
at 0.05 significance level, the percentage of columns on average ranges from 1.1%
to 2.0% and is slightly lower than for the scanner-pattern-only case because here
we have the average EDF values (at the particular significance levels) among the
100 images. For the Veridicom scanner, at 0.05 significance level, the percentage is
slightly higher (2.5%) but still negligible. The percentages of rejected columns by
the Anderson-Darling test for the UPEK scanners are similarly close to the scanner-
pattern-only case: at most 1.7% on average at 0.01 significance level and in the range
from 4.0% to 6.9% on average at 0.05 significance level. For the Veridicom scanner,
the percentages of rejected columns is also slightly higher at 0.05 significance level:
6.1% against 5.5% for the scanner-pattern-only case.
In conclusion, the variable part of the scanner pattern can be very safely as-
sumed to have a Gaussian distribution as the percentage of columns for which this
assumption can be rejected is negligible. Furthermore, despite the considerable per-
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centage of columns for which the spatial scanner noise cannot be assumed Gaussian,
the variable part of the composite signal {scanner pattern and spatial scanner noise}
can also be very safely assumed Gaussian. Nevertheless, similarly to the scanner
noise, here some deviations from normality are also present, in particular outliers
and possibly heavy tails, for which reason they were excluded from the hypothesis
tests. For this reason, we chose methods and designed algorithms that are robust
against significant violations of the Gaussian assumption; a confirmation that these
deviations are not a problem for our advanced algorithms is their excellent perfor-
mance. If the signals were truly Gaussian, the algorithms would be optimal, which
is desired, but of greater importance for us it that the algorithms are robust (and
also implementable).
Scanner Pattern Dependence from Temperature
We observed that the scanner pattern depends significantly on the tempera-
ture, which is not surprising as it is related to the gain of an amplifier. We studied
this dependence by acquiring images with air at various temperatures; details about
the thermal tests are given in the appendix, Section 6.2. Because of the strong ther-
mal dependence of the scanner pattern and the difficulty in controlling precisely the
temperature of the scanner platen, it was not possible to acquire a set of images at
exactly the same temperature (for other than the room temperature), from which
images to estimate the scanner pattern. For this reason, for these temperatures we
use directly the pixel values g(po), which contain both the scanner pattern and the
scanner noise.
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Figure 5.53 illustrates the thermal dependence of the scanner pattern. The
upper plot shows column 100 (of Scanner u103) with the pixel values g(po) at low
temperature (about 5 oC), the scanner pattern estimated from 100 images with air
at room temperature, and the pixel values g(po) at high temperature (about 40 oC);
the plot shows only rows 260 through 360 for better visibility. The lower plot shows
the variable part of these signals, computed by filtering with an 11-tap moving-
average filter. Despite the scanner noise, present in the variable parts of the pixel
values g(po), it is remarkable how close to each other these variable parts are. Their
close similarity can also be seen in the very large correlation coefficients: 0.922 and
0.960 for the two temperatures and the room temperature and 0.885 for the low and
high temperatures. The correlation coefficients are computed for all 360 rows, not
only for the shown 100 rows.
For the UPEK scanners, the scanner pattern shifts down when lowering the
temperature (and the pixel values become smaller), and shifts up when increasing
the temperature (and the pixel values become larger). A temperature difference of
34 oC changes the scanner pattern with about 30 grayscales levels, and we expect
that a temperature change of 40 oC (from 0 oC to 40 oC) will change the scanner
pattern with about 35-40 grayscale levels, which is considerable. It is, therefore,
required that the algorithms be robust against such variations, as our advanced
algorithms are.
Scanner Pattern Dependence from Water
It is well known that wet (as well as dry) fingertips create problems for the
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Pixel values g(po) at low and high temperatures and the scanner pattern estimate 
at room temperature for column 100, Scanner u103
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Variable part of the scanner pattern, estimated by filtering with
11−tap moving−average filter for the signals above, and the correlation coefficients
 
 
g(po) at low temperature
Scanner pattern at room temperature
g(po) at high temperature
High and room: 0.960
Low and room:  0.922
Figure 5.53: Thermal dependence of the scanner pattern (and noise) at 3 tempera-
tures, their differences, and the correlation coefficients (column 100, Scanner u103)
fingerprint authentication. Although our signal to be authenticated is different,
we observed that the scanner pattern changes when water, especially in abundant
quantities, is present on the scanner platen. One would expect that water, similarly
to air, would also be an ideal predetermined object as (a) water is homogeneous, (b)
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water naturally covers the scanner platen uniformly because water is a liquid, and
(c) water adheres tightly to the scanner platen. Water is indeed a predetermined
object (and generally could be used for scanner pattern estimation), but its effect
on the scanner pattern proved to be very different from that of air and using it
as predetermined object for estimating the scanner pattern has be done with great
care.
Water affects the scanner pattern in a similar way as lowering temperature
does – it shifts the scanner pattern down – but with two major differences:
• The shift is not uniform (or not even nearly uniform) across the platen area:
close to the platen edges, the scanner pattern decreases much more than the
scanner pattern in the middle does.
• The shift is much larger in magnitude; it can even be over 100 grayscale levels.
These effects of water are illustrated in Figure 5.54. The scanner pattern estimate
in the figure is computed by averaging 100 images with air. The pixel values g(w)
are when water covers completely the scanner platen, from edge to edge.
Although the absolute scanner pattern changes significantly, its variable part,
remains substantially unchanged. The variable parts of the signals of Figure 5.54,
computed by filtering with a 11-tap moving average filter, are shown in the upper
plot of Figure 5.55. Although the variable parts seems to also be considerably
different, the correlation coefficients (shown in the lower plot) between the signals
are very close to 1: 0.907 between the first image with water and the scanner pattern
estimate and 0.856 between the second image with water and the scanner pattern
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Pixel values g(w) of 2 images with water and scanner pattern estimate for column 186
 
 
g(w) of image#1 with water
g(w) of image#2 with water
Scanner pattern estimate
Figure 5.54: Effect of water on the scanner pattern: pixel values of two images with
water and the scanner pattern estimate, all for column 186
estimate. The correlation coefficient between the two images with water is also
very high: 0.832. The correlation coefficients are computed for all 360 rows, not
only for the shown 100 rows. The lower plot also shows the differences between the
variable parts, from which it is clear that the differences for certain pixels can be
considerable.
Obviously, this peculiar effect of water on the scanner pattern requires that
this problem be considered and solved, as our advanced algorithms do.
189













Variable parts of the pixel values g(w) of images with water and the scanner pattern
estimate, computed by filtering with 11−tap moving−average filter, for column 186
 
 g(w) of image#1 with water
g(w) of image#2 with water
Scanner pattern estimate













Differences between the variable parts of the scanner pattern estimate and 
the pixel values g(w) of images with water, and the correlation coefficients
 
 
Difference: Scanner pattern − image#1 with water
Difference: Scanner pattern − image#2 with water
g(w) of image#1 and the scanner pattern estimate: 0.907
g(w) of image#2 and the scanner pattern estimate: 0.856
g(w) of image#1 and g(w) of image#2: 0.832
Figure 5.55: Effect of water on the scanner pattern: the signals of Figure 5.54,
filtered with an 11-tap moving-average filter, their differences, and correlation coef-
ficients
Estimation of the Scanner Pattern Variance
The main conclusion of the preceding discussions is that the signal of interest is
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the variable part of the scanner pattern. The statistical characteristic that quantifies
this variable part is the variance σ2s of the scanner pattern, and it needs to be either
known or computed from image(s). Since the scanner pattern is a random field,
for which only a finite amount of data is available, and because of the presence of
the scanner noise, it is only possible to compute an estimate of σ2s . To do so, as
already explained, we first need to compute the scanner pattern estimate ŝ(i, j) at
each pixel by pixel-wise averaging images with air.
One approach to estimating the scanner patter variance is to first compute










where I is the number of rows and J is the number of columns in the image. The
estimate σ̂2s of the scanner pattern variance σ
2








(ŝ(i, j)− s̄)2 (5.23)
Instead of the biased estimate in Expression 5.23, it is also possible to compute
the unbiased estimate by dividing by (I − 1)(J − 1) instead of by I.J , although in
our case the difference between the two will be small because I and J are very large
(several hundreds). The problem with this approach is that, as already demon-
strated (see Figure 5.49), the mean µs of the scanner pattern is not constant, and
it also depends on the temperature and the moisture, which may result in an overly
conservative (large) estimate for the variance σ2s and thus possibly to suboptimal
overall performance.
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Therefore, a better approach is to compute local estimates µ̂s(i, j) for the
mean of the scanner pattern at each pixel (at row index i and column index j) by
















ŝ(i+ l, j + r) (5.24)
where the integers L and R define the block over which the local estimate is com-
puted, with best results achieved for L and R in the range from about 5 to about
20. When the index (i + l) (or the index (j + r)) falls outside the image bound-
aries, the size of the block is reduced to accommodate this by decreasing L (or R,
respectively).
However, in the context of the one-dimensional signal processing (e.g., pix-
els in columns or rows) of the advanced algorithms, we computed local estimates
µ̂s(i, j) of the mean µs in one dimension (instead of in two dimensions). This es-
sentially is filtering the sequence of pixels with the moving-average filter as detailed
earlier. This, in general, can be done along rows, along columns, or along any one-
dimensional cross section of the image, but since the preferred mode of operation of
the advanced algorithms is columnwise, we computed the local means columnwise.
Hence, computing µ̂s(i, j) at each pixel with row index i and column index j can











ŝ(i+ l, j) (5.25)
We used L = 11, but any L in the range from about 5 to about 20 can give good
estimates.
192
The estimate s̄ for the scanner pattern mean and the local estimates µ̂s(i, j)
also depend on the signal model, and for Signal Model A they are in the range from
about 150 to about 220 and for Signal Model B – in the range from about 200 to
about 250. The estimates s̄ and µ̂s(i, j) also depend on the particular scanner and
the conditions under which they are estimated (e.g., temperature and moisture),
and the local estimates µ̂s(i, j) also varies across the image.








(ŝ(i, j)− µ̂s(i, j))2 (5.26)
Here, similarly to computation of the local means µ̂s(i, j), instead of the two-







(ŝ(i, j)− µ̂s(i, j))2, (5.27)










Similarly to the computation of the variance of the scanner noise in space, the
difference between the computation of the sample variance of the scanner pattern in
the two cases (one-dimensional and two-dimensional) is in the mean, global or local,
subtracted from the scanner pattern estimate ŝ(i, j) at each pixel. According to our
observations, the difference is sufficiently small to be neglected. Furthermore, the
two-dimensional computation takes significantly more time, which may be a problem
if the scanner pattern variance is estimated by the system during enrolment.
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After computing the sample variances of the scanner pattern, estimated by
averaging within each group of 100 images, we averaged these three sample variances
to compute the average scanner pattern variance σ̂2s,m for each scannerm. Finally, we







The detailed results are provided in the appendix, Table 6.11, and in summary:
• Signal Model A (UPEK scanners): the sample variance per scanner ranges
from 12.459 to 19.317, with an average variance across all scanners 15.423;
• Signal Model B (Veridicom scanner): the sample variance for the scanner we
have is 8.645.
An alternative to computing an average scanner pattern variance across a set
of scanners is to compute σ̂2s for the particular scanner and then adjust the algo-
rithm parameters accordingly, and this can be done during the scanner enrolment;
only about 10 images acquired with air are sufficient to yield an accurate estimate
σ̂2s . Using a predetermined object, however, has a downside as it requires that dur-
ing the scanner enrolment, two groups of images be acquired: one group with a
predetermined object and another group with user’s fingerprint, thus potentially
increasing the computational time for enrolment and, much worse, weakening the
security because the legitimate scanner may be replaced between the acquisitions of
the two groups of images.
Computing and using an accurate estimate of the scanner pattern variance
is important, but the advanced algorithms are sufficiently robust, i.e., the overall
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performance remains relatively unchanged, against wide deviations of the estimate
σ̂2s from the true value. Therefore, of greater importance for is not the variance
of the scanner pattern alone, but the variance of the sum of the scanner pattern
and the spatial scanner noise. Thus, instead of estimating the scanner pattern
ŝ(i, j) by averaging images with air (in Expression 5.19), we used the pixel values
of a single image g(po)(i, j) instead of ŝ(i, j) to compute the local mean µ̂(i, j) in
Expression 5.25. This µ̂(i, j) we in turn used to compute the sample variances σ̂(j)






(g(po)(i, j)− µ̂(i, j))2, (5.30)








The detailed results are provided in the appendix, Section 6.14, and in summary:
• Signal Model A (UPEK scanners): the sample variance per scanner ranges
from 13.678 to 20.952, with an average variance across all scanners 17.00;
• Signal Model B (Veridicom scanner): the sample variance for the scanner we
have is 9.436.
It is good to note that these variances are about 1.2 to 2.0 higher than the corre-
sponding scanner pattern variances σ̂2s , which is in line with the variance of the sum
of two Gaussian random variables.
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In conclusion, the scanner pattern, viewed as a two-dimensional random pro-
cess, i.e., a random process dependent on two independent spatial variables, can
be well approximated by a Gaussian random field, i.e., with the two-dimensional
random variable having a Gaussian distribution N(µs, σ
2
s), where µs is the mean
and σ2s is the variance of the scanner pattern. The random field is not necessarily
stationary in the mean, i.e., the mean µs may change across one and the same im-
age (e.g., as a gradient effect) and among different images acquired with the same
fingerprint scanner under different environmental conditions, e.g., under different
temperatures or different moistures. For each fingerprint scanner, the variations of
the scanner pattern around this mean do not change significantly and are relatively
stable under different conditions (thus, the variance σ2s is relatively constant); these
persistent variations around the (possibly variable) mean determine the part of the
scanner pattern that we use for scanner authentication.
Scanner Pattern Spatial Dependence
Studying the scanner pattern spatial dependence proved to be much more
difficult than anticipated, even for the simplest possible measure of dependence –
its second order statistics, i.e., the correlation within the signal.
Initially, we tried to study the PSD of the scanner pattern by two approaches:
(1) using the DFT of the autocorrelation function of the variable part of the scanner
pattern (along columns) and (2) averaging DFTs of these variable parts. However,
neither approach yielded conclusive results. We did observe spectral peaks that can
reach several dBs above the average PSD, but the frequencies of these peaks are not
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constant and vary across columns, even adjacent ones, and it is difficult to attribute
them to consistent patterns (per scanner or across scanners), especially ones that
can be exploited and used systematically in the advanced algorithms. Rather, the
PSD looks more like the PSD of a noise (filtered by a high-pass filter, explained
below), and the peaks can be also attributed to artifacts of the PSD estimation
(e.g., from the finite signal length). The only definite observation is that, unlike for
the UPEK scanners, the scanner pattern of the Veridicom scanner has a consistent
peak at frequency very close to π rad.
We already saw some indirect evidence in Figure 5.6 (which shows the 2D
DFT of image blocks with air) – the spectral power for the Veridicom scanner is
concentrated along the two main frequency axes, implying correlation within the
scanner pattern along columns and rows, and particularly closely to π rad. There
is no such power concentration in the 2D DFT for the UPEK scanner as it is nearly
uniformly distributed in frequency (the sample means of the image blocks have been
subtracted before computing the DFT, so there is no DC component).
Nevertheless, these initial studies led us to the conclusion that there is some
correlation in the scanner patterns, which, however, we could not systematize for
the purpose of using it. To quantify it relatively and integratively, we looked at the
problem somewhat unconventionally.
First, computing directly the autocorrelation (or autocovariance) function of
a column (or a row) gives an extremely inaccurate estimate of the actual signal
dependence because of the variable mean, especially when this variable mean is due
to gradient effects, and is therefore not useful. To compute the variable part of
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the scanner pattern, in the preceding discussions we used a moving-average filter.
Any kind of filtering, however, introduces correlation artifacts because the impulse
response of the filter is convolved with the signal, which process essentially self-
correlates the signal on a local basis, i.e., within the span of the filter impulse
response. For this reason, we chose the simplest possible filter – a 3-tap (noncausal,
symmetric) moving-average filter – and then subtracted the average from the signal.
Applying this filter to a signal with pixel values even perfectly independent from
each other introduces expected dependence at lag 1 as the local mean, which is
subtracted from the current pixel, depends on the two pixels adjacent to the current
pixel. Therefore, when using such a filter to compute the variable part of the
scanner pattern, the autocorrelation estimate at lag 1 will be inherently inaccurate
and cannot be relied upon for making conclusions. (Note: we show only positive
lags because the signals are real valued and hence the autocorrelation function is
real and symmetric. In addition, since the sample mean of the variable part of the
scanner pattern estimate is very close to 0, the autocorrelation function is essentially
the autocovariance function.)
The upper plot of Figure 5.56 shows the autocorrelation functions (normalized
to 1 at lag 0) of the variable part of the scanner pattern, computed with a 3-tap
moving average filter, of one column (186), estimated from 100 images with air,
for three UPEK scanners. Although quantifying the level of correlation in a single
metric is difficult, it is visible that the correlation for all lags, except for the first 2
lags (better visible on the lower plot), is small and contained in magnitude to 0.2,
and for most lags, at most 0.1 in magnitude. The large values at lag 1 have already
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been explained as an artifact of the moving-average filtering. Unexpected is only
the consistently somewhat large values at lag 2, which does suggest the presence of
correlation. The autocorrelation functions along rows have similar behavior, with
the difference being the larger values at lag 1.
The lower plot on the same figure shows the box plots of the normalized
autocorrelation functions for all 256 columns of the scanner pattern estimate for
Scanner u114, depicted only for the first 39 lags. The interquartile range (IQR), or
the difference between the upper and the lower quartiles, which is 50% of the values,
is the boxes in blue; the median (the second quartile) is in red. The whiskers of the
box plots are at 1.5 IQR outside the lower and the upper quartiles, which in case of
Gaussian distribution cover ±2.7σ (or 99.3% of the values). For lags other than lag
1 and 2, we can make three observations:
• The median of the normalized autocorrelation function at each lag is very
close to 0. The medians at the subsequent lags also appear to be random, not
changing according to a pattern;
• 50% of the normalized autocorrelation at each lag is contained within ±0.06,
which corresponds to a range of 0.12, which is very small;
• Except for the few outliers, the range covered by the whiskers is within ±0.2,
which corresponds to a range of 0.4.
All this suggests that while the scanner pattern (along columns) for the UPEK
scanners may exhibit some correlation, this correlation is limited and justifies our
assumption for being largely uncorrelated.
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Autocorrelation of the variable parts of the scanner pattern estimate, 




































Box plots of the autocorrelation at different lags of the variable parts of the scanner pattern
estimate, computed with a 3−tap moving−average filter, all 256 columns, Scanner u114
Figure 5.56: Autocorrelation function of the variable part of the scanner pattern
estimate along columns for three UPEK scanners
We did the same study for the Veridicom scanner (v1). The upper plot of
Figure 5.57 shows the autocorrelation functions (also normalized to 1 at lag 0) of
the variable part of the scanner pattern, computed with a 3-tap moving average
filter, of three columns (83, 186, and 231), estimated from 100 images with air, for
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Scanner v1. Although here the normalized autocorrelation is contained in magnitude
to 0.3, it is markedly larger than 0.1 at most lags. The lower plot of the same figure
shows the autocorrelation function for all 256 columns for the first 39 lags. While
the IQR and the whisker’s coverage here are practically the same as those of the
UPEK scanners, the medians here consistently oscillate between about -0.07 and
0.07, alternating between adjacent pixels, which corroborates the observation made
from the PSD studies of a peak close to π rad. The autocorrelation function along
rows is very similar to the one along columns.
In summary, after studying the scanner pattern, directly by computing auto-
correlation functions and indirectly, we believe that the random field of the variable
part of the scanner pattern can be modeled as white, i.e., either its one-dimensional
or its two-dimensional autocorrelation function can be well approximated by a Dirac
delta function, one-dimensional or two-dimensional, respectively. Nevertheless, the
fact that the autocorrelation functions are not perfect Dirac delta functions needs to
be kept in mind, as we did while designing the algorithms. Moreover, the accuracy
of this model approximation depends on the particular signal model. The accuracy
is also different along the two main axes of the two-dimensional autocorrelation
function due to specifics in the hardware (and possibly software) implementation
of the fingerprint scanner type and model in question, most probably to its sensing
technology and addressing of its sensing elements (see Section 5.3). In particular, for
the UPEK scanners (Signal Model A), the autocorrelation function along columns is
typically closer to the Dirac delta function than the autocorrelation function along
rows is. For the Veridicom scanner (Signal Model B), the autocorrelation function
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Autocorrelation of the variable parts of the scanner pattern estimate,      
computed with a 3−tap moving−average filter, for three columns of Scanner v1
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Box plots of the autocorrelation at different lags of the variable parts of the scanner pattern
estimate, computed with a 3−tap moving−average filter, all 256 columns, Scanner v1
Figure 5.57: Autocorrelation function of the variable part of the scanner pattern
estimate along columns for the Veridicom scanner
along columns is as close to the Dirac delta function as it is along rows.
Amount of Information in the Scanner Pattern
Quantifying accurately the amount of information (in number of bits) that
uniquely identifies each individual scanner and that is contained in the scanner
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pattern is for further study as it proved particularly difficult because it depends on
many and diverse factors, including:
• the inherent correlation within the scanner pattern itself;
• the correlation incurred by the filtering (moving-average or Wiener) of the
advanced algorithms;
• the effect of quantization;
• the scanner noise, which cannot be removed from the scanner pattern as it is
estimated from a single image containing a fingerprint in it;
• the residual distortion from the fingerprint (discussed later) that remains in
the scanner pattern estimate.
As for the correlation in the variable part sv(i, j) of the scanner pattern, we
believe that estimating the joint PDF of the scanner pattern (in order to compute
the entropy rate) will be particularly difficult and we will have to use simplified
models. The amount of information also depends on the number of pixels for which
the scanner pattern is estimated after masking (in the advanced algorithms), which
number is random for the area scanners but fixed for the swipe scanners.
Nevertheless, as a very simple and idealized model, we used a Gaussian process
in which the pixel values are uncorrelated (and therefore independent) and compute











s), in bits (5.32)
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The Gaussian model also gives the upper bound as its entropy is the largest among
all random variables of equal variance. In Table 5.11 below we provide the minimum,
the average, and the maximum number of bits per pixel according to this model.
Assuming that at least 100 pixels are required to identify a scanner (this is the
minimum number of pixels required to overlap so that a matching score can be
reliably computed in the advanced algorithms for the area scanners), then the upper
bound for 100 pixels in this ideal case is roughly 350 to 400 bits. For the area
scanners, however, the number of pixels used can be much larger, possibly tens of
thousands, potentially giving at least one order of magnitude more bits. The only
real limitation is for the UPEK swipe scanners (and for any swipe scanner) as the
number of pixels there is very limited, only about 150 to 200, and thus the entropy
is limited to about 550 to 800 bits, again in the ideal case.
Parameter Min Average Max
Signal Model A variance σ2s 12.459 15.423 19.317
bits/pixel 3.87 4.02 4.18
Signal Model B variance σ2s 8.501 8.645 8.763
bits/pixel 3.59 3.60 3.61
Table 5.11: Differential entropy of the scanner pattern per pixel in the ideal case
Because of the correlation within the scanner pattern (of each individual scan-
ner), the pixel values are not independent and therefore the effective number of
unique bits will be smaller. For example, if the correlation affects 2 adjacent pixels,
as our observation for the UPEK areas scanners generally is, the number of unique
bits very roughly can be assumed to be twice smaller, which is a correction factor
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only to compensate for the correlation.
A fundamental shortcoming of this approach for computing the number of bits
is that what matters for the randomness is not the entropy of the scanner pattern per
se, but the degrees of freedom in the scanner pattern across the whole population of
scanners. This will require estimating the scanner pattern of many scanners (in the
order of one hundred, at least) and study the distribution of (the variable part of) the
scanner pattern for each individual pixel across the scanner population. Then, again
a correlation coefficient or a another, different but appropriate similarity metric can
be used to compute the degrees of freedom of the scanner pattern. We leave this
research for further study because, besides the significant effort, most probably it
will also require details about the specific application which will use these bits and
exploit their randomness.
5.4.4 Fingerprint Pattern
In the discussion that follows, we will use the term fingerprint pattern to
refer to the two-dimensional function f(i, j) as defined by Expression 5.9 (for Signal
Model A) and in Expression 5.12 (for Signal Model B).
The surface of the fingertip skin (as well as its subsurface) is a sequence of
ridges and valleys. This surface is read by the fingerprint scanner and represented
as a two-dimensional signal. Along with other imperfections introduced by the
fingerprint scanner in this representation, the acquisition process may also include
nonlinear transformations, such as (a) a projection of the three-dimensional fingertip
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onto the two-dimensional scanner platen and (b) a sensing process that reads the
ridges and valleys and converts these readings into electrical signals, which signals
are further processed and converted into a digital image. As result of such nonlinear
transformations, the fingerprint pattern may become a nonlinear function of the
actual surface (and/or subsurface) of the fingertip skin.
For our purposes, the fingerprint pattern f(i, j), in each of the its two dimen-
sions, can be roughly viewed as one dominant, single-frequency oscillation along its
harmonics. The frequency of this oscillation depends on the width of the ridges and
valleys, which are specific for each individual. This frequency also depends on the
particular type of finger – it is known that thumbs typically have much wider ridges
and deeper valleys than little fingers do (of the hands of one and the same person).
Also typically, index fingers have narrower ridges and valleys than thumbs, and
wider than little fingers. This frequency also depends on the gender (male fingers
typically have wider ridges and valleys than female fingers) and on the age (adults
usually have wider ridges and valleys than children do). Finally, this frequency may
even vary within one and the same fingerprint.
The upper plot of Figure 5.58 shows the scanner pattern estimate and the pixel
values (in grayscale levels) of an image containing a fingerprint (of an index finger)
for one and the same column and one and the same UPEK scanner. The regions
corresponding to valleys and to ridges are also shown. As already explained, because
of the capacitive sensing, the ridges have smaller pixel values than the valleys have.
The circles on the plot are over the regions where the pixel values of the image are
close to the scanner pattern estimate. These regions are either of valleys or where
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the fingertip is not present at all, i.e., near the edges of the scanner platen (for small
and high row indices). In this particular plot, the pixel values of the image with
fingerprint is almost the same as the estimate of the scanner pattern, and therefore,
not only are the variable parts of the scanner pattern the same, but also the absolute
values of the pixels are.












































Figure 5.58: Scanner pattern estimate and pixel values of 3 fingers, Scanner u103
207
The lower plot of Figure 5.58 shows the pixel values of one image containing a
thumb finger and one image containing a little finger, both for the same column and
scanner as in the upper plot. Here, however, the absolute levels of the two signals
differ, yet their variable parts are very similar to each other in certain regions –
again near the edges (for small and high row indices) and in the overlapping regions
with valleys (both marked with circles). One very important observation can be
made here: in this particular example, 31% of the pixel values of the column from
the image with a thumb are constant and equal to 1 (the images never contain 0 as a
pixel value), i.e., the scanner becomes saturated and the signal “clips.” In contrast,
for the index and little finger, all pixel values are well above 20.
We observed that this saturation (“clipping”) can be due to several reasons:
(a) strong pressure of the fingertip to the scanner platen (typical for thumb fingers
as they are stronger), (b) wide ridges (also typical for thumbs and to some extent for
the middle fingers as they are naturally larger than the other fingers), and (c) highly
moisturized fingers. While this saturation of the signal to 1 is not a problem for
the fingerprint recognition (because the signal will eventually be binarized anyway),
extracting the scanner pattern from such saturated regions is impossible because
it is simply not present there. Therefore, it is very important to be able to locate
and exclude such regions from further processing, as the advanced algorithms are
designed to do.
We did not do a detailed study on the frequency the fingerprint pattern because
it cannot be relied upon for our purposes. As visible from both plots of Figure 5.58,
besides the smooth valleys (and ridges) and nice periodic segments, there are also
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many irregularities, in particular “spikes,” which can be due to many and various
factors. Nevertheless, as a very approximate model, we decided that a frequency of
about 0.63 radians per pixel is sufficiently representative for modeling purposes in
the context of our algorithm design.
The range of f(i, j) is (0, 1]. The pixel values g(i, j) for the two general types of
regions of the fingertip skin, ridges and valleys, taking into account that s(i, j) 1
for either signal model, are approximately as follows:
• In the regions with ridges, f(i, j) is close to 1. Hence:
– for Signal Model A: g(r)(i, j) ≈ s(i,j)
1+s(i,j)
+ n(i, j, t) ≈ 1 + n(i, j, t)
– for Signal Model B: g(r)(i, j) ≈ s(i,j)
1+1
+ n(i, j, t) ≈ s(i,j)
2
+ n(i, j, t)
• In the regions with valleys, f(i, j) is close to 0. Hence:
– for Signal Model A: g(v)(i, j) ≈ s(i,j)
1+0
+ n(i, j, t) ≈ s(i, j) + n(i, j, t)
– for Signal Model B: g(v)(i, j) ≈ s(i,j)
1+0
+ n(i, j, t) ≈ s(i, j) + n(i, j, t)
Therefore, in the regions with valleys, for either signal model we have (see
Expression 5.15):
g(v)(i, j) ≈ s(i, j) + n(i, j, t) = g(po)(i, j) (5.33)
And this is essentially what Figure 5.58 illustrates. Identifying the regions where
this approximation holds sufficiently accurately is the basis of our approach.
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5.5 Advanced Algorithms
In this section we present the signal processing steps, henceforth referred to as
modules, and their modes of operation; the set of all modules and their modes we
collectively call advanced algorithms. We developed the advanced algorithms based
on our understanding of the image acquisition process, summarized in the signal
models we created for it, and the initial work on the three scanner authentication
scenarios. The advanced algorithms actually refer to two groups of algorithms:
one group for the area scanners of UPEK/Authentec and Veridicom/Fujitsu and
another one for the swipe scanners of UPEK/Authentec. Two important elements
of the algorithms are the signal inversion and the Wiener filter, both discussed next.
Signal Inversion
Expressions 5.9 and 5.12 model the relationship between the scanner pattern
s(i, j) and the fingerprint pattern f(i, j). Because of the division and the multi-
plication operations in them, directly separating s(i, j) from f(i, j) is difficult. To
simplify this complex relationship, we propose using inversion. The pixel values







for g(i, j) 6= 0
1 for g(i, j) = 0
(5.34)
This inversion applied to Signal Model A transforms the relationship between
the scanner pattern and the fingerprint pattern differently than when applied to
Signal Model B, but the final result of the inversion for the regions with valleys is
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very similar for the two signal models because (a) the scanner noise n(i, j, t) is much
weaker than the scanner pattern s(i, j), which makes the effect of the scanner noise
negligible, and (b) the value of the scanner pattern f(i, j) in the regions with valleys





+ n(i, j, t)
≈ 1
s(i, j)
+ f(i, j) (5.35)












Since the mean µs of the scanner pattern s(i, j) is much larger (at least one
order of magnitude) than its standard deviation σs, the variations of the scanner pat-





. This means that the fingerprint pattern f(i, j) is essentially simply
scaled down by a constant factor µs, but its waveform shape as such is preserved; we
refer to this scaled down version of the fingerprint pattern as f ′(i, j). Hence, using
this approximation, Expression 5.36 becomes similar to Expression 5.35 and is:








+ f ′(i, j) (5.37)





tially making the second term in Expression 5.36 negligible, further simplifying to
h(i, j) ≈ 1
s(i,j)
in the regions with valleys.
Because of its importance for the analysis that follows, we also define the signal








Therefore, by applying the signal inversion of Expression 5.34, the multiplica-
tive relationship between s(i, j) and f(i, j) in Expressions 5.35 and 5.36 becomes
transformed into the sum of two terms, one of which represents the scanner pattern
and the other one – the fingerprint pattern, thus making their separation possible
using simple signal processing:
h(i, j) ≈ t(i, j) + f(i, j) (5.39)
As a next step, we developed a Gaussian approximation for the inverse of a
Gaussian random variable (derived in detail in the appendix, Section 6.5), according










This approximation is sufficiently accurate when µs > 100 and µs  σs, both of
which hold true for either signal model. Note: because of the inevitable presence
of (spatial) scanner noise, which we have neglected in the current discussion about
the inversion, of importance for the signal processing of the pixels in the valleys is
not the variance σ2s of the scanner pattern alone, but the variance of the combined
scanner pattern and spatial scanner noise. Since the scanner pattern and the spatial
scanner noise can both be assumed Gaussian, their sum is also Gaussian (verified for
the real signals earlier), and therefore, the inversion approximation is still applicable,
but has to be used with the sum of their variances, i.e., σ2s + σ
2
n.
In summary, the problem of separating the scanner pattern and the fingerprint
pattern, which are in complex relationship with each other, is reduced to separating
a Gaussian signal from an additive and roughly sinusoidal signal, which can be
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done in a straightforward and computationally-efficient way. Two downsides of this
inversion, however, are that: (a) the inversion may require care when implementing
it in digital precision-limited systems, e.g., with fixed-point arithmetic, because of
possible roundoff errors, and (b) it may also create other types of nonlinear effects.
We also observed that even without the inversion, in the regions with valleys,
i.e., where f(i, j) ≈ 0, for both signal models (see Expression 5.33), the scanner
pattern can also be relatively easily extracted because:
g(i, j) ≈ s(i, j). (5.41)
However, f(i, j) is as close to 0 as to make the approximation in Expression 5.41
sufficiently accurate only for very small part of the pixels in an image containing a
fingerprint. In this case, therefore, the subsequent signal processing modules may
use only that part of the image for which the approximation in Expression 5.41 is
sufficiently accurate or use a larger part of the image where the approximation is
not. Our study showed that either approach degrades the overall performance of
the algorithm but is still possible and can be used in certain cases.
Wiener Filter
Herewith we incorporate a summary of the theory of Wiener filters as presented
in [Lim 1989] for the one-dimensional case. Let the signal p(k) and the additive noise
q(k), where k is an integer, are two zero-mean second-order stationary discrete-time
random processes, linearly independent of each other, and the noisy observation
is r(k) = p(k) + q(k). The objective is to find that linear time-invariant (or al-
ternatively, space-invariant) filter with a possibly infinite and possibly non-causal
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impulse response b(k) such that the linear estimate p̂(k) given the observation r(k),
i.e., p̂(k) = r(k) ∗ b(k), is closest to the signal p(k) in mean-square error sense:
E[|p (k)− p̂ (k)|2]. The discrete-time Fourier transform of the linear time-invariant
filter b(k) that minimizes the mean square error is:
B (ω) =
Sp (ω)
Sp (ω) + Sq (ω)
where Sp (ω) and Sq (ω) are the power spectral densities of the signal p (k) and
the noise q (k), respectively, and ω is the angular frequency. If p (k) and q (k) are
Gaussian random processes, then the Wiener filter is also the optimal nonlinear
mean-square error estimator.
In essence, the Wiener filter preserves the high SNR frequency components





in function of the frequency. Then the Wiener filter transfer function is: B (ω) =
ρ(ω)
ρ(ω)+1
. At the frequencies where the signal is much stronger than the noise, i.e.,
where ρ (ω) >> 1, the transfer function is B (ω) ≈ 1, and the observation r (k)
passes through the filter almost unchanged. On the other hand, the Wiener filter
almost completely suppresses, i.e., B (ω) ≈ 0, the frequency components at which
the signal is much weaker than the noise, i.e., where ρ (ω) ≈ 0. If the signal p (k)
has a nonzero mean µp and the noise q (k) has a nonzero mean µq, then they have
to be subtracted from the observation r (k) before filtering it.
When the impulse response b(k) of the Wiener filter changes in function of the
local characteristics of the signal being processed, the filter becomes time variant (or
alternatively, space variant). Therefore, instead of using constant (for all indices k)
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power spectral densities for the signal and the noise, they can be estimated locally;
furthermore, the expected values of the signal and the noise can be estimated locally
as well. Depending on how these quantities are estimated, many variations are
possible, but the simplest option is when the local power spectral densities of both
the signal and the noise are assumed constant in function of the frequency, i.e.,
the signal and the noise are both “white.” When the signal and the noise are zero
mean, their power spectral densities are equal to their (local) variances: Sp (ω) = σ
2
p
and Sq (ω) = σ
2




q are the variances of the signal and the noise,
respectively. In this case, the frequency response of the Wiener filter is constant








where δ (k) is the Dirac delta function. Moreover, the filtering also depends on
the relative relationship between the local variance of the signal and the noise:
where the signal local variance σ2p is smaller than the noise local variance σ
2
q , the
filter suppresses the noise and thus the filter output is approximately equal to the
local mean of the signal. On the other hand, where the signal local variance σ2p
is larger than the noise local variance σ2q , the filter leaves the input signal almost
unchanged. Since the signal (local) variance is not known and generally is difficult
to be estimated, in practice an estimate for the variance of the noisy observation




q (since p(k) and q(k) are assumed to be
independent). Putting all things together yields the following expression for the
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estimate p̂(k) of the signal p (k):
p̂(k) = µp (k) +
max(0, σ2r (k)− σ2q )
max(σ2r (k) , σ
2
q )
(p (k)− µp (k)) (5.42)
where σ2r (k) is the local variance of the observation r(k), and µp (k) is the local mean
of the signal p (k), which is also equal to the local mean µr (k) of the observation
r(k) since the noise q(k) is zero mean. Assumed to be known is only the variance
σ2q of the noise; σ
2
r (k) and µr (k) (and thus also µp (k)) are estimated from the
observation r(k). The output of the adaptive Wiener filter is the estimate p̂(k),
which is a smoothed version of the signal p (k).
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5.5.1 Advanced Algorithms for the Area Scanners
Figure 5.59 shows a conceptual diagram of the sequence of signal process-
ing modules in which the signal g, the image, is processed to produce the signal
d, the scanner verification decision, along with the interface signals among them.
The signals between the subsequent modules in Figure 5.59 represent only the
main, not all, input and output signals of the modules. Next we describe the
processing of each module and their different modes of operation as disclosed in

















Figure 5.59: Conceptual diagram of operation of the modules for the area scanners
5.5.1.1 Preprocessing Module
The Preprocessing Module (see Figure 5.59) has the signal g(i, j), i.e., the
pixels of the image, as input and the signal u, a two-dimensional signal with the
same size as g, as output. It has two modes of operation:
(a) Direct mode: u(i, j) = g(i, j);
(b) Inverse mode: u(i, j) = h(i, j) = 1
g(i,j)
;
This mode implements the signal inversion discussed in the preceding section.
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5.5.1.2 Selection Module
The Selection Module (see Figure 5.59) selects part of the pixels from its input
signal u and produces this selection as output signal v, which signal defines regions
of interest. This selection is necessary because: (a) selecting part of the pixels
from all pixels in the image in a particular order provides a signal with statistical
characteristics that facilitates the subsequent signal processing and (b) using only
some of all pixels minimizes the computations, therefore decreasing the required
computational time of the whole algorithm or alternatively, relaxing the requirement
for computational power.
One or many lines of pixels are selected from the two-dimensional input signal
u to produce the one-dimensional signal output v, and thus, all subsequent signal
processing is one dimensional. The output signal v consists of b line segments,
concatenated one after each other, with each line segment having N elements and
each element being a pixel value. The selected line or lines can be columns of pixels,
rows of pixels, or diagonal lines of pixels.
Columns of Pixels
Since the one-dimensional autocorrelation function of the variable part of the
scanner pattern along columns can be assumed a Dirac delta function, then the
pixel values when selected column-wise are close to a white sequence. This type of
selection greatly facilitates the processing of the Filtering Module. The columns of
pixels, as line segments, are concatenated in a sequence one after each other to form
one line of pixels, which line becomes the output signal v.
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Let the input signal u be an image with N rows. If the first column of pixels to
be included as the first line segment in the output signal v is column j of the input
signal u, we denote this line segment as vector v1 = [u(1, j) u(2, j) . . . u(N, j)]
T .
Next, if the second column of pixels to be included as the second line segment
in the output signal v is column k of u, we denote this line segment as vector
v2 = [u(1, k) u(2, k) . . . u(N, k)]
T . The other vectors v3, v4, . . . vc, where c is
the number of columns to be concatenated, are formed in the same way, and their








which is a column vector with (c.N) elements. Each element of this vector v is a
pixel value.
It is possible to select all columns in the image or only a few of them. In
the latter case, it is recommended to have the columns selected nonadjacent and
about evenly spaced across the whole image area because (a) this type of selection
reduces the statistical dependence among the selected pixels and (b) using pixels
from all regions of the image ensures processing a sufficient number of pixels with
high quality estimates of the scanner pattern. For example, for Signal Model A,
selecting about 10 nonadjacent columns, each column containing 360 pixels, may be
sufficient. Thus, the output signal v may contain about 3,600 pixels or only about
4% of the total 92,160 pixels in an image with 360 rows and 256 columns, greatly
reducing the number of computations and computational time. Furthermore, it is
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also possible that the columns contain only a subset of the rows of the image. For
example, it is possible to exclude the first several and the last several rows. Thus,
if using only rows from 25 through 245, the line segments for each selected column
j are of the form: [u(25, j) u(26, j) . . . u(245, j)]T . The overall performance in this
case may be higher because the pixels in the regions close to the boundaries of the
image may experience edge effects that are difficult to mitigate.
Rows of Pixels
Since the one-dimensional autocorrelation function along rows may not be suf-
ficiently close to a Dirac delta function, the pixels along rows exhibit non-negligible
statistical dependence, and selecting and using them may degrade the overall perfor-
mance. However, it is still possible to achieve good performance by selecting more
pixels, i.e., a larger number of rows.
Similarly to the case with columns of pixels, the rows of pixels, as line segments,
are concatenated in a sequence one after another to form one line of pixels, which
line becomes the output signal v. Thus, if row i of the input signal u becomes the
first line segment, then v1 = [u(i, 1) u(i, 2) . . . u(i, N)]
T ; if row k of the input
signal u becomes the second line segment, then v2 = [u(k, 1) u(k, 2) . . . u(k,N)]
T ;
etc. When c number of rows are concatenated, the output signal v is a column








Again, similarly to the case with columns of pixels, it is possible to select all
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rows in the image or only a few of them. In the latter case, it is recommended to have
the rows selected nonadjacent and about evenly spaced across the whole image area.
For example, for Signal Model A, we estimated that selecting about 20 rows (from
the total of 300 rows) is sufficient to ensure good overall performance, meaning that
only about 7% of all pixels of the image are processed, greatly reducing the number
of computations and computational time. Furthermore, it is also possible that the
rows contain only a subset of the columns of the image, e.g., the first several and
the last several columns are excluded: if using only columns from 10 through 246,
then the line segments for each selected row i are: [u(i, 10) u(i, 11) . . . u(i, 246)]T .
Diagonal Lines of Pixels
Selecting diagonal lines from the input signal u is also possible. For example,
the diagonal lines of pixels can be constructed by taking lines parallel to the main























The output signal v is then constructed by concatenating the column vectors v1,v2,
. . .v10.
Selecting pixels from the input signal u can be done in alternative ways as long
as the selection is done so that: (a) these pixels include pixels from regions with
valleys, (b) the fingerprint pattern contained in the resulting output signal v has a
“smooth” waveform (e.g., no discontinuities), and (c) the statistical dependence in
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the scanner pattern contained in the resulting pixels is not significant.
Finally, the algorithm as specified above is with the Preprocessing Module
coming before the Selection Module (see Figure 5.59) because this simplifies the
exposition of the theory and principle of operation. However, it is trivial that
they can be swapped, i.e., the Selection Module can precede the Preprocessing
Module, because the processing in one of them is independent from the processing
in the other one. When the two modules are swapped, the implementation is less
computationally expensive because only (very small) part of all pixels in the image
needs to be inverted.
5.5.1.3 Filtering Module
The Filtering Module (see Figure 5.59) has as input the signal v and as output
the signal x. It can be implemented in three ways: as a bypass implementation,
with a low-pass filter, and with an adaptive Wiener filter.
In the bypass implementation, the input signal v is not modified and thus
x = v. This implementation does not provide a very good overall performance, but
it is the simplest one and can be used in certain very computational-limited systems.
In both the low-pass filter implementation and the adaptive Wiener filter im-
plementation, the input signal v is processed to produce the output signal x, which
signal x contains the scanner pattern. Because of the signal inversion, this filtering
can performed using simple signal processing and essentially comprises two opera-
tions: (1) a smoothing operation F(.) that smooths v and (2) a subtraction oper-
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ation that subtracts thus smoothed signal F(v) from v, and produces the output
signal x:
x = v −F(v) (5.45)
In this way, the smoothing also removes the (variable) mean of the scanner pattern
and yields only the variable part of it, from which another signal is derived and used
in the Matching Module.
Padding and Windowing
The input signal v, which is the output of the Selection Module, is a col-
umn vector consisting of the successive concatenations of c column vectors, with
each vector representing different columns, rows, or diagonal lines and each vector
having N pixels (see Expressions 5.43 and 5.44). Because of this construction, the
signals in two adjacent vectors in v may be substantially different, creating a signal
discontinuity at the place of the concatenation of the two vectors, which, in turn,
may create unwanted artifacts. We propose three methods for mitigating these ar-
tifacts: computation shortening, replica padding, and constant padding, although
using other methods is also possible. The replica padding method and constant
padding method are specified below, while the computation shortening method is
specific for the particular implementation of the Filtering Module and specified in
the appropriate sections.
1. Replica padding
Each vector vi, where i is an integer from 1 to c, is extended to include zero
and negative indices and indices larger than N such that the added elements
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are symmetric about the first and the last indices of vi:
















The added elements in this extension can also be copies of the first and last
elements, respectively, of the vector vi in the same order as they appear in vi.
2. Constant padding
Each vector vi, where i is an integer from 1 to c, is extended to include zero
and negative indices and indices larger than N such that the added elements
are set to constants. The constants can be the first or the last elements,
respectively, as follows:
















The constants can also be other numbers, such as 0 (the smallest minimum
grayscale level), 127 (the middle grayscale level), 255 (the largest grayscale
level), or any number in the range from 0 to 255. However, selecting constants
that do not depend on the elements of the vector vi may lead to degraded
overall performance.
Thus, each vector vi from the input signal v is processed separately, and the
vectors that are the result of this processing are concatenated one after each other
to form the output signal x.
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Incorporating such methods to avoid using pixels from one vector for signal
processing in the vector adjacent to it may seem unjustified, but actually it may
be quite important. Because applying a fingertip tightly in the regions around
the boundaries of the scanner platen area (and of the image in this respect) is
difficult, the pixels in these regions typically contain no fingerprint pattern. Hence,
the estimate of the scanner pattern in these regions can be made very accurate if
introduction of unwanted artifacts is avoided as specified above.
Another important aspect of the processing in this module is applying a win-
dowing function. By multiplying the pixel values by a windowing function (for
example, see w (j) in Expression 5.51), the pixels close to the current index of the
signal being processed have higher weight in the computation, thus controlling the
level of the smoothing by placing larger weight on the pixels around the center pixel
than on the distant pixels and thus reducing the effect of the latter.











can be a rectangular, triangular, Hann, Hamming, or a Gaussian window:
• A rectangular window (also known as Dirichlet window): w (j) = 1












• A Hamming window: w (j) = 2
(














, where w0 is a suitably
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chosen value below 0.5.
Using other windowing functions is also possible. The windowing function of
choice has to satisfy is the normalization condition:
∑
w(j) ≈ 1 for all j for which w(j) is used. (5.50)
Low-pass Filter Implementation of the Filtering Module
The smoothing operation F(.) in this implementation is performed by a low-
pass filter whose cutoff frequency, order, and attenuation in the different frequency
bands are optimized for best performance. This low-pass filter can be a Butterworth,
Chebyshev, elliptic, Bessel or another suitable filter. The filter may have a finite
(FIR) or infinite (IIR) impulse response.
The low-pass filter we selected and describe here is the (possibly windowed)
moving-average filter because of its extreme implementation simplicity and the cor-
responding excellent overall performance. Let the vectors vi, where i is an integer
from 1 to c, are the vectors from the input signal v (see Expression 5.43). Generally,
for a pixel with index k sufficiently far from the beginning and end of this vector
vi, i.e., such that the index (k + j) does not address elements outside vector vi, the
local mean v
(lm)








w (j) .vi (k + j) (5.51)
where M is a positive integer and determines the size of the moving-average window,
w is a windowing function, and b.c is the floor function. Preferably, M is selected
to be odd so that the window is symmetric about index k, but selecting M to be
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even is also possible. Selecting M about 5 gives optimal results, but selecting values
in the range from about 3 to about 7 is also possible. Using large values for M
leads to better smoothing as a large number of pixels are taken in the sum, which,
however, also makes the estimate of the scanner pattern in the neighborhood of
transition regions between valleys and ridges less accurate. Using small values for
M leads to worse smoothing as small number of pixels are taken in the sum (see
Expression 5.51), which results in a less accurate estimate of the scanner pattern
in the regions with valleys. Once the windowing function is selected, the size M of
the moving-average window may need to be adjusted for achieving optimal overall
performance.
For the pixels that are close to the beginning or the end of the vector vi, we
propose three techniques for computing the local mean v
(lm)
i , although using other
techniques is also possible:
1. Computation shortening
The sum in Expression 5.51 and the denominator in the coefficient in front of























(jmax − jmin + 1)
jmax∑
j=jmin
wk (j) .vi (k + j) (5.52)

















In this case, the windowing function depends on the index k because the
window is truncated and needs to be normalized such that the sum of its
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and w is the chosen windowing function. The computation shortening may
lead to slight degradation in the accuracy of the local mean estimate for the
pixels where it is applied to, but the distortion the computation shortening
introduces is the smallest in comparison with the other techniques.
2. Replica padding
Each vector vi is extended to include zero and negative indices and indices
larger than N as specified in Expressions 5.47. The added elements in this
extension can also be copies of the first and last elements, respectively, of the
vector vi in the same order as they appear in vi. Then the local mean vector
v
(lm)
i is computed using Expression 5.51.
3. Constant padding
Each vector vi is extended to include zero and negative indices and indices
larger than N as specified in Expressions 5.49. Then the local mean vector
v
(lm)
i is computed using Expression 5.51.
Once the local mean vectors v
(lm)
i , where i is an integer from 1 to c, are
computed, they are concatenated one after each other to form the local mean signal
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Finally, the output signal x of the Filtering Module in this implementation is
the difference between the input signal v and the local mean signal v(lm):
x (k) = v (k)− v(lm) (k) , (5.55)
where k is the current pixel index, an integer from 1 to (c.N).
Figures 5.60 and 5.61 in the Magnitude Masking Implementation for the Low-
pass Filter (Section 5.5.1.4) show examples for signals processed with this imple-
mentation in both direct and inverse signal modes.
Adaptive Wiener Filter Implementation of the Filtering Module
Let the vectors vi, where i is an integer from 1 to c, be the vectors from the
input signal v (see Expressions 5.43 and 5.44). Each vector vi is processed separately
in the following five steps:
I. Computing the local mean
The local means v
(lm)
i of the vectors vi are computed exactly in the same way
as the local means v
(lm)
i described in the Low-pass Filter Implementation in
Section 5.5.1.3 and repeating that is not necessary. The only difference here is
that for optimal results, the size of the moving-average window M should be
about 3, although values in the range from about 2 to about 7 also yield good
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results. Here again, once the windowing function is selected, M may need to
be adjusted for achieving optimal overall performance.
II. Computing the local square
The local squares v
(ls)
i of the vectors vi are computed similarly to the local
means v
(lm)
i above, with the difference being that vi(k + j) in the sums are
replaced by v2i (k + j). Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, here below we
repeat the specification.
Generally, for a pixel with index k sufficiently far from the beginning and end
of this vector vi, i.e., such that the index (k + j) does not address elements
outside vector vi, the local square v
(ls)








w (j) .v2i (k + j) (5.56)
where M is a positive integer and determines the size of the moving-average
window, w is a windowing function, and b.c is the floor function. Preferably,
M is selected to be odd so that the window is symmetric about index k, but
selecting M to be even is also possible. Selecting M about 3 gives optimal
results, but selecting values in the range from about 2 to about 7 is also possi-
ble. Once the windowing function is selected, the size M of the moving-average
window may need to be adjusted for achieving optimal overall performance.
For the pixels that are close to the beginning or the end of the vector vi, we
propose three techniques for computing the local square v
(ls)
i , although using
other techniques is also possible:
230
1. Computation shortening
The sum in Expression 5.56 and the denominator in the coefficient in
front of it are adjusted so that only elements of the vector vi are used.














, the local square
vector v
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i (k + j) (5.57)

















In this case, the windowing function depends on the index k because the
window is truncated and needs to be normalized such that the sum of
its elements equals 1. Therefore, for all values of j from jmin to jmax as








and w is the chosen windowing function. The computation shortening
may lead to slight degradation in the accuracy of the local square estimate
for the pixels where it is applied to, but the distortion the computation
shortening introduces is the smallest in comparison with the other tech-
niques.
2. Replica padding
Each vector vi is extended to include zero and negative indices and indices
larger than N as specified in Expressions 5.47. The added elements in this
extension can also be copies of the first and last elements, respectively,
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of the vector vi in the same order as they appear in vi. Then the local
square vector v
(ls)
i is computed using Expression 5.56.
3. Constant padding
Each vector vi is extended to include zero and negative indices and indices
larger than N as specified in Expressions 5.49. Then the local square
vector v
(ls)
i is computed using Expression 5.56.
III. Computing the local variance vector
For each pixel with index k, where k is from 1 to N , each element of the local
variance vector v
(lv)
i is computed by:
v
(lv)









IV. Computing the scaling coefficient vector
For each pixel with index k, where k is from 1 to N , each element of the scaling

















where σ2w is the Wiener filter variance and βw is the Wiener beta coefficient.
Since in Expression 5.60 the numerator is always smaller than the denomina-
tor, by raising the ratio to power βw > 1, the scaling coefficient di (k) becomes
smaller than when βw = 1. Conversely, by raising the ratio to power βw < 1,
the scaling coefficient di (k) becomes greater than when βw = 1. Therefore,
the Wiener filter beta coefficient βw controls the relative weight put on the




and the Wiener filter variance σ2w. We observed that when βw = 1, the over-
all performance is good and the implementation is simple because there is no
raising to power; however, other values of βw can also be used, in particular
βw = 2. Also, generally, βw need not be integer.
The Wiener filter variance σ2w is a critically important parameter that
determines the overall performance. Its optimal value is related to the scanner
pattern variance σ2s (and to its derived parameter σ
2
t in case of inverse signal
mode) because the level of the filtering effect of the Wiener filter directly




t ) or its
estimate to derive a value for σ2w in a simplistic way is not recommended
because:
(a) For the Wiener filter, the “signal” is the fingerprint pattern, while the
“noise” is the combined effect of the scanner pattern and the (spatial)
scanner noise;
(b) σ2w is a tradeoff parameter that controls the relationship between the FAR
and the FRR;
(c) Other factors, such as varying environmental conditions, may require
adjustment of σ2w in order to compensate for these variations.
Therefore, the best value for σ2w is typically the result of optimization and tests,
preferably with a great number of scanners of the same type and under different
environmental conditions. When doing such optimization is not feasible, as a
very approximate guideline, in direct signal mode, σ2w can be set to the sum
233
of the estimates for the scanner pattern variance σ2s and the scanner noise
variance σ2n. For the direct signal mode implementation of the Preprocessing
Module, σ2w can be set to about 30 for Signal Model A and to about 8 for Signal
Model B. For the inverse signal mode implementation of the Preprocessing
Module, σ2w can be set to about 3 ∗ 10−8 for Signal Model A and to about
4 ∗ 10−9 for Signal Model B.
V. Computing the smoothed signal
For each pixel with index k, where k is from 1 to N , each element of the
smoothed signal vector v
(s)
i is computed by:
v
(s)
i (k) = v
(lm)







Once the smoothed signal vectors vi
(s), where i is an integer from 1 to c, are















Finally, the output signal x of the Filtering Module in this implementation
is the difference between the input signal v and the smoothed signal v(s),
corrected with the Wiener mean µw:
x (k) = v (k)− v(s) (k) + µw
where k is the current pixel index, an integer from 1 to (c.N). In the preferred
implementation, the Wiener filter mean µw is set to 0, but other values of µw
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are also possible as µw can be used to compensate in case when fixed-valued
offset is present so that the output signal v becomes zero mean. However,
setting a non-zero value for µw may require adjustments in the thresholds of
the various implementations of the Masking Module.
Figures 5.62 and 5.63 in the Magnitude Masking Implementation for the Adap-
tive Wiener Filter (Section 5.5.1.4) show examples for signals processed with this
implementation in both direct and inverse signal modes.
5.5.1.4 Masking Module
The Masking Module (see Figure 5.59) marks as usable those pixels from the
input signal x that contain sufficiently accurate estimate of the scanner pattern and
as unusable the remaining pixels, producing a binary mask as the output signal y.
When using the Low-pass Filter Implementation or the Adaptive Wiener Fil-
ter Implementation of the Filtering Module, the following observations regarding
masking can be made for the four types of regions below:
(i) In the regions of transitions between a valley and a ridge, the adjacent pixels
have very different grayscale values, which makes the local mean signal v(lm)
significantly different from the input signal v. Consequently, the output signal
x is large and considerably different from the scanner pattern, which makes
using the output signal x as a scanner pattern estimate difficult. Therefore,
such regions are marked not to be used, i.e., with mask value 0.
(ii) In the regions with ridges where either (a) the adjacent pixels have consider-
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ably different grayscale values (which is similar to case (i)), with this difference
particularly pronounced when using the inverse signal model, or (b) the pixel
values are saturated because of the particular fingerprint scanner implementa-
tion, thus all of these pixels have the same constant grayscale value, resulting
in an output signal x being equal to 0, rendering it not useful as a scanner
pattern estimate. Therefore, such regions are marked not to be used, i.e., with
mask value 0.
(iii) In the regions where the adjacent pixels have grayscale values approximately
equal to each other, very often such pixels actually are significantly corrupted
by the scanner noise, which makes using the output signal x as a scanner
pattern estimate difficult. Therefore, such regions are marked as not to be
used, i.e., with mask value 0.
(iv) In the regions with valleys and in the regions without a fingerprint pattern
being present (i.e., no fingertip skin touches the scanner platen), the difference
between the input signal v and the local mean signal v(lm) provides an accurate
estimate of the scanner pattern. Therefore, such regions are marked as useful,
i.e., with mask value 1.
The Masking Module has several implementations which are described next.
Threshold Implementation
When using the Bypass Implementation of the Filtering Module, the Masking
Module is implemented as Threshold Implementation. In the direct signal mode of
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the Preprocessing Module, the pixel values in the regions with valleys are greater
than the pixel values in the regions with ridges for both Signal Model A and Signal
Model B (see Expression 5.33). Therefore, by comparing the values of each pixel
with a threshold, a decision can be made as to whether the pixel can be used to
estimate the scanner pattern or not. Thus, in the direct signal mode, for each pixel
index k from 1 to (c.N), the output signal y is computed by:
y (k) =
{
1 if u (k) ≥ θ
0 otherwise.
(5.62)
where θ is the threshold value. The comparison can be done also in the inverse
signal mode of the Preprocessing Module, in which case the condition for 1 in Ex-
pression 5.62 is replaced by u (k) ≤ (1/θ).
The value of θ depends strongly on the overall level of the scanner pattern
and to its mean and variance; methods for computing different estimates for them
were described in Section 5.4.3. When an estimate s̄ of the scanner pattern mean µs
for a particular fingerprint scanner is available, then θ can be set fixed for all pixel
indices k to about 90% of s̄. When local estimates µ̂s (i, j) of the scanner pattern
mean µs are available, then θ can be set separately for each index k to about 90%
of the local estimate µ̂s (i, j) that corresponds to the pixel in question. When, in
addition to estimates of the scanner pattern mean µs, an estimate σ̂
2
s of the scanner
pattern variance σ2s is also available, the threshold θ can be set to about 3σ̂s below
the estimate (s̄ or µ̂s (i, j), whichever is available) of the scanner pattern mean µs.
When no estimate of the scanner pattern mean µs is available, the threshold
θ can be computed using the following method. First, the unique values of signal
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v are stored in a vector Uv such that each element of the vector Uv represents
each unique value of v and the elements of Uv are sorted in ascending order, with
the first element of Uv being equal to the smallest value of v and the last element
of Uv being equal to the largest value of v. This is possible because the signal v
is either equal to the signal g, which is a discrete-valued (quantized) signal, e.g.,
its range is the integers from 0 to 255 when g is an 8-bit grayscale image, or to its
inverse, the signal h, which is also a discrete-valued signal when g is discrete valued.
Furthermore, when g is an 8-bit grayscale image, the vector Uv has at most 256
elements in both cases.
Next, a new vector Dv, derived from the vector Uv, is computed by:
Dv (k) = Uv (k + 1)− Uv (k) (5.63)
where the index k runs such as to address all elements of the vector Uv. The vector
Dv contains differences between the values of adjacent elements of the vector Uv and
thus it carries information about “gaps” in the unique pixel values of the image g.
In implementations where the direct signal mode of the Preprocessing Module
is used, the last Q elements of the vector Dv are then inspected. A large-value
element in these Q elements of the vector Dv, which element corresponds to a large
difference between adjacent elements in the vector Uv, may mark the separation
between the values of two groups of pixels of the image: (1) a group of pixels that
correspond to abnormally operating sensing elements (outliers), such as dead and
defective pixels which are unique for every fingerprint scanner, and (2) a group of
pixels that correspond to valleys in the image. Thus, the largest value of these Q
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elements of the vector Dv can be considered as an indicator about a split between
these two groups of pixels. Let the index of this largest value element be R. Then,







If the value of the element Dv (R) is over about 4 times greater than this
average d̄, i.e., if Dv (R) > 4d̄, then the value of the element Uv (R) indicates the
peak value from which the threshold θ can be computed by:
θ = Uv (R)−∆
where ∆ is a suitably chosen constant, which is about 32 for Signal Model A and
about 18 for Signal Model B, both for the case when the direct signal mode of the
Preprocessing Module is used. When an estimate σ̂2s of the scanner pattern variance
σ2s is available, then the constant ∆ can be set to about 6 times this estimate σ̂s.
This factor 6 can be motivated by the observation that since (the variable part of)
the scanner pattern s has a Gaussian distribution, then thus selected threshold θ can
be thought to be about 3σs below the scanner pattern mean µs (which is unknown)
and the peak value Uv (R) to be about 3σs above the scanner pattern mean µs.
Thus, all pixels that are about ±3σs around the (unknown) scanner pattern mean
µs are being marked as useful.
In implementations where the inverse signal mode of the Preprocessing Module
is used, the processing is analogous. Since the inversion (Expression 5.34) transforms
large numbers into small ones and small numbers into large ones, several adjustments
have to be made: (i) the first Q elements of the vector Dv are inspected, not the last
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ones, (ii) a small-value element in these Q elements of the vector Dv corresponds
to a large difference between pixels in the image g, therefore the smallest value of
these Q elements can be considered as an indicator about the split point, (iii) the
inequality condition has the opposite direction, and (iv) the constant ∆ can be set




In an alternative implementation where no estimates of the scanner pattern
characteristics (mean µs and standard deviation σs) are available, the threshold θ
can be set to about 185 for Signal Model A and to about 210 for Signal Model B
and used in Expression 5.62. When the inverse signal mode of the Preprocessing
Module is utilized, the condition in Expression 5.62 is replaced by u (k) ≤ (1/θ) and
the same values for the threshold θ are used.
The Threshold Implementation was inspired by Scenario B and Scenario C al-
gorithms of our initial research (see Section 5.2.4.2). The Threshold Implementation
is simple to implement, especially when the threshold θ is set without determination,
but its performance under changing environmental conditions, such as temperature
and moisture, may be suboptimal if the value of the threshold θ is not adjusted
to changes of the mean of the scanner pattern due to the different environmental
conditions.
Magnitude Masking Implementation for the Low-pass Filter
In this implementation, by comparing the magnitude (i.e., the absolute value)
of the elements of the input signal x with two thresholds, a decision can be made
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as to whether the pixel can be used to estimate the scanner pattern or not. Thus,
in the direct signal mode of the Preprocessing Module, for each pixel index k from
1 to (c.N), the output signal y is computed by:
y (k) =
{
1 if ϕmin ≤ |x (k)| ≤ ϕmax
0 otherwise
(5.64)
where ϕmin and ϕmax are two threshold values.
Figure 5.60 shows example signals v and x for one and the same column (#43)
of an image with a fingerprint (thumb) and an image with air in an implementation
using direct signal mode, a 3-tap moving-average filtering, and magnitude masking.
For better visibility, only the first 60 rows (one-sixth of all) are shown in the figure.
The reason for choosing one of the images with air instead of an image with an-
other fingerprint is to better illustrate the process visually as when both images are
with fingerprints, the commonly masked pixels in a single column are very few and
sparsely distributed along the rows, and the figure becomes difficult to understand.
An image with air contains both the scanner pattern and the scanner noise, and
this is sufficient for illustrative purposes.
The moving-average filter, used to “denoise” v, creates spikes in the signal x
in the transition regions from valleys to ridges (and vice versa). As we already
explained, extracting the scanner pattern from these transition regions is difficult
because the scanner pattern is much weaker than the fingerprint pattern. On the
other hand, in the regions with plateaus, i.e., in valleys and ridges as well as in
areas where no fingertip is present, the signal x is weak. Therefore, by marking as
not useful the pixels with magnitudes above the higher threshold ϕmax, we discard
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Signals  v from an image with a fingeprint (thumb) and with air, column 43, Scanner u106
 
 







Signals  x obtained after moving−average filtering of the signals  v
 
 







Signals  x masked with magnitude masking (only the commonly masked pixels are shown)
 
 
 v with a fingerprint
 v with air
 x with a fingerprint
 x with air
 x with a fingerprint








Figure 5.60: Advanced algorithms for area scanners: example signals in an imple-
mentation with moving-average filtering and magnitude masking in direct mode
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the pixels in the transitions, while retaining those in the plateaus. Because in the
regions with valleys, the signal x is essentially scanner pattern and scanner noise,
choosing the threshold ϕmax as a function of their combined variance will retain
considerable number of pixels containing the scanner pattern. However, of course,
there will always be incorrectly discarded pixels as the scanner pattern can have
much larger values than its (combined with the scanner noise) standard deviation,
as it is visible from the figure (e.g., at rows #11 and #37).
Next, we observed that because of the saturation (“clipping”) problem in some
of the ridges (see the figure), no scanner noise can be extracted from them. The
moving-average filtering in this case yields 0 in signal x because there is no “noise” at
these pixels. The second observation is that sometimes pixels for which x has a very
small magnitude contain predominantly noise because the scanner noise variance is
much smaller than the scanner pattern variance and therefore in pixels with very
small magnitudes, the scanner noise is more likely to dominate over the scanner
pattern (because both are zero-mean Gaussians), in which case it is better not
to use these pixels. These two observations led to the conclusion that a lower
threshold ϕmin is also necessary, which logically, is related to the scanner noise
variance.
The lowest plot in Figure 5.60 shows the common pixels after masking both
signals x. As designed, these are only (a) pixels in the valleys and (b) pixels where
no fingertip is present, which number in this case is much larger than the number
of pixels in (a) because the segment of rows shown in the figure is close to the edge
of the scanner platen. The total number of common pixels in the whole column (for
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all 360 rows) is 89, which is about 25% and considerably higher than in a typical
case with two images with fingerprints. The correlation coefficient between these 89
common pixels is 0.6209.
Figure 5.61 shows exactly the same two columns of pixels from the same two
images as in Figure 5.60. The moving-average filtering and the magnitude masking
are also the same; the only difference is that here the two columns are processed
in inverse signal mode. Because of the inversion, the ridges are now on top, and
the valleys become too small to be discernible in the figure; the latter also applies
to the signal v with air. The reasoning, however, remains exactly the same: the
pixels in the transition regions are discarded and the pixels in signal x with too
small magnitudes are discarded as well. One important note: the inversion does
transform large values into small values (and vice versa), but for the signals we
process (Gaussians with means much larger than their standard deviations), a signal
with large variance still has large variance after the inversion (provided that the
mean is unchanged) and a signal with small variance still has small variance after
the inversion (for details, see Section 6.5 in the appendix). Therefore, the higher
threshold ϕmax still should be computed in function of both the scanner pattern and
the scanner noise variances; the reasoning for the lower threshold ϕmin is similar.
The lowest plot in Figure 5.61 shows the common pixels after masking both
signals x. The total number of common pixels in the whole column (for all 360 rows)
is much smaller (58) or about 16%, although the correlation coefficient is slightly
higher (0.6749). We believe that this is due to the values of the thresholds, which
have not been optimized. However, one can notice that the overall pattern remains
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roughly the same (but, of course, inverted).





















Signals  v from an image with a fingeprint (thumb) and with air, column 43, Scanner u106
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Signals  x masked with magnitude masking (only the commonly masked pixels are shown)
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Figure 5.61: Advanced algorithms for area scanners: example signals in an imple-
mentation with moving-average filtering and magnitude masking in inverse mode
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Hereby we propose some guidelines for computing the thresholds φmin and
φmax. However, we advise doing some experimentation and tests in order to find
the values giving the best overall performance. In the direct signal mode of the
Preprocessing Module, ϕmin can be set to about half of the scanner noise standard
deviation σn and ϕmax to about the square root of the sum of the scanner pattern
variance σ2s and the scanner noise variance σ
2





can be set to about 0.67 for Signal Model A and to about 0.5 for Signal Model B.
When an estimate σ̂s of the scanner pattern standard deviation σs is available, ϕmax
can be set to about
√
σ̂2s + 1.8 for Signal Model A and to about
√
σ̂2s + 1 for Signal
Model B. When no estimate of the scanner pattern standard deviation is available,
ϕmax can be set to about 5.5 for Signal Model A and to about 3.6 for Signal Model
B.
In the inverse signal mode of the Preprocessing Module, ϕmin can be set to
about σn/2µ
2






s. Thus, when an estimate s̄ of the
scanner pattern mean µs for a particular fingerprint scanner is available, ϕmin can
be set to about 0.67/s̄2 for Signal Model A and to about 0.5/s̄2 for Signal Model
B. When no estimate of the scanner pattern mean µs is available, ϕmin can be set
to about 1.8 · 10−5 for Signal Model A and to about 0.95 · 10−5 for Signal Model B.
When an estimate σ̂2s of the scanner pattern variance σ
2








Model B. When no estimate of the scanner pattern variance σ2s is available, ϕmax
can be set to about 1.36 ·10−4 for Signal Model A and to about 0.68 ·10−4 for Signal
Model B.
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Variance Masking Implementation for the Low-pass Filter
In this implementation, by comparing an estimate of the local variance of the
input signal x with two thresholds, a decision can be made as to whether the pixel
can be used to estimate the scanner pattern or not. Thus, in the direct signal mode
of the Preprocessing Module, for each pixel index k from 1 to (c.N), the output
signal y is computed by:
y (k) =
{
1 if γmin ≤
∣∣v(lv) (k)∣∣ ≤ γmax
0 otherwise
(5.65)
where γmin and γmax are two threshold values. The signal v
(lv) is the local variance
computed by concatenating the local variance vectors v
(lv)
i , where the index i is
















i in Expression 5.66 is computed using Expression 5.59, wherein
M , the size of the moving-average window, is chosen to be about 5 for computing
the local mean vectors v
(lm)
i and the local square vectors v
(ls)
i as specified in the
Adaptive Wiener Filter implementation of the Filtering Module.
In the direct signal mode of the Preprocessing Module, γmax can be set to
approximately the sum of the scanner pattern variance σ2s and the scanner noise
variance σ2n, and γmin can be set to about 50% of γmax. When an estimate σ̂
2
s of
the scanner pattern variance σ2s is available, γmax can be set to about (σ̂
2
s + 1.8) for
Signal Model A and to about (σ̂2s + 1) for Signal Model B. When no estimate of
the scanner pattern standard deviation is available, γmax can be set to about 30 for
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Signal Model A and to about 14 for Signal Model B.
In the inverse signal mode of the Preprocessing Module, γmax can be set to




s, and γmin can be set to about 50% of γmax. Thus, when an
estimate s̄ of the scanner pattern mean µs for a particular fingerprint scanner and
an estimate σ̂2s of the scanner pattern variance σ
2
s are available, γmax can be set to
about (σ̂2s + 1.8)/s̄
4 for Signal Model A and to about (σ̂2s + 1)/s̄
4 for Signal Model
B. When no estimates of the scanner pattern mean µs or standard deviation σs is
available, γmax can be set to about 1.87 · 10−8 for Signal Model A and to about
0.46 · 10−8 for Signal Model B.
Magnitude Masking Implementation for the Adaptive Wiener Filter
In regions where the signal v changes very little, such as in valleys or in areas
with no fingerprint pattern, the adaptive Wiener filter suppresses these small changes
(because the “signal-to-noise” ratio with respect to the fingerprint pattern is small
and the Wiener filter treats the signal as containing predominantly “noise”). Thus,
the output of the filter, the signal x, which is the difference between the signal v and
its smoothed version, gives an accurate estimate of the scanner pattern. Therefore,
the magnitude of the signal x can be used as a criterion for the usefulness of the
pixel in question: if this magnitude is sufficiently large, the corresponding pixel
is marked as useful. On the other hand, in regions where the signal v undergoes
significant changes, such as in transitions between a valley and a ridge, the adaptive
Wiener filter leaves the signal v almost unaltered (because the “signal-to-noise”
ratio with respect to the fingerprint pattern is large and the Wiener filter does not
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suppress the “noise”). Thus, the magnitude of the difference between the signal v
and its smoothed version is close to 0, and therefore using the signal x may lead
to inaccurate estimate of the scanner pattern. For this reason, these regions are
marked not to be used, i.e., they are discarded.
This process is illustrated in Figure 5.62. The columns of pixels used as signals
v are exactly the same as in the Magnitude Masking Implementation for the Low-
pass Filter (see Figure 5.60). Three clusters of pixels on each of the three subplots
are boxed to serve as examples for the pairs of pixels that are masked as useful. The
determination for this usefulness is shown in the middle plot: the corresponding
pairs of signals x have magnitudes above the threshold, i.e., this is the magnitude
masking criterion.
The lowest plot shows the common pixels after masking both signals x. The
total number of common pixels in the whole column (for all 360 rows) is only 37
or only about 10% of all; however, the correlation coefficient is very high (0.9462).
One of the explanation for this is that the scanner pattern here is estimated more
accurately than in case of moving-average filtering.
Figure 5.63 shows the same process in inverse signal mode. The first plot is
enlarged so that the valleys can be seen clearly. The three boxed clusters of pixels
correspond to the same clusters of pixels in the direct mode in Figure 5.62, with the
difference being two more pixels determined here as useful. The visual comparison
of the accuracy of the scanner pattern estimate between the inverse and the direct
mode (the third plots in the two figures) is in favor of the inverse mode. The total
number of common pixels in the whole column (for all 360 rows) is 34 and slightly
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Signals  v from an image with a fingeprint (thumb) and with air, column 43, Scanner u106
 
 







Signals  x obtained after adaptive Wiener filtering of the signals  v
 
 







Signals  x masked with magnitude masking (only the commonly masked pixels are shown)
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Masked as useful
pairs of pixels
Figure 5.62: Advanced algorithms for area scanners: example signals in an imple-
mentation with adaptive Wiener filtering and magnitude masking in direct mode
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less than that in the direct mode; the correlation coefficient is also slightly smaller
(0.9413). However, the differences are too small to generalize from this particular
example that the direct mode is better.
In summary, the magnitude masking for the Adaptive Wiener Filter imple-
mentation is as follows. For each pixel with index k from 1 to (c.N), the output
signal y is constructed by:
y (k) =
{
1 if |x (k)| ≥ αw · σw
0 otherwise
(5.67)
where σw is the square root of the Wiener variance as specified in the Adaptive
Wiener Filter Implementation, and αw is a suitably chosen scaling coefficient. For
Signal Model A, αw can be chosen to be about 0.50 in the direct signal mode and
about 0.33 in the inverse signal mode. For Signal Model B, αw can be chosen to be
about 0.50 in either signal mode, direct or inverse.
Valley Masking Implementation for the Adaptive Wiener Filter
The objective of this mode of masking is determining the pixel indices of the
regions with valleys directly from the signal v. We propose a heuristics based on
the observation that the derivative (gradient) of the signal vi changes much less in
the regions with valleys and ridges than in the regions of transitions from valleys
to ridges and vice versa. Thus, by localizing the regions with small changes of
the gradient, we identify the plateaus with valleys or ridges. The next step is
discriminating between valleys and ridges in these plateaus, for which we observed
that the distribution of the gradients of vi in these plateaus can be of two different
types:
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Signals  v from an image with a fingeprint (thumb) and with air, column 43, Scanner u106
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Figure 5.63: Advanced algorithms for area scanners: example signals in an imple-
mentation with adaptive Wiener filtering and magnitude masking in inverse mode
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1. Unimodal distribution for plateaus where no fingerprint pattern is present.
In this case, all pixels can be used;
2. Bimodal distribution for plateaus with a fingerprint pattern. We observed
that the pixels in the left (lower) distribution (mode) are typically plateaus
with ridges, while the pixels in the right (higher) distribution (mode) are
typically plateaus with valleys. We propose to identify the pixels in the latter
plateaus by thresholding above a certain value.
The masking algorithm is as follows. First, for each vector vi of the signal v,
where i is an integer from 1 to c, the gradient vector v
(g)




vi (k + 1)− vi (k − 1)
2
(5.68)
where k is an integer from 2 to (N − 1). The first and the last elements of the
gradient vector v
(g)
i are computed by:
v
(g)
i (1) = vi (2)− vi (1) (5.69)
v
(g)
i (N) = vi (N)− vi (N − 1) (5.70)
Let Fi be the set of all elements in vi for which
∣∣∣v(g)i (k)∣∣∣ is less than about 2
times the value of σ̂s in direct signal mode or about 2 times the value of σ̂t in inverse
signal mode. This essentially is the criterion for localizing the plateaus with valleys
and ridges. Next, a decision is made as to whether the distribution is unimodal or
bimodal. Let µF be the mean value of the elements in Fi, mLF be the mode of the
histogram of those elements in Fi that are smaller than µF , and mRF be the mode
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of the histogram of those elements in Fi that are greater than or equal to µF . The
two cases are:
1. Unimodal distribution. If the difference (mRF−mLF ) is smaller than about
2 times the value of σ̂s in direct signal mode or about 2 times the value of σ̂t
in inverse signal mode, all elements in vi can be used, i.e., y (k) = 1 for all k.
2. Bimodal distribution. Otherwise, y (k) is set to 1 only for those k for which
vi (k) is greater than (mRF −λ), where λ is a predetermined value, which can
be chosen to be about equal to σ̂s in direct signal mode or to σ̂t in inverse
signal mode.
This algorithm is repeatedly applied to all vectors vi.
Threshold Masking Implementation for the Adaptive Wiener Filter
When using the Adaptive Wiener Filter Implementation of the Filtering Mod-
ule, the Threshold Implementation of the Masking Module can be used in the same
way as when using the Bypass Implementation of the Filtering Module.
5.5.1.5 Matching Module
The Matching Module (see Figure 5.59) computes a similarity score between
the scanner patterns extracted from two images and produces a decision as to
whether they are sufficiently similar or not.
Let xe denote the output signal of the Filtering Module and ye denote the
output signal of the Masking Module when the input signal g is an image acquired
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during the scanner enrolment. Let xq denote the output signal of the Filtering
Module and yq denote the output signal of the Masking Module when the input
signal g is an image acquired during the scanner verification. Using the signals xe,
ye, xq, and yq, the Matching Module:
(i) selects the common pixel indices marked as useful in the signals ye and yq;
(ii) quantifies the similarity between the two signals xe and xq for these common
pixel indices in a score;
(iii) produces a decision via the output signal d as to whether the two images have
been acquired with the same fingerprint scanner by comparing this score with
a threshold. When the output signal d is set to 1, this indicates scanner match;
when it is set to 0, this indicates scanner non-match; and when it is set to (-1),
this indicates that a decision on matching/non-matching cannot be made and
a new query image must be acquired.
The selection of the common pixel indices marked as useful in the signals ye
and yq produces the signal ym so that:
ym (k) =
{
1 if ye (k) = 1 and yq (k) = 1
0 otherwise
(5.71)
where the index k is an integer running from 1 to (c.N). Let D be the set of all
indices k for which ym (k) = 1, and let ND be the number of elements in this set D.
If ND is less than about 100, the Matching Module produces (-1) as the output
signal d, which indicates that the number of common pixel indices is insufficient to
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compute a reliable similarity score and to make a decision thereof. In this case,
acquiring a new query image is necessary.
Quantifying the similarity between the two signals xe and xq for the common
pixel indices as computed in the signal ym in a score can be done with the following
three implementations.
Normalized Correlation Implementation









If either one of the norms ‖xe‖ or ‖xq‖ is equal to zero, d is set to 0 and




k∈D xe (k) . xq (k)
‖xe‖ . ‖xq‖
(5.73)
The output signal d is then computed by comparing the similarity score z(nc)
with a predetermined threshold:
d =
{
1 if z(nc) ≥ τ (nc)
0 otherwise
(5.74)
The decision threshold τ (nc) is the result of optimization and is in the range
from about 0.4 to about 0.6.
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Correlation Coefficient Implementation
First, the zero-mean signals x̃e and x̃q for the indices k in the set D are
computed:











where the index k runs through all elements in the set D. The values of x̃e (k) and
x̃q (k) for indices k that do not belong to the set D can be set to 0 or any other
number because they will not be used in the computations that follow.









If either one of the norms ‖x̃e‖ or ‖x̃q‖ is equal to zero, d is set to 0 and




k∈D x̃e (k) . x̃q (k)
‖x̃e‖ . ‖x̃q‖
(5.77)
The output signal d is then computed by comparing the similarity score z(cc)
with a predetermined threshold:
d =
{
1 if z(cc) ≥ τ (cc)
0 otherwise
(5.78)
The decision threshold τ (cc) is the result of optimization and is in the range
from about 0.4 to about 0.6.
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Relative Mean Square Error Implementation





If the norm ‖xe‖ is equal to zero, d is set to 0 and no further computations
are performed. Otherwise, the similarity score z(rmse) is computed by:
z(rmse) =
√∑




The output signal d is then computed by comparing the similarity score z(rmse)
with a predetermined threshold:
d =
{
1 if z(rmse) ≤ τ (rmse)
0 otherwise
(5.81)
The decision threshold z(rmse) is the result of optimization and is in the range
from about 0.8 to about 1.1.
5.5.1.6 Using Multiple Images
All implementations described above can use a single image for the scanner
enrolment and a single image for the scanner authentication, and this is preferred
because (a) it requires the least number of computations and (b) it is the most secure
as it determines if two images are taken with the same scanner or not without
any additional images. However, variations are also possible. For example, it is
typical for the biometric systems to capture three images and use them for enrolling
the biometric information. Similarly, another implementation allows using multiple
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images for the scanner enrolment and/or multiple images for the scanner verification.
This may improve the overall accuracy of the scanner authentication.
Let the number of enrolled images be E and the output signals of the Filtering
Module and the Masking Module when the enrolled image with index r is being
processed be xr and yr, respectively. In the preferred implementation, the similarity
scores for each pair consisting of one enrolled image and the query image are averaged
and the resulting average similarity score is used to produce a decision. Thus, if
the similarity score between the query image and the enrolled image with index r
is denoted by zr, computed using Expression 5.73, 5.77, or 5.80, then the average







Finally, the output signal d of the Matching Module is computed using Ex-
pression 5.74, 5.78, or 5.81, depending on which implementation of the Matching
Module is used for computing the similarity scores zr.
Another implementation computes an “average” enrolled scanner pattern from
all enrolled images and uses this “average” enrolled scanner pattern in the Matching













where Na is the number of elements in ya for which ya (k) = 1. Next, xa is used
259
instead of xe and ya is used instead of ye in the Matching Module. The performance
of this implementation may be suboptimal in certain cases because of two reasons:
(1) since the signals yr for different indices r (and thus different enrolled images) may
be considerably different from one another, the “average” mask ya, which essentially
is a logical AND of all yr, may have very few non-zero elements, which may result
in fewer than sufficient number of pixels to be used in the Matching Module, and
(2) the “average” signal xa may become considerably distorted for some pixels and
this may result in false scanner match or false scanner non-match decisions.
5.5.1.7 Combinations of Module Modes for the Area Scanners
All modes (implementations) of the {Selection Module, Filtering Module,
Matching Module} can be used in combination with any of the modes of the mod-
ules that precede this current module in the conceptual signal flow diagram shown
in Figure 5.59). Those of them that can be used in combination are suggested in
the description of each module. However, different combinations of modes may pro-
vide different overall performance. Two well-performing combinations are described
next.
Figure 5.64 shows the flowchart of one exemplary implementation using a single
enrolled image ge, acquired and processed during the scanner enrolment, and a single
query image gq, acquired and processed during the scanner verification. Although ge
and gq are processed at different times, the consecutive processing steps are identical,
and therefore we discuss them simultaneously. ge and gq are first processed by the
260
Preprocessing Module in its inverse signal mode. The output signals ue and uq are
processed by the Selection Module selecting columns of pixels. The resulting signals
ve and vq are processed by the Filtering Module with an adaptive Wiener filter.
The Masking Module performs magnitude masking and produces the signals ye and
yq. Finally, the Matching Module computes the correlation coefficient and outputs
the signal d, based on which a decision for scanner match or scanner nonmatch is
made.
Figure 5.65 shows another exemplary implementation that uses moving-average
filtering. The figure is self explanatory as the signals are the same and the operations
are evident.
5.5.1.8 Performance
The advanced algorithms for the area scanners are scalable in performance
(accuracy) as well as they are in complexity and in computational power. Our un-
derstanding is that the modes of each module should be chosen and the values of the
parameters should be optimized once the available computational power (and other
implementation constraints, e.g., memory and numerical precision) are set. Obvi-
ously, there is a tradeoff between performance and computational power/complexity.
The performance of the advanced algorithms decreases gradually when decreasing
the available computational power (e.g., when processing fewer pixels) and when
choosing less complex modes. The algorithms also have a fail-safe guard: if the
number of pixels to be used for computing the similarity score falls below a certain
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Figure 5.64: Advanced algorithms for area scanners: An exemplary implementation
that uses Wiener filtering
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Figure 5.65: Advanced algorithms for area scanners: An exemplary implementation
that uses moving-average filtering
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value, the Matching Module flags this to avoid producing an unreliable decision.
For illustrative purposes, here we present the performance of the exemplary
implementation shown in Figure 5.64. It uses inverse signal mode, 50 columns of
pixels (which is slightly less than 20% of the image), 3-tap adaptive Wiener filter
with variance σ2w = 3 · 10−8 and β = 1, magnitude masking with scaling coefficient
αw = 0.326, and correlation coefficient for matching. The normalized histograms
(integrating to 1) of the correlation coefficients from running this implementation on
4,400 images acquired (at room temperature) with the 22 UPEK area scanners (see
Section 6.1 in the appendix) for 10 images per finger for all 10 fingers of 2 persons
are shown in Figure 5.66. Only a single image is used for scanner enrolment and
only a single image for scanner verification. Every image is matched against all
other images. Since all processing is completely symmetric for the enrolled image
and the query image, only one of the matchings, AB or BA, is computed; the total
number of computed matchings is about 10 million.
The two distributions of correlation coefficients (when the query image is ac-
quired with the same scanner and when it is acquired with a different one) are
very clearly separated, with their means about 0.75 apart. We chose the decision
threshold (0.368) just below the smallest self correlation coefficient, and the empir-
ical FRR is 0. The corresponding empirical FAR is 8.64 · 10−7 (in the tails, the
numerical precision of the empirical FAR and FRR is limited by the number of
matchings).
We ran the same implementation (including with the same parameter values)
on the 22 UPEK area scanners in the appendix) for 10 images per finger for 3 fingers
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Normalized histograms of correlation coefficients for same scanner and different scanners 
















Self correlations (same scanner)
Cross correlations (different scanner)
Mean: 0.0527
Std deviation: 0.0492
Range: [ −0.1998  0.3934 ]
Mean: 0.7975
Std deviation: 0.0895
Range: [ 0.3683  0.9655 ]
Decision: 0.368
Figure 5.66: Performance of the advanced algorithms for the area scanners imple-
mented with Wiener filtering
(right thumb, right index, and right little finger) of one person at 3 temperatures:
at room temperature, at about 5 oC, and at about 40 oC (see Section 6.2 in the
appendix); in total 1,980 images. The results are shown in Figure 5.67. When using
the same decision threshold (0.368) as in Figure 5.66, no decision errors were regis-
tered, i.e., the empirical FAR = empirical FRR = 0. Somewhat surprising is that
although the distribution of the self correlation coefficients in Figure 5.66 is sub-
stantially different than that of the self correlation coefficients in Figure 5.67 (with
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the thermal tests), both their means and standard deviations are almost identical.












Normalized histograms of correlation coefficients for same scanner and different scanners
















Self correlations (same scanner)




Range: [ 0.4026  0.9491 ]
Mean: 0.0495
Std deviation: 0.0441
Range: [ −0.1348  0.305 ]
Figure 5.67: Performance of the advanced algorithms for the area scanners imple-
mented with Wiener filtering under 3 different temperatures
266
5.5.2 Advanced Algorithms for the Swipe Scanners
Generally speaking, in the swipe scanners (also known as slide or sweep scan-
ners), a line, being a row or a column, of sensor elements performs an instant scan of
a tiny area of the fingertip skin and converts the readings into a line of pixels. As the
fingertip is swiped over this line of sensor elements, a sequence of such lines of pixels
is produced, which sequence is then assembled (and possibly further enhanced) to
construct a two-dimensional fingerprint image.
The swipe scanners we used in this research are also from UPEK (details
are provided in Section 6.1 in the appendix). Besides the fact that they, like the
UPEK area scanners, also use capacitive sensing and besides the general technical
information in scanners’ datasheets, we were unable to find any publicly available
information, including patents, with details about their specific acquisition or op-
eration. Therefore, the only reasonable hypothesis was that they too use the same
capacitive sensing cells as the UPEK area scanners, which led to the assumption
that the values of the pixels they acquire follow Signal Model A. Although this as-
sumption helped us develop the algorithms and it can, to a great extent, explain the
algorithm operation, we have no other evidence about the applicability of this signal
model to these fingerprint scanners. Furthermore, we also observed deviations from
the results we expected, which also casts some doubt on that.
The first step, obviously, was to try to directly apply or extend the advanced
algorithms of the area scanners for the swipe scanners. This, however, proved to be
problematic because of three main reasons:
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1. Although each UPEK swipe scanner contains several lines (rows) of sensing
elements, our study on the topic concluded that only one of them scans the
fingertip skin sequentially, row by row. The number of sensing elements per
row depends on the type of swipe scanner; for the type of scanner we used,
the sensing elements are only 144, producing images 144 pixels wide (and 384
pixels high). For comparison, the UPEK area scanners have nearly 3 orders
of magnitude more sensing elements (360 ∗ 256 = 92, 160).
2. The software (libraries) acquire images only when there is a fingertip swiped
over the scanner and therefore acquiring images with a predetermined object
is impossible.
3. The software also combines the scanned lines and constructs a whole image
from them. Sometimes the constructed images contain artifacts. And in ad-
dition to constructing an image, the software also enhances it. All this made
acquiring the raw images we needed particularly difficult.
The swipe scanners, however, have two favorable properties over the area
scanners:
• The pixels in the image never saturate (“clip”), unlike as the pixels in the
UPEK area scanners do, and therefore all sensing elements in the row can be
used. One possible explanation for this is that since the fingertip has to be
swiped, pressing it hard enough as to saturate the sensing elements (which
is easy with the UPEK area scanners) here is very difficult. This also led to
another simplification (explained later).
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• In a single image, each sensing element produces many (e.g., hundreds) pixel
values, not only one pixel value as the area scanners do. In this way, the
scanner pattern of each sensing element gets “incorporated” in many pixels of
the image, thus facilitating the process of estimating it.
5.5.2.1 Averaging Along Columns
The last observation above naturally led to the idea that by averaging along
columns, we should be able to “strengthen” the scanner pattern in an image. Com-
bining this with the signal inversion essentially led to the solution.
From Signal Model A (see Expression 5.9) and neglecting the scanner noise
n(i, j, t) for now, for the pixel value at row i and column j, we have:
g(i, j) ≈ s(i, j)
1 + s(i, j)f(i, j)
(5.85)
Since there is only one row of sensing elements, the scanner pattern along






+ f(i, j) (5.86)
As s(j) is the same along each column j, averaging along columns will produce an
average row havg(j), which is still a function of an average fingerprint row favg(j)





An example for havg(j) is shown in the upper plot in Figure 5.68. It is surpris-
ing how small local variations havg(j) along the row (the column indices j) has. This
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is also difficult to believe given that the values of havg(j) are averages along columns
and that the pixel values g(i, j) along nonadjacent columns can substantially differ.
An example for the pixel values g(i, j) of three such columns is shown in the lower
plot of Figure 5.68.













(j) for an image with index finger acquired with Scanner u509
























Figure 5.68: Swipe scanners: average row in inverse mode and 3 columns
However, by looking at the (inverses of) adjacent columns (an example for 3
adjacent columns is shown in Figure 5.69), we observed that although their pixel
values (and their inverses as well) can somewhat differ, their averages are very close
to each other. This can be explained with the high scanning spatial resolution of
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the scanners: they sample the fingertip skin at about 10 times faster rate than the
typical frequency of the fingerprint pattern (i.e., the sequence of valleys and ridges).
Consequently, the pixel values for adjacent columns cannot differ by much, and more
importantly, the averages along adjacent columns should be close to each other, as
we see from Figure 5.69.


























Inverse pixel values h(i,j) of 3 columns (72, 73, and 74) from the image 






Column 72 average  h
avg
(72)  =  0.0066318
Column 73 average  h
avg
(73)  =  0.0066372
Column 74 average  h
avg
(74)  =  0.0066172
Figure 5.69: Swipe scanners: 3 columns in inverse mode and their averages
Next, as we know from the area scanners, the scanner pattern along rows (i.e.,
s(j) in this case) has approximately Gaussian distribution, and consequently, its
inverse 1/s(j) is also approximately Gaussian (see Section 6.5 in the appendix).
Since havg(j) in Expression 5.87 is slowly varying and the scanner pattern s(j) and
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the (average) fingerprint pattern favg(j) are independent, the problem of separating
them from havg(j) appears to be like separating a Gaussian noise (1/s(j)) from a
(slowly) varying signal (favg(j)), which is exactly what we did in the advanced algo-
rithms for the area scanners using a moving-average and adaptive Wiener filtering.
And not surprisingly, both filters work here as well, which is the inverse mode of
the algorithms we propose (described later).
Drawing from the experience with the area scanners, here we also tried these
two filters in direct signal mode, i.e., without the inversion in Expression 5.86, and
found that this also works; this is the direct mode of the algorithms we propose.
The explanation why it works, however, proved much more difficult than in inverse
mode. The main argument about that hinges on the observation that the pixel values
g(i, j) for the particular case of UPEK swipe scanners are approximately linearly
dependent on the fingerprint pattern f(i, j) in Expression 5.85. This (hypothetical)
approximation is discussed in detail in Section 6.6 in the appendix. In summary:
g(i, j) ≈ k(j) (f(i, j)− a) + b(j), (5.88)







for a suitably chosen constant a (0.0025 in our case). By averaging g(i, j) along
columns, for the average row gavg(j), we receive the approximation:
gavg(j) ≈ k(j) (favg(j)− a) + b(j). (5.90)
because k(j) and b(j) do not depend on the row index i – they both are function
only of the scanner pattern s(j) (and the constant a).
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Looking at Expression 5.87, we also observed that since havg(j) does not change
significantly for adjacent column indices j and that 1/s(j) does not change signif-
icantly either (because although it changes rapidly, the changes around its mean
are small), then favg(j) must also change very little for adjacent column indices j,
i.e., favg(j) is also a slowly varying function. Furthermore, as the number of rows is
typically large (it is variable, but well over 100), the average favg(j) is close to its
mean, which we observed is about 0.0025, i.e., the constant a in Expression 5.89 (see
Section 6.6 in the appendix for details). This implies that the term (favg(j)− a) in
Expression 5.90 is close to zero. So, our speculation is that k(j) (favg(j)− a) is very
small or at least slowly varying with j, which via the process of denoising, a filter
can remove, producing the noise-like term b(j) that is a function only of the scanner
pattern s(j). Therefore, processing gavg(j) with a moving-average or an adaptive
Wiener filter will produce the scanner pattern (in some form), similarly to what
filtering havg(j) does.
Finally, we claim that (a) with the characteristics of our signals and (b) in the
context of the denoising algorithms for swipe scanners we propose, the approxima-
tion b(j) ≈ const · s(j), with const varying within only ±3%, is accurate. This
essentially implies that b(j) can be assumed as being the scanner pattern s(j) it its
direct form. Details about this approximation we also provide in Section 6.6 in the
appendix.
Figure 5.70 shows an example average row in direct mode gavg(j) and in in-
verse mode havg(j), computed from the same image, which has been acquired with
a UPEK swipe scanner.
273


















(j) for an image with a thumb finger acquired with Scanner u518















Average row in inverse mode h
avg
(j) for the same image as above
Figure 5.70: Swipe scanners: average row in direct and inverse modes
Next we describe the algorithms for swipe scanner authentication as disclosed
in [Ivanov and Baras US’907]. Figure 5.71 shows a conceptual diagram of signal
processing modules in which the signal g, the image, is processed to produce the
signal d, the scanner verification decision, along with the interface signals among the
modules. The signals between the subsequent modules represent only the main, not
all, input and output signals of the modules. Similarly to the advanced algorithms
for the area scanners, each signal processing module has different modes of operation
(also called “implementations”). Next we discuss the processing of each module and
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their different modes of operation.
Figure 5.71: Conceptual diagram of operation of the modules for the swipe scanners
5.5.2.2 Preprocessing Module
The Preprocessing Module (see Figure 5.71) has the signal g(i, j), i.e., the
pixels of the image, as input and the signal u, a two-dimensional signal with the
same size as g, as output. It has two modes of operation:
(a) Direct mode: u(i, j) = g(i, j);
(b) Inverse mode: u(i, j) = h(i, j) = 1
g(i,j)
;
This mode implements the same signal inversion as discussed for area scanners
(see Section 5.5).
5.5.2.3 Averaging Module
The Averaging Module (see Figure 5.71) computes the average values of the
pixels along columns (or along rows, depending on the scanning direction of the line
of sensor elements) from its input signal u, which represents the pixel values u (i, j)
of the image, and produces these average values as its output signal v. Thus, the
input signal u is two dimensional, whereas the output signal v is one dimensional.
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Let I be the total number of rows and J be the total number of columns in g.
Typically, the line of sensor elements in most scanners is perpendicular to the length
of the finger, and therefore the finger is swept over the scanner in the direction of
finger’s length. In this case, the sequentially produced lines of pixels form rows in
the two-dimensional image g. Thus, the pixels in each column of g are produced
by one and the same sensing element, i.e., for a given (and fixed) column j and for
all row indices i from 1 through I, the pixels g(i, j) are produced by the sensing
element with index j in the line of J sensing elements. Alternatively, in scanners
for which the orientation of the line of sensor elements is along the length of the
finger, for a given (and fixed) row i and for all column indices j from 1 through J ,
the pixels g(i, j) are produced by the sensing element with index i in the line of I
sensing elements.
The Averaging Module computes the average of the pixel values produced by
one and the same sensor element. Thus, for scanners in which the line of sensor
elements is perpendicular to the length of the finger, the averaging is along columns






g (i, j) (5.91)
where j is from 1 to J . For scanners in which the orientation of the line of sensor







g (i, j) (5.92)
where i is from 1 to I.
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Some swipe scanners may employ more than one line of sensing elements, in
which case the process of constructing a fingerprint image from the sequence of
lines of pixels may involve sophisticated signal processing, which, unfortunately, is
usually manufacturer proprietary.
5.5.2.4 Filtering Module
The Filtering Module (see Figure 5.71) filters the input signal v, which is the
output of the Averaging Module, to produce the output signal x, which contains
the scanner pattern. Similarly to the advanced algorithms for the area scanners, the
Filtering Module here also essentially comprises two operations: (1) a smoothing
operation F(.) that smooths v and (2) a subtraction operation that subtracts thus
smoothed signal F(v) from v, and produces the output signal x:
x = v −F(v) (5.93)
In this way, the smoothing also removes the (variable) mean of the scanner pattern
and yields only the variable part of it.
Let N denote the number of elements of the input signal v. In scanners for
which the line of sensor elements is perpendicular to the length of the finger, N = J ,
whereas in scanners for which the orientation of the line of sensor elements is along
the length of the finger, N = I.
From this point onwards, the processing is essentially the same as for the area
scanners. The signal v here is similar to one vector vi in the signal v in the advanced
algorithms for the area scanners, or in other words, the signal v there can be thought
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as having only a single vector (v1), i.e., c = 1 in Expression 5.43 or Expression 5.44.
Similarly, the Filtering Module here can be implemented in two ways: with a
low-pass filter and with an adaptive Wiener filter. Both implementations are essen-
tially the same as the low-pass filter and the adaptive Wiener filter implementations
of the advanced algorithms for the area scanners (see Section 5.5.1.3), except for
some values of the parameters.
Because of the finite length of the input signal v, the signal processing of the
discontinuity at the beginning and at the end of v may lead to unwanted artifacts.
The methods we propose here are the same as described in the advanced algorithms
for the area scanners (see Section 5.5.1.3)): computation shortening, replica padding,
and constant padding, although using other methods is also possible.
Incorporating such methods to avoid edge effect artifacts may seem unjustified,
but actually it is quite important because the length N of v is relatively small (in
the order of one to several hundreds) and such artifacts may affect the estimate of
the scanner pattern of about 10 pixels, which is not negligible and may decrease
the performance. Furthermore, because applying a fingertip tightly in the regions
around the edges of the scanner platen area (and in the two ends of the line of sensor
elements in this respect) is difficult, the pixels in these regions typically contain no
fingerprint pattern. Hence, the estimate of the scanner pattern in these regions can
be made very accurate if introduction of unwanted artifacts is avoided as specified
above.
Another important aspect of the processing in this module is using a window-
ing function applied to the signal being processed. The windowing here is exactly
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the same as the windowing in the advanced algorithms for the area scanners and
therefore will not be repeated.
Low-pass Filter Implementation of the Filtering Module
All discussions about the Low-pass Filter Implementation of the Filtering Mod-
ule in the advanced algorithms for the area scanners apply here as well. The low-
pass filter of preference here is also a (windowed) moving-average filter. Selecting
M about 3 gives optimal results, but good overall performance is also achieved for
M in the range from 2 to about 7.
For the pixels that are close to the beginning or the end of v, the three tech-
niques for computing the local mean v(lm) proposed here are computation shorten-
ing, replica padding, and constant padding, which are also the same as for comput-
ing the local mean in the advanced algorithms for the area scanners. Using other
techniques, however, is also possible.
Finally, the output signal x of the Filtering Module in this implementation is
the difference between the input signal v and the local mean signal v(lm):
x (k) = v (k)− v(lm) (k) , (5.94)
where k is the current pixel index, an integer from 1 to N .
Figure 5.72 shows the input signals v and output signals x of this module
for two images containing a thumb and a little finger and acquired with one and
the same scanner, processed in direct mode with a moving-average filter, and the
correlation coefficient between them. The lower subplot shows only the first half of
the columns for better visibility.
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Signals  v from an image with a thumb and an image with a little finger, Scanner u518
 
 
 v with thumb
 v with little finger











Signals  x obtained after moving−average filtering of the signals  v
 
 
 x with thumb
 x with little finger
Correlation coefficient:  0.7547
Figure 5.72: Swipe scanners: signals of the moving-average filtering in direct mode
Figure 5.73 shows the input signals v and output signals x of this module for
the same images as in Figure 5.72, processed in inverse mode with a moving-average
filter, and the correlation coefficient between them. The lower subplot shows only
the first half of the columns for better visibility.
Adaptive Wiener Filter Implementation of the Filtering Module
All discussions about the Adaptive Wiener Filter Implementation of the Fil-
tering Module in the advanced algorithms for the area scanners apply here as well,
and the computation of the local mean v(lm), local square v(ls), local variance v(lv),
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Signals  v from an image with a thumb and an image with a little finger, Scanner u518
 
 
 v with thumb
 v with little finger













Signals  x obtained after moving−average of the signals  v
 
  x with thumb
 x with little finger
Correlation coefficient:  0.7604
Figure 5.73: Swipe scanners: signals of the moving-average filtering in inverse mode
and scaling coefficient d vectors are exactly the same. Similarly, for computing
both v(lm) and v(ls), selecting M about 3 gives optimal results, but good overall
performance is also achieved for M in the range from 2 to about 7.
For the pixels that are close to the beginning or the end of v, the three tech-
niques for computing the local mean and the local square vectors proposed here
are: computation shortening, replica padding, and constant padding, which are also
the same as for computing the local mean in the advanced algorithms for the area
scanners. Using other techniques, however, is also possible.
Regarding the Wiener filter variance σ2w, here it is also a critically important
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parameter that determines the overall performance. The major difference with the
area scanners is that here the effect of the scanner noise can be neglected as signal
v is the average of the columns (or rows, depending on the line of sensing elements).
Nevertheless, σ2w is still a tradeoff parameter that needs to be determined after
careful optimization and tests. When doing such optimization is not feasible, as a
very approximate guideline, in direct signal mode, σ2w can be set to the estimate
for the scanner pattern variance σ2s . For Signal Model A, for the direct signal mode
implementation of the Preprocessing Module, σ2w can be set to about 30 and to
about 3 ∗ 10−8 for the inverse signal mode.
Computing the smoothed signal is also done in a similar way. For each pixel
with index k, where k is from 1 to N , the smoothed signal vector v(s) is computed
by:
v(s) (k) = v(lm) (k) + d (k) .
(
v (k)− v(lm) (k)
)
. (5.95)
Finally, the output signal x of the Filtering Module in this implementation is the
difference between the input signal v and the smoothed signal v(s), corrected with
the Wiener mean µw:
x (k) = v (k)− v(s) (k) + µw
where k is the current pixel index, an integer from 1 to N . In the preferred imple-
mentation, the Wiener filter mean µw is set to 0, but other values of µw are also
possible as µw can be used to compensate in case when fixed-valued offset is present
so that the output signal v becomes zero mean.
Figure 5.74 shows the input signals v and output signals x of this module
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for the same images as in Figure 5.72, processed in direct mode with an adaptive
Wiener filter, and the correlation coefficient between them. The lower subplot shows
only the first half of the columns for better visibility.





















Signals  v from an image with a thumb and an image with a little finger, Scanner u518
 
 
 v with thumb
 v with little finger











Signals  x obtained after Wiener filtering of the signals  v
 
 
 x with thumb
 x with little finger
Correlation coefficient:  0.7775
Figure 5.74: Swipe scanners: signals of the adaptive Wiener filtering in direct mode
Figure 5.75 shows the input signals v and output signals x of this module
for the same images as in Figure 5.72, processed in inverse mode with an adaptive
Wiener filter, and the correlation coefficient between them. The lower subplot shows
only the first half of the columns for better visibility.
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Signals  v from an image with a thumb and an image with a little finger, Scanner u518
 
 
 v with thumb
 v with little finger













Signals  x obtained after Wiener filtering of the signals  v
 
  x with thumb
 x with little finger
Correlation coefficient:  0.7758
Figure 5.75: Swipe scanners: signals of the adaptive Wiener filtering in inverse mode
5.5.2.5 Matching Module
The Matching Module (see Figure 5.71) computes a similarity score between
the scanner patterns extracted from two images and produces a decision as to
whether they are sufficiently similar or not.
Let xe denote the output signal of the Filtering Module when the input signal
g is an image acquired during the scanner enrolment and xq denote the output
signal of the Filtering Module when the input signal g is an image acquired during
the scanner verification. Using the signals xe and xq the Matching Module:
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(i) quantifies the similarity between the two signals xe and xq in a score;
(ii) produces a decision via the output signal d as to whether the two images have
been acquired with the same fingerprint scanner by comparing this score with
a threshold. When the output signal d is set to 1, this indicates scanner match;
when it is set to 0, this indicates scanner non-match; and when it is set to (-1),
this indicates that a decision on matching/non-matching cannot be made and
a new query image must be acquired.
Quantifying the similarity between the two signals xe and xq in a score can be
done with the same three implementations as described in the advanced algorithms
for the area scanners: normalized correlation, correlation coefficient, and relative
mean-square error (see Section 5.5.1.5); however, other implementations are also
possible. The only difference is that set D in the Matching Module specification of
the advanced algorithms for the area scanners in Section 5.5.1.5 here comprises all
indices k from 1 to N (and therefore ND = N) because no masking is done. All
other formulas and discussions are exactly the same.
5.5.2.6 Using Multiple Images
Similarly to the advanced algorithms for the area scanners, all implementations
described above can use a single image for the scanner enrolment and a single image
for the scanner authentication, and this is the preferred case. However, here it is also
possible to use multiple images for the scanner enrolment and/or multiple images
for the scanner verification. This may improve the overall accuracy of the scanner
285
authentication.
The two implementations here are the same as those described in the advanced
algorithms for the area scanners (see Section 5.5.1.6). The first method, averaging
the similarity scores (Expression 5.82), is exactly the same, while the second one,
computing an “average” enrolled scanner pattern is slightly different as there is no
masking here, and therefore, ya(k) = 1 for k from 1 to N . Hence, the computation







where k is an integer running from 1 to N . The rest of the computation of the
similarity score is the same.
5.5.2.7 Image cropping
Some swipe scanners produce images that contain rows and/or columns of
pixels with constant, “dummy,” values around the area of the actual fingerprint
pattern. Since the pixels with these constant values carry no information about the
scanner pattern (and about the fingerprint pattern either), these pixels have to be
detected and removed from the image before it is processed further, i.e., the image
has to be cropped. These areas of constant values typically surround the useful area
as rectangular pads on the top and bottom and on the left and the right of the
fingerprint pattern.
One method for finding if a row falls within such a pad is by computing
the absolute values of the differences between each two adjacent pixels along this
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particular row. If the maximum of these absolute values is 0, this indicates that all
pixel values in the row are constant and thus this row of pixels has to be removed.
Finding if a column falls within one of these pads can be done in the same way.
This test is then applied to each row and each column in the image and the detected
rows and columns are removed. The image cropping can be done before or after the
Preprocessing Module.
5.5.2.8 Combinations of Module Modes for the Swipe Scanners
All modes (implementations) of the {Filtering Module, Matching Module}
can be used in combination with any of the modes of the modules that precede
this current module in the conceptual signal flow diagram shown in Figure 5.71.
However, different combinations of modes may provide different overall performance.
One well-performing combination is described next.
Figure 5.76 shows the flowchart of one exemplary implementation using a
single enrolled image ge, acquired and processed during the scanner enrolment, and
a single query image gq, acquired and processed during the scanner verification.
Although ge and gq are processed at different times, the consecutive processing
steps are identical, and therefore we discuss them simultaneously. ge and gq are
first processed by the Preprocessing Module in its direct signal mode. The output
signals ue and uq are processed by the Averaging Module. The resulting signals ve
and vq are processed by the Filtering Module with a moving-average filter. Finally,
the Matching Module computes the correlation coefficient and outputs the signal d,
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based on which a decision for scanner match or scanner nonmatch is made.




Although the advanced algorithms for the swipe scanners offer fewer choices
of modes and fewer parameters for optimization, a system designer can still trade
performance for computational power and complexity.
For illustrative purposes, here we present the performance of the exemplary im-
plementation shown in Figure 5.76. It uses direct signal mode, 3-tap moving-average
filtering with replica-symmetric padding, and correlation coefficient for matching.
The normalized histograms (integrating to 1) of the correlation coefficients from
running this implementation on 5,400 images acquired (at room temperature) with
the 27 UPEK swipe scanners (see Section 6.1 in the appendix) for 10 images per
finger for all 10 fingers of 2 persons are shown in Figure 5.66. Only a single image is
used for scanner enrolment and only a single image for scanner verification. Every
image is matched against all other images. The total number of matchings is about
15 million (here, again, only one of the matchings, AB or BA, is computed since
all processing is again completely symmetric for the enrolled image and the query
image).
Here, however, in contrast with case with the area scanners, the two distri-
butions of correlation coefficients visibly overlap. Although both the mean and the
standard deviation of the self correlation coefficients here are very close to the mean
and the standard deviation of the self correlation coefficients for the exemplary im-
plementation of the advanced algorithms for the area scanners (see Figures 5.66 and
5.67), the mean and the standard deviation of the cross correlation coefficients here
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Normalized histograms of correlation coefficients for same scanner and different scanners 
















Self correlations (same scanner)




Range: [ 0.2736  0.9881 ]
Mean: 0.3077
Std deviation: 0.089
Range: [ −0.136  0.6712 ]
Figure 5.77: Performance of the advanced algorithms for the swipe scanners imple-
mented with moving-average filtering
are considerably different: the mean is about 0.30, versus about 0.05 for the area
scanners, and the standard deviation is about twice larger: about 0.09, versus about
0.045 for the area scanners. We think that the most probable reasons for this are:
1. The very limited number of pixels for which the scanner patter is extracted,
upper bounded to about 140 pixels for the swipe scanners because only a single
row of sensor elements produces all pixels in the image. Another possible
reason that may compound the problem is the stronger correlation within the
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scanner pattern s(j); and
2. A possible suboptimal performance of the filters used.
With the decision threshold we chose (0.56), we achieve roughly an empirical
EER of 1 ·10−3: the empirical FAR is 9.25 ·10−4 and the empirical FRR is 9.66 ·10−4.
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5.5.3 Physical Implementations of the Advanced Algorithms
Figure 5.78 illustrates a typical system that uses biometric information. The
system may include one or more processors, e.g., general-purpose microprocessors,
signal processors, or microcontrollers, along with the associated ROM and RAM
memories of various types and also storage devices (not shown). The system may
also have additional digital hardware, such as programmable arrays (FPGA, CPLD,
PLA, etc.), ASICs, or any other type of hardware that can perform computations
and process signals. The system may further include I/O interfaces and commu-
nication interfaces that connect it to various networks (wired and wireless). For
increased security, the system may also have Trusted Computing functionality and
for example, be equipped with a TPM that can provide complete control over the
software that is running and that can be run in it. Finally, the fingerprint scanner
may be connected to the system directly or via a network; it can also be part of the
system.
Figure 5.78: System block diagram
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The advanced algorithms can be implemented entirely as a software program
that runs on the processor(s), entirely in the digital hardware, or some modules
can be implemented as software programs and some modules be implemented in
the digital hardware. For example, the Selection Module and the Masking Module
can be implemented in the digital hardware, while the Preprocessing Module, the
Filtering Module, and the Matching Module can be implemented in software.
5.5.4 Features of the Advanced Algorithms
The results we achieved exceeded our expectations. Here we list some of
features of the advanced algorithms.
• Unmatched accuracy. To best of our knowledge, our algorithms are the
first and the only that provide error rates way well below 1% and for scanners of
exactly the same type, manufacturer, and model.
It is important to note that we do not claim that the performance (as accu-
racy) of the exemplary implementations we showed earlier is the best one possible
the advanced algorithms can deliver; rather, it is just an example for their potential.
The advanced algorithms as we define them, both for area and for swipe scanners,
should be considered as a set of tools for achieving the purpose of scanner authenti-
cation. Therefore, the modules and their modes to be implemented in a particular
target application should be chosen and their parameters optimized once the specific
application requirements and constraints are set (see below).
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• Computational efficiency. We developed the advanced algorithms with
the specific objective for computational efficiency, with simplicity being a central
objective for the algorithm design. This led to straightforward and extremely com-
putationally efficient algorithms.
The main reason for this efficiency is the one-dimensional signal processing
of the advanced algorithms and their simplicity. In the Filtering Module, it is not
necessary to compute conventional convolution as the moving-average filter scales
the adjacent pixel values in a window with a constant, which in case of a fixed-point
implementation can be speed-optimized by using a window with size that is a power
of 2 (e.g., 2, 4, or 8) so that the division in the moving average is reduced to a shift-
right (by 1, 2, 3, etc.) processor instruction or a shift-right hardware operation.
In this respect, the adaptive Wiener filter needs more computations as the local
variance requires raising to the power 2 and explicit division (whenever the scaling
coefficient is nonzero). When using the variance masking mode (for the low-pass
filter), the Masking Module similarly computes the local variance (to compare it
with the two thresholds).
The second reason is the absence of any transforms from one domain into
another (like the Fourier transform) – all processing is done directly and only in
the base domain (which is space). These two reasons result in a linear dependence
between the number of computations needed and the number of pixels used.
• Scalability. Each module has different modes of operation, allowing gran-
ularity with varying degrees of complexity depending on the computational and the
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time constraints. Furthermore, the algorithms for both the swipe and the area scan-
ners (to much greater extent) provide higher accuracy when more pixels are used.
For the area scanners, good accuracy can be achieved by using even only 4% of the
pixels of an image (=10 columns out of 256).
• Robustness. Another advantage of the advanced algorithms is their
robustness under a wide variety of conditions – environmental changes (tempera-
ture, moisture, dirt/grease, etc.), different fingertip pressure on the scanner platen,
changes in the fingertip skin (scratches, wear, etc.). For example, the algorithms are
specifically developed to work in a range of temperatures and in significant presence
of water on the fingertip (not only the ordinary skin moisture). The problem aris-
ing from pressing the fingertip very strongly to the scanner platen is also handled
particularly well.
In addition to working with images containing patterns of two completely dif-
ferent fingers, both as patterns and as types of fingers, the algorithms work properly
even when not a fingertip, but another body part is applied to the scanner, e.g. a
palm, because the algorithms inherently do not rely on the fingerprint pattern to
have specific characteristics – as long as the object applied to the scanner platen
does not adhere tightly and completely to the scanner platen, but leaves small air
gaps, the algorithms work properly.
Finally, the parameters of the signal processing modules and their modes can
vary in wide ranges.
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• Stability. All modules and modes are unconditionally stable as there are
no feedback loops in any form and at any level.
• Fixed-point implementations. Because of their simple design, the ad-
vanced algorithms can tolerate round-off effects (errors) due to finite-length effects
in the parameter, coefficient, and signal quantization. The dynamic range of the
input signal (the pixels of the image) is standardized and limited to 8 bits/pixel,
which greatly facilitates the design of the scaling coefficients between the subsequent
stages of the processing (both in a microprocessor and in a dedicated computational
hardware). All processing revolves around computing moving-average sums, which
cannot create overshoots in the intermediate signals, and scaling with bounded (even
to a great extent predetermined) numbers. The computation of the correlation and
its variant as well as the relative mean-square error, as to the fact that they involve
multiplication and accumulation of two signals, can be arranged to operate with
the current indices and thus the current sum to never exceed the dynamic range
of the finite-precision arithmetic unit. The rest of the processing is indexing and
comparisons.
The advanced algorithms do not use transforms from one domain into another
domain, which are typically susceptible to numerical problems due to the finite word
length. The signal inversion mode may, however, require care in implementing most
of the modules in fixed-point systems because of possible scaling and roundoff errors.
The inversion may also create other types of nonlinear effects, which we will study
once we implement the algorithms in a real system.
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Finally, our algorithms even have an edge over algorithms developed in the
future that require floating point computations and use software libraries for this
because they will probably require more time and consume additional energy.
• Deployment in existing systems. As the algorithms do not require
changes in the fingerprint scanner, they can be implemented in systems that have
already been manufactured and even sold to customers by upgrading their system
software, firmware, and/or hardware (if using programmable hardware), which can
be done even online. The methods for identifying devices by designing special hard-
ware, in particular analog and/or digital circuits, typically incur material and man-
ufacturing cost and are not applicable to systems (including fingerprint scanners)
that have already been manufactured.
• Improvements and extra functionality. Since only a single image
is needed for the scanner enrolment (and also for the scanner verification), the
advanced algorithms for the area scanners can offer additional functionality. The
decision whether to be adopted in practice or not and the exact implementations
of this additional functionality, however, is at discretion of the system integrator
because it is very application and system specific and generally involves a tradeoff
between the reliability (accuracy) of the scanner authentication and the security of
the scheme as a whole.
One of the possible ways to increase the accuracy is using more than one image
(e.g., 3 or even 5) for scanner enrolment and/or scanner verification, which (for both
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area and swipe scanners) has been described in the corresponding sections.
Another way to increase the accuracy and reliability of the scanner authenti-
cation is to reduce it Scenario A as in Scenario A, the system can compute a very
good estimate of the scanner pattern by using an image (or even several images)
with air, both for scanner enrolment and for scanner verification. In either step
(enrolment or verification), the system can acquire image(s) with air shortly before,
shortly after, or both shortly before and shortly after acquiring the image(s) with
a fingerprint. The user does not need to know about these additionally acquired
images with air or do anything specific because these images are not related to
his or her fingerprint – the system simply measures its components. Once images
with both air and fingerprint are available, the system can (1) estimate the scanner
pattern from the images with air and (2) perform Scenario B–type scanner authen-
tication between this scanner pattern estimate and the image(s) with fingerprint, in
this way verifying that the scanner has not been changed in the meantime. If this
is confirmed, the system can then store this scanner pattern estimate as a reference
(if this happens during the scanner enrolment) or use it to match it against already
stored scanner pattern estimate (if this happens during the scanner verification). We
will leave the work-out of the implementation details of this method to the system
integrator and will only point out that regardless of the small time period between
the acquisition of images with air and with a fingerprint, the security of this scheme
is somewhat lower than that of Scenario C; it will also require additional images.
Nevertheless, the gained accuracy and reliability of the scanner authentication may
make it preferred in certain applications.
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An extension of this idea can be a technique that ensures continuous trust-
worthiness of the hardware components. The system can acquire images with air
periodically and/or at system boot time, then process them and perform a tacit
scanner authentication. In order to further increase the accuracy of the scanner
pattern estimate and the authentication in general, the system may acquire tens,
even hundreds, of images with air, which generally may take only a couple of minutes
when the system is otherwise idle.
Another extra functionality is the automatic scanner re-enrolment. After every
successful scanner verification, the query scanner pattern can be stored as a new
enrolled (reference) scanner pattern because it is already extracted and needs only
to be stored. This can allow the system to adapt to potential long-term changes of
the scanner pattern of the legitimate scanner.
The automatic scanner re-enrolment, however, has a downside that may result
in a serious security flaw. Due to environmental changes or other factors, the scanner
authentication may make a false accept decision, which in this case will automati-
cally enrol another, nonauthentic scanner. Nevertheless, the scanner re-enrolment
still has a merit as it can be done not automatically, but on purpose, explicitly and
not every time the user authenticates. Because of the features of the advanced algo-
rithms, this can be done very easily and the scanner pattern information on record
can be updated without additional processing and without even being noticed by
the user.
Regardless of the downsides of the scanner re-enrolment, its modification can
still be used to improve the security. After (every) successful scanner verification,
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the scanner pattern of a new set of columns (or rows) can be computed and the
scanner re-enrolled. These new columns or rows can be randomly selected; the al-
gorithm can even change from columns to rows (or vice versa) or to combinations
of both. This will improve the security as it will add a random element that an
attacker will be impossible to predict when trying to construct images with embed-
ded counterfeit scanner pattern. This method can be also combined with the other
techniques described above.
In conclusion, to emphasize how practical and easy to integrate our technology
is, we developed the software for select implementations of the advanced algorithms
for both the area and the swipe scanners of UPEK into a fully operational (and with
a graphical interface) demonstration prototype. It uses the UPEK development kit





6.1 Fingerprint Scanners Used
In this section we list and provide details about the scanners used during the
different stages of research.
6.1.1 UPEK Scanners
We used three groups of scanners equipped with UPEK sensors, all of which
capacitive. The first group, which we used only during the initial research, contains
4 area scanners as follows:
• Two scanners equipped with UPEK area TCS1 sensors; we refer to them as
Scanner 1 and Scanner 2. The TCS1 sensors (see the sensor on the left side
of Figure 6.1) are the only capacitive (and generally solid-state) fingerprint
sensors that are FIPS-201 certified.
Figure 6.1: UPEK area TCS1 sensor (left) and TCS2 sensor (right)
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• Two scanners equipped with UPEK area TCS2 sensors (see the sensor on the
right side of Figure 6.1); we refer to them as Scanner 3 and Scanner 4.
Each sensor is connected to a third-party hardware module (containing a pro-
cessor running firmware) and the hardware module is connected to an adapter,
which in turn is connected to a computer via the RS 232 port (the configuration is
shown in Figure 6.2). A computer software program is used to acquire and save the
images as files. This set of hardware and software we purchased as an off-the-shelf
product developed by MB FingerMetrica. Our analysis of the images acquired with
it, however, showed that the post-processing done by these third-party components
introduces additional artifacts in the raw images, which artifacts, however, did not
hinder our study of the acquisition process and were not critically important for de-
veloping the initial algorithms; therefore, we did not correct or modify the affected
images to compensate for these artifacts.
Figure 6.2: MB FingerMetrica kit with a UPEK area TCS1 sensor
The advanced algorithms we developed using the second and the third groups
of scanners. Both groups consist of a development kit that connects to a computer
via a USB interface (see Figure 6.3). The fingerprint sensor is mounted on a sensor
module which, in turn, is connected to the development kit.
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Figure 6.3: UPEK development kit with a UPEK area TCEFC1 sensor module
In the second group, each sensor module is TCEFC1 (see Figure 6.4, left) and
contains a UPEK area TCS1 sensor (see Figure 6.1). Initially, we purchased 22 such
TCEFC1 sensor modules, labeled as Scanner u101 through Scanner u122, which is
safe assume that were manufactured in one batch. The two TCEFC1 sensor modules
that came included in the UPEK development kit (purchased separately), we labeled
as Scanner u151 and Scanner u152; they possibly do not come from the same batch
as Scanners u101 through u122. Since during the study, three of the sensor modules
(Scanners u104, u109, and u123) became damaged and unsuitable for further image
acquisition and tests, later we purchased additionally three TCEFC1 sensor modules,
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labeled as Scanner u131 through Scanner u133, which, again, possibly do not come
from the same batch as Scanners u101 through u122 and Scanners u151 and u152.
However, all these sensor modules are exactly of the same model and the sensors in
them are exactly of the same model as well.
Figure 6.4: UPEK area TCEFC1 (left) and swipe TCESC4K (right) sensor modules
In the third group, each sensor module is TCESC4K (see Figure 6.4, right)
and contains a UPEK swipe TCS4K sensor. We purchased 25 such TCESC4K
sensor modules, labeled as Scanner u501 through Scanner u525, which is safe to
assume that were manufactured in one batch. The two TCESC4K sensor modules
that came included in the UPEK development kit we labeled as Scanner u551 and
Scanner u552; they possibly are not from the same batch as Scanners u501 through
u525. However, all these sensor modules are exactly of the same model and the
sensors in them are exactly of the same model.
Regarding the software, besides the firmware, running in the sensor modules,
to which we have no access, UPEK provides software libraries (via APIs) that allow
acquiring images with their sensors. We used one of these libraries and developed
a software tool that acquires raw images and saves them in BMP format. After
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developing the advanced algorithms, we extended the functionality of this software
tool into a demonstration software that performs scanner authentication, both for
the area and swipe scanners of UPEK, in real time.
AuthenTec acquired UPEK in September 2010, after which the are sensors
with the UPEK technology are known as AuthenTec TouchChip R© sensors. The
UPEK swipe sensors were also integrated into the AuthenTec swipe sensors product
line.
6.1.2 Veridicom Scanner
About a decade ago, the Veridicom fingerprint sensors were one of the first
widely sold capacitive sensors and were integrated in many systems still used today.
However, their sensitivity was quite limited, and since their technology apparently
have not improved over the years, it lagged behind that of their competitors. Veridi-
com eventually sold the technology to Fujitsu, for which reason these sensors are
also called Veridicom/Fujitsu. Fujitsu continued selling essentially the same Veridi-
com sensors until 2007, when Fujitsu discontinued their fingerprint products. For
this reason, we could not buy scanners with recent Veridicom sensors. Instead, we
used a USB reader (connected via the USB directly to the computer) equipped with
a Veridicom sensor model FPS200 from around the year 2000, which sensor Fujitsu
later sold as MBF200. This USB reader with the FPS200 sensor was used in our re-
search, and in the thesis, it is referred to as Scanner 5 (see Figure 6.5). The scanner
was directly connected to the USB port of a computer, and the image acquisition
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was done by the native Veridicom software.
Figure 6.5: Veridicom reader with FPS200 sensor
6.2 Thermal Tests
Once we observed that the scanner pattern depends significantly on the tem-
perature, we created a setup for thermal tests. We used a laboratory thermal plate
that can both heat up and cool down. The fingerprint scanner to be tested is placed
on top of this plate and heated up or cooled down. The temperature of the plate
can be controlled precisely (within 1 oC) via a thermal controller, but because of
the thermal resistance of the scanner hardware from the back of the scanner to the
surface of its platen where the array sensor is, the temperature of the scanner platen
is substantially different from that of the thermal plate (can reach over 10 oC). For
this reason, we placed a separate temperature sensor (RTD sensor) on the scanner
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platen and connected it to a multimeter, allowing us to have an accurate estimate
of the temperature of the fingerprint sensor array.
Nevertheless, however accurate the temperature measurement was, it was very
difficult have a precise control over the scanner platen temperature. The first obvious
reason for this is that once placing the fingerprint on the scanner platen for image
acquisition, the scanner platen temperature changes uncontrollably, possibly with
several degrees. The second problem is that maintaining precise temperature outside
of a closed, dedicated temperature chamber (i.e., in open air and hence unavoidable
air flows) is virtually impossible. It is clear, however, that a closed temperature
chamber was not an option for us as we had to place a fingertip on top of the
scanner. The third problem was that we could not achieve very low temperatures
(around 0 oC as initially planned) because of the large temperature resistance of the
sensors and the limited cooling capacity of the thermal plate. Thus, even with a
plate temperature of -7 oC, the temperature on the scanner platen was about 5 oC,
considerably far away from the freezing point of water.
A separate problem when cooling down to low temperatures, even well above
0 oC, is the air moisture: the water in the air condenses and covers the scanner
platen, effectively making the fingertip very wet. When no fingertip is present, the
scanner platen literally gets covered by a layer of water, and, consequently, acquiring
images with air, as the ideal predetermined object, was practically impossible –
all images acquired with “air” at low temperatures are heavily contaminated with
water. The condensing water required constant cleaning of the scanner platen which,
together with the difficulty of setting and maintaining the target temperature, took
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enormous amount of time and made the images acquired in such conditions very far
from the desired ones. And finally, because the water in the air condensed also on
the internals of the scanners, sometimes it created electric short circuits, most of
which temporary, but some permanent, irreversably damaging a couple of scanners.
Despite all problems, we succeeded to acquire images, both with and without
fingertips, at two temperatures of the scanner platen: at about 5 oC and at about
40 oC. Since the temperature on the scanner platen could not be controlled tightly,
estimating the scanner pattern by taking repetitive images with air was impossible.
The images acquired outside the thermal tests were at room temperature:
about 23 to 25 oC.
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6.3 Initial Work
Query scanner −→ Scnr 1 Scnr 2 Scnr 3 Scnr 4 Scnr 5
Enrolled scanner and
indices of the files
used for enrolment ⇓
Scanner 1
with parameters 55/0.20 FRR, % FAR, % FAR, % FAR, % FAR, %
1, 2, and 3 0 0 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0 0 0
Scanner 2
with parameters 55/0.20 FAR, % FRR, % FAR, % FAR, % FAR, %
1, 2, and 3 0 0 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0 0 0
Scanner 3
with parameters 30/0.20 FAR, % FAR, % FRR, % FAR, % FAR, %
1, 2, and 3 0 0 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0 0 0
Scanner 4
with parameters 30/0.20 FAR, % FAR, % FAR, % FRR, % FAR, %
1, 2, and 3 0 0 0 1.3 1.0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 1.7 0.3
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 2.0 1.3
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0 2.0 1.3
Scanner 5
with parameters 18/0.25 FAR, % FAR, % FAR, % FAR, % FRR, %
1, 2, and 3 0 0 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6.1: Scenario B results: FAR and FRR for all five capacitive scanners
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Query scanner −→ Scnr 1 Scnr 2 Scnr 3 Scnr 4 Scnr 5
Indices of the files
used for enrolment ⇓ FAR, % FRR, % FAR, % FAR, % FAR, %
Left little finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0 0 0
Left middle finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0.3 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0.7 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 1.0 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 1.7 0 0 0
Left thumb finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0.7 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 1.3 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0.3 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 2.0 0 0 0
Right index finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0.3 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 1.0 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 1.3 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 2.3 0 0 0
Right ring finger
1, 2, and 3 0 1.0 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0.3 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0.3 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0.7 0 0 0
Table 6.2: Scenario C results: FAR and FRR for Scanner 2 (parameters 55/0.40)
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Query scanner −→ Scnr 1 Scnr 2 Scnr 3 Scnr 4 Scnr 5
Indices of the files
used for enrolment ⇓ FAR, % FAR, % FRR, % FAR, % FAR, %
Left little finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0 1.0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0.7 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0.7 0 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 3.0 0.3 0
Left middle finger
1, 2, and 3 0.3 0 0 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0.3 0 0.3 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0 2.7 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0.3 0 1.0 0 0
Left thumb finger
1, 2, and 3 0.7 0 0.7 0 0
4, 5, and 6 6.0 1.67 0 1.3 1.7
10, 11, and 12 1.7 1.3 0 0.3 0.3
28, 29, and 30 1.3 0 0 0 0
Right index finger
1, 2, and 3 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.3 0
4, 5, and 6 3.3 1.7 0 2.3 0.67
10, 11, and 12 0.3 0 6.3 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 6.3 0 0
Right ring finger
1, 2, and 3 2.0 0 0 0.3 0
4, 5, and 6 1.0 0 1.0 1.3 0
10, 11, and 12 3.3 0 0.3 0.3 0
28, 29, and 30 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 0
Table 6.3: Scenario C results: FAR and FRR for Scanner 3 (parameters 30/0.40)
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Query scanner −→ Scnr 1 Scnr 2 Scnr 3 Scnr 4 Scnr 5
Indices of the files
used for enrolment ⇓ FAR, % FAR, % FAR, % FRR, % FAR, %
Left little finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0.3 0 2.7 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0.3 0.7 0 2.7 0
28, 29, and 30 0.3 0 0 0 0
Left middle finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0 0 2.3 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0.7 0 2.0 1.3
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 1.3 1.3
28, 29, and 30 0 0.7 0 0.3 0
Left thumb finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0.7 0 2.3 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 3.0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 1.7 1.7
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0 2.7 0
Right index finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0.3 0 1.3 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 3.7 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 6.0 0
28, 29, and 30 0.3 1.0 0 1.0 0.7
Right ring finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0 0 0.7 0
4, 5, and 6 0 1.0 0 1.3 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0.3 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0.7 0 0 0
Table 6.4: Scenario C results: FAR and FRR for Scanner 4 (parameters 30/0.40)
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Query scanner −→ Scnr 1 Scnr 2 Scnr 3 Scnr 4 Scnr 5
Indices of the files
used for enrolment ⇓ FAR, % FAR, % FAR, % FAR, % FRR, %
Left little finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0 0 0 0.3
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 0 1.3
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0.3 0 0.3
Left middle finger
1, 2, and 3 0.3 0 1.3 0.7 1.7
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0.7 0.3 0
10, 11, and 12 0.3 0 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0 0 0
Left thumb finger
1, 2, and 3 0.3 0 0.7 0.7 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0.3 0 0.3
10, 11, and 12 0.3 0 1.0 1.3 0
28, 29, and 30 0.7 0 0.3 0 1.3
Right index finger
1, 2, and 3 0 0 0 0.7 0
4, 5, and 6 0.3 0 0 0.3 1.7
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 0 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0 0 0
Right ring finger
1, 2, and 3 0.3 0 0.3 0 0
4, 5, and 6 0 0 0 0 0
10, 11, and 12 0 0 0 0.7 0
28, 29, and 30 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6.5: Scenario C results: FAR and FRR for Scanner 5 (parameters 18/0.25)
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6.4 Signal Characteristics
6.4.1 Scanner Noise: Temporal Characteristics
6.4.1.1 Scanner Noise: Temporal Characteristics: Sample Variances
Scnr Grp 1 Grp 2 Grp 3 Avg Scnr Grp 1 Grp 2 Grp 3 Avg
u101 1.759 1.680 1.679 1.706 u114 2.039 1.977 1.948 1.988
u102 1.768 1.674 1.695 1.712 u115 1.873 1.860 1.850 1.861
u103 1.821 1.827 1.848 1.832 u116 2.075 2.032 1.998 2.035
u105 1.907 1.913 1.834 1.884 u117 1.636 1.679 1.681 1.665
u106 1.872 1.958 1.811 1.880 u118 1.791 1.697 1.679 1.722
u107 1.819 1.751 1.749 1.773 u119 1.432 1.378 1.366 1.392
u108 1.749 1.848 1.724 1.774 u120 1.686 1.651 1.663 1.667
u110 1.730 1.664 1.686 1.693 u121 1.629 1.741 1.739 1.703
u111 1.847 1.860 1.792 1.833 u122 1.790 1.857 1.780 1.809
u112 1.966 2.011 1.953 1.977 u151 1.857 1.840 1.831 1.843
u113 1.797 1.714 1.709 1.740 u152 1.843 1.734 1.768 1.782
v1 0.890 0.882 0.883 0.885
Table 6.6: Sample variances of the temporal scanner noise for the three groups of
images, each of 100 images, and the average of the three for each scanner: u101
through u152 (UPEK) and v1 (Veridicom)
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6.4.1.2 Scanner Noise: Temporal Characteristics: Jarque-Bera Test
Significance 0.01 Signif. 0.01 Significance 0.05 Signif. 0.05
Scanner Groups: 1 2 3, % Maximum, % Groups: 1 2 3, % Maximum, %
u101 6.6 7.8 7.7 7.8 16.8 19.0 18.7 19.0
u102 8.4 10.5 10.1 10.5 18.7 21.9 21.4 21.9
u103 11.6 12.9 12.0 12.9 24.4 26.8 26.0 26.8
u105 11.1 9.8 9.7 11.1 23.9 22.4 21.7 23.9
u106 9.8 9.5 12.0 12.0 22.4 22.4 25.3 25.3
u107 9.6 12.1 11.8 12.1 23.0 25.9 25.3 25.9
u108 9.1 7.4 10.1 10.1 21.5 19.2 23.4 23.4
u110 7.5 8.8 8.2 8.8 19.3 21.3 20.5 21.3
u111 8.4 7.4 8.6 8.6 19.9 18.3 20.5 20.5
u112 9.3 8.7 9.9 9.9 21.4 20.5 22.0 22.0
u113 9.3 9.8 9.8 9.8 20.8 22.1 21.9 22.1
u114 7.9 7.8 8.5 8.5 18.2 18.6 20.2 20.2
u115 9.5 8.2 9.5 9.5 21.7 19.3 21.5 21.7
u116 8.9 10.0 10.3 10.3 21.5 22.9 23.7 23.7
u117 11.6 12.7 13.0 13.0 24.6 27.2 27.9 27.9
u118 7.8 9.3 10.2 10.2 19.2 22.1 23.0 23.0
u119 6.3 7.4 7.5 7.5 15.9 17.8 18.1 18.1
u120 9.4 9.9 11.2 11.2 22.0 22.7 25.0 25.0
u121 9.9 10.4 10.7 10.7 21.7 23.4 24.4 24.4
u122 8.8 8.1 10.4 10.4 20.7 19.7 23.4 23.4
u151 10.5 10.9 11.1 11.1 23.6 23.9 24.3 24.3
u152 9.7 12.3 12.4 12.4 22.1 26.5 26.2 26.5
v1 21.2 26.2 25.0 26.2 43.8 51.3 49.8 51.3
Table 6.7: Percentage of pixels (for the 3 groups of images and their maxima) whose
Jarque-Bera test p-values for the values of each pixel across 100 images are below
0.01 and 0.05 significance levels. Pixel values deviating over 3σ from the sample
mean are excluded (“3σ trimming”).
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6.4.2 Scanner Noise: Spatial Characteristics
6.4.2.1 Scanner Noise: Spatial Characteristics: Sample Variances
Scnr Grp 1 Grp 2 Grp 3 Avg Scnr Grp 1 Grp 2 Grp 3 Avg
u101 1.670 1.649 1.649 1.656 u114 1.967 1.926 1.902 1.932
u102 1.662 1.652 1.648 1.654 u115 1.834 1.805 1.822 1.820
u103 1.792 1.803 1.794 1.796 u116 2.015 1.984 1.975 1.991
u105 1.871 1.842 1.809 1.841 u117 1.599 1.652 1.659 1.637
u106 1.818 1.785 1.788 1.797 u118 1.701 1.660 1.656 1.672
u107 1.749 1.731 1.710 1.730 u119 1.336 1.346 1.348 1.343
u108 1.696 1.693 1.700 1.696 u120 1.619 1.598 1.637 1.618
u110 1.665 1.634 1.641 1.647 u121 1.608 1.680 1.716 1.668
u111 1.801 1.772 1.769 1.781 u122 1.722 1.731 1.756 1.737
u112 1.935 1.911 1.896 1.914 u151 1.816 1.814 1.810 1.813
u113 1.765 1.668 1.658 1.697 u152 1.734 1.709 1.723 1.722
v1 0.868 0.870 0.868 0.869
Table 6.8: Sample variances for the three groups, each of 100 images, and the average
of the three for each scanner: u101 through u152 (UPEK) and v1 (Veridicom)
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6.4.2.2 Scanner Noise: Spatial Characteristics: χ2 Test
Significance 0.01 Signif. 0.01 Significance 0.05 Signif. 0.05
Scanner Groups: 1 2 3, % Maximum, % Groups: 1 2 3, % Maximum, %
u101 6.9 7.5 7.4 7.5 17.8 18.7 18.6 18.7
u102 7.8 8.4 7.5 8.4 19.2 20.8 19.3 20.8
u103 8.9 10.8 11.4 11.4 21.7 24.2 25.5 25.5
u105 9.4 9.4 8.1 9.4 22.0 22.3 19.9 22.3
u106 9.8 9.8 9.7 9.8 22.8 23.0 23.0 23.0
u107 11.2 10.7 11.4 11.4 25.1 24.9 25.5 25.5
u108 8.6 8.7 8.9 8.9 20.7 21.1 21.2 21.2
u110 8.3 8.6 8.6 8.6 20.6 21.2 21.0 21.2
u111 9.4 8.8 9.3 9.4 21.4 21.4 22.0 22.0
u112 9.7 10.0 8.9 10.0 22.9 23.6 21.9 23.6
u113 8.7 10.7 10.1 10.7 20.4 24.7 23.1 24.7
u114 8.2 8.3 9.4 9.4 19.6 20.7 22.6 22.6
u115 9.2 8.1 8.7 9.2 21.8 19.6 21.2 21.8
u116 10.9 11.6 11.5 11.6 24.7 25.9 26.1 26.1
u117 11.1 13.8 14.4 14.4 24.2 29.2 29.6 29.6
u118 9.7 10.6 10.7 10.7 22.3 24.2 24.5 24.5
u119 6.4 6.7 7.0 7.0 16.9 17.5 17.5 17.5
u120 10.5 10.7 11.6 11.6 23.8 24.1 25.9 25.9
u121 9.2 11.4 11.5 11.5 21.3 25.5 25.6 25.6
u122 8.2 9.1 9.2 9.2 20.6 21.6 21.9 21.9
u151 11.5 11.7 11.5 11.7 25.6 25.8 25.8 25.8
u152 11.1 12.4 13.1 13.1 25.1 27.4 28.3 28.3
v1 14.8 16.2 15.9 16.2 27.1 28.9 28.8 28.9
Table 6.9: Average percentage of columns (for the 3 groups of images and their
maxima) whose χ2 test p-values for the scanner noise estimate are below 0.01 and
0.05 significance levels. Pixel values deviating over 3σ from the sample mean are
excluded (“3σ trimming”).
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6.4.2.3 Scanner Noise: Spatial Characteristics: Jarque-Bera Test
Significance 0.01 Signif. 0.01 Significance 0.05 Signif. 0.05
Scanner Groups: 1 2 3, % Maximum, % Groups: 1 2 3, % Maximum, %
u101 15.4 16.9 16.5 16.9 32.8 34.6 33.8 34.6
u102 21.5 23.6 23.5 23.6 40.0 42.3 42.0 42.3
u103 27.4 31.9 33.0 33.0 46.5 51.2 52.8 52.8
u105 26.6 25.5 21.2 26.6 45.3 45.1 39.0 45.3
u106 24.9 27.9 28.2 28.2 44.8 47.8 47.7 47.8
u107 26.7 31.2 32.0 32.0 47.2 51.1 51.5 51.5
u108 20.3 21.5 21.6 21.6 39.4 40.9 41.2 41.2
u110 18.0 20.3 19.6 20.3 36.5 39.5 38.8 39.5
u111 21.3 19.3 19.8 21.3 39.6 37.8 39.2 39.6
u112 23.1 24.6 25.4 25.4 42.4 44.8 45.0 45.0
u113 22.0 26.6 26.8 26.8 40.1 46.1 46.5 46.5
u114 18.5 18.4 20.8 20.8 35.4 36.2 39.5 39.5
u115 23.4 19.6 22.2 23.4 43.0 37.5 41.7 41.7
u116 23.5 26.2 27.3 27.3 43.1 46.8 47.7 47.7
u117 30.7 34.5 35.9 35.9 50.3 54.9 56.3 56.3
u118 21.8 25.1 25.7 25.7 41.2 45.5 45.9 45.9
u119 14.5 15.4 15.2 15.4 32.0 32.8 32.5 32.8
u120 25.5 26.5 28.8 28.8 45.7 46.6 49.5 49.5
u121 23.9 28.9 28.6 28.9 43.2 49.7 49.4 49.7
u122 20.5 22.5 23.6 23.6 39.5 41.9 43.6 43.6
u151 29.1 28.9 29.0 29.1 49.2 48.8 49.4 49.4
u152 31.0 35.8 36.2 36.2 51.0 56.0 56.4 56.4
v1 50.5 51.4 51.5 51.5 63.6 64.8 64.8 64.8
Table 6.10: Average percentage of columns (for the 3 groups and their maxima)
whose Jarque-Bera test p-values for the scanner noise estimate for the values of the
each pixel across 100 images are below 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels. Pixel values
deviating over 3σ from the sample mean are excluded (“3σ trimming”).
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6.4.3 Scanner Pattern Characteristics
6.4.3.1 Scanner Pattern Characteristics: Sample Variances
Scnr Grp 1 Grp 2 Grp 3 Avg Scnr Grp 1 Grp 2 Grp 3 Avg
u101 16.360 16.381 16.411 16.384 u114 15.628 15.692 15.652 15.657
u102 15.315 15.365 15.357 15.346 u115 17.601 17.558 17.634 17.598
u103 19.269 19.352 19.331 19.317 u116 13.157 13.215 13.177 13.183
u105 18.472 18.530 18.425 18.475 u117 12.726 12.696 12.729 12.717
u106 14.150 14.120 14.150 14.140 u118 14.107 14.116 14.111 14.111
u107 15.431 15.414 15.403 15.416 u119 12.420 12.482 12.475 12.459
u108 16.815 16.796 16.796 16.802 u120 15.066 15.096 15.071 15.078
u110 14.651 14.771 14.797 14.740 u121 15.059 15.134 15.121 15.105
u111 17.194 17.264 17.266 17.241 u122 16.844 16.978 16.932 16.918
u112 14.394 14.423 14.390 14.403 u151 15.837 15.902 15.883 15.874
u113 14.165 14.161 14.130 14.152 u152 14.227 14.207 14.156 14.197
v1 8.501 8.672 8.763 8.645
Table 6.11: Sample variances σ̂2s of the variable part, computed with an 11-tap
moving-average filter, of the scanner pattern, estimated from each group of 100
images, and the average of the three for each scanner: u101 through u152 (UPEK)
and v1 (Veridicom)
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6.4.3.2 Scanner Pattern Characteristics: Jarque-Bera Test
Significance 0.01 Signif. 0.01 Significance 0.05 Signif. 0.05
Scanner Groups: 1 2 3, % Maximum, % Groups: 1 2 3, % Maximum, %
u101 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 1.6 1.6
u102 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
u103 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.6
u105 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 3.5 2.3 3.5
u106 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.6
u107 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.6
u108 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.6
u110 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.4
u111 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
u112 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
u113 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.3
u114 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.2 0.8 1.2
u115 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 2.0 1.6 2.0
u116 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.2 0.8 1.2 1.2
u117 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
u118 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.6 0.8 1.6
u119 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 1.6 1.6
u120 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 2.3 3.5 3.5
u121 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
u122 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.4 1.2 1.2
u151 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
u152 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.8
v1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Table 6.12: Percentage of columns (for the 3 groups and their maxima) whose
Jarque-Bera test p-values for the variable part, computed with an 11-tap moving-
average filter, of the scanner pattern, estimated from each group of 100 images, are
below 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels. Values deviating over 3σ from the sample
mean are excluded (“3σ trimming”).
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6.4.3.3 Scanner Pattern Characteristics: Anderson-Darling Test
Significance 0.01 Signif. 0.01 Significance 0.05 Signif. 0.05
Scanner Groups: 1 2 3, % Maximum, % Groups: 1 2 3, % Maximum, %
u101 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.8 4.3 3.5 3.1 4.3
u102 1.2 1.6 0.8 1.6 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
u103 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 6.6 5.5 5.1 6.6
u105 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.6 5.1 4.7 4.3 5.1
u106 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.8 4.3 5.1 5.5 5.5
u107 1.6 2.3 2.0 2.3 4.3 5.1 5.9 5.9
u108 0.4 0.8 1.6 1.6 5.9 4.3 4.7 5.9
u110 1.6 0.8 0.8 1.6 6.6 6.2 5.1 6.6
u111 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.7 3.5 3.9 3.9
u112 1.6 1.2 0.8 1.6 5.9 6.2 5.9 6.2
u113 1.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 7.4 7.4 7.0 7.4
u114 1.6 1.6 2.0 2.0 5.9 5.1 5.9 5.9
u115 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.8 6.2 5.5 5.9 6.2
u116 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 3.9 2.7 3.1 3.9
u117 1.6 2.0 1.6 2.0 5.9 5.9 6.2 6.2
u118 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 4.7 4.3 5.1 5.1
u119 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.8 4.7 4.3 5.1 5.1
u120 2.0 1.6 1.6 2.0 8.2 7.0 6.6 8.2
u121 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.8 5.5 5.5 3.9 5.5
u122 1.2 0.4 0.4 1.2 4.3 3.9 4.7 4.7
u151 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 6.6 5.9 6.2 6.6
u152 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 6.2 5.9 5.5 6.2
v1 1.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.1 5.1 5.5 5.5
Table 6.13: Percentage of columns (for the 3 groups and their maxima) whose
Anderson-Darling test p-values for the variable part, computed with an 11-tap
moving-average filter, of the scanner pattern, estimated from each group of 100
images, are below 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels. Values deviating over 3σ from
the sample mean are excluded (“3σ trimming”).
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6.4.4 Scanner Pattern and Noise Characteristics
6.4.4.1 Scanner Pattern and Noise Characteristics: Sample Variances
Scnr Grp 1 Grp 2 Grp 3 Avg Scnr Grp 1 Grp 2 Grp 3 Avg
u101 17.878 17.886 17.914 17.893 u114 17.415 17.443 17.383 17.413
u102 16.825 16.868 16.855 16.850 u115 19.265 19.199 19.294 19.253
u103 20.899 20.996 20.962 20.952 u116 14.987 15.023 14.972 14.994
u105 20.171 20.207 20.069 20.149 u117 14.176 14.196 14.237 14.203
u106 15.798 15.738 15.774 15.770 u118 15.652 15.628 15.620 15.633
u107 17.024 16.989 16.956 16.990 u119 13.632 13.704 13.697 13.678
u108 18.354 18.335 18.338 18.342 u120 16.534 16.553 16.556 16.548
u110 16.166 16.258 16.290 16.238 u121 16.520 16.666 16.657 16.615
u111 18.834 18.881 18.874 18.863 u122 18.406 18.550 18.526 18.494
u112 16.153 16.164 16.114 16.143 u151 17.486 17.554 17.533 17.525
u113 15.765 15.678 15.636 15.693 u152 15.806 15.765 15.722 15.764
v1 9.289 9.464 9.553 9.436
Table 6.14: Sample variances of the variable part, computed with an 11-tap moving-
average filter, of the pixel values g(po) in each image in the three groups of 100
images, and the average of the three for each scanner: u101 through u152 (UPEK)
and v1 (Veridicom)
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6.4.4.2 Scanner Pattern and Noise Characteristics: Jarque-Bera Test
Significance 0.01 Signif. 0.01 Significance 0.05 Signif. 0.05
Scanner Groups: 1 2 3, % Maximum, % Groups: 1 2 3, % Maximum, %
u101 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2
u102 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1
u103 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.6
u105 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0
u106 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6
u107 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5
u108 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
u110 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.0
u111 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7
u112 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
u113 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6
u114 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.1
u115 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
u116 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
u117 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
u118 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9
u119 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2
u120 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6
u121 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
u122 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
u151 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3
u152 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
v1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5
Table 6.15: Average percentage of columns (for the 3 groups and their maxima)
whose Jarque-Bera test p-values for the variable part, computed with an 11-tap
moving-average filter, of the pixel values g(po) are below 0.01 and 0.05 significance
levels. Deviations beyond 3σ from the sample mean are excluded (“3σ trimming”).
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6.4.4.3 Scanner Pattern and Noise Charac’s: Anderson-Darling Test
Significance 0.01 Signif. 0.01 Significance 0.05 Signif. 0.05
Scanner Groups: 1 2 3, % Maximum, % Groups: 1 2 3, % Maximum, %
u101 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.0 4.9 4.7 5.0 5.0
u102 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.6
u103 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 6.0 5.7 5.8 6.0
u105 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.0
u106 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 5.7 5.9 5.8 5.9
u107 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.4 5.7 6.2 6.2 6.2
u108 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 5.5 5.7 6.0 6.0
u110 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.1 5.9 5.3 5.4 5.9
u111 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.0
u112 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5
u113 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.5 6.5 6.4 6.6 6.6
u114 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 5.5 5.7 5.7 5.7
u115 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 5.9 5.7 5.7 5.9
u116 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1
u117 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.9
u118 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.6
u119 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0
u120 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.9
u121 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 5.0 4.9 4.8 5.0
u122 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 5.2 4.9 5.1 5.2
u151 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.1
u152 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 5.1 4.8 4.9 5.1
v1 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 6.1 5.9 6.0 6.1
Table 6.16: Average percentage of columns (for the 3 groups and their maxima)
whose Anderson-Darling p-values for the variable part, computed with an 11-tap
moving-average filter, of the pixel values g(po) are below 0.01 and 0.05 significance
levels. Deviations beyond 3σ from the sample mean are excluded (“3σ trimming”).
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6.5 Gaussian Approximation of the Inverse of a Gaussian Random
Variable
6.5.1 Derivation of the Approximation
LetX be a Gaussian random variable with PDF fX(x) ∼ N (µ, σ2) and Y = 1X .
In our case, µ  σ, e.g., µ of about 100 and σ about 5, which is the worst case as
the mean is the smallest and the standard deviation of the scanner pattern, possibly
together with the spatial scanner noise, is the largest. Then:











= Q(−20) = 1−Q(20) ≈ 1− 3 ∗ 10−89 ≈ 1.
Therefore, we can very safely assume that P (X > 0) = 1 for all practical purposes
(this is in addition to the fact that the pixel values in the images the scanners
produce are positive or at least non-negative).











since X and y can only be positive⇒







since X is N(µ, σ2), and










Let U be N(0, 1) and fU(u) is its PDF. Then :
[Q(u)]
′
u = [1− P (U ≤ u)]
′
u = − [P (U ≤ u)]
′























































The PDF of Y in Expression 6.1 is not simple and easy to work with, but at least it
is in closed form. Since µ σ and µ ∼ 200, we now introduce two approximations:




because variations around µ will be negligibly
small. Moreover, in the regions far from µ, fY (y) will be dominated by the
exponent, which exponent will be close to 0 anyway;





















, again around µ.
These two approximations seem to be very imprecise; when applied, however,
the overall error is acceptably small for our purposes. Next we detail the steps in





























































+ · · ·
We observed that by using only the first several (2 or 3) terms, the Taylor series







participates squared in fY (y) (see Expression 6.1), using the Taylor series













is in the exponent of fY (y) with a negative sign, the large
positive values effectively make the whole exponent close to 0. Now, by taking only





















































By combining Approximations #1 and #2, we receive:


























An alternative view on this is to look at the function y = 1/x at given x0
(which represents the mean µX). The larger x0 is, the more linear the function
y = 1/x becomes, and small perturbations ∆x around x0 will give almost linearly
dependent on them deviations ∆y, i.e., ∆y ≈ k∆x . Therefore, a Gaussian ∆x will
be almost linearly transformed into ∆y, which is again Gaussian by theorem, thus
corroborating the approximation just derived.












6.5.2 Numerical Evaluation of the Approximation
The comparison between the exact PDF of the inverse Y of a Gaussian random
variable X with N (200, 52) and the approximate PDF is shown in Figure 6.6. The
mean of the inverse Y is µY = 1/µX = 5 ∗ 10−3, and the standard deviation of the
approximating Gaussian is σY = σX/µ
2
X = 1.25∗ 10−4. Note that the PDF becomes
very large (over 3000) but diminishes very quickly just ±4 ∗ 10−4 (which is ±3σY )
away from the mean µY .
The second plot shows the relative error, which is within ±10% in the range
±2σY of Y around its mean. The tails beyond ±2σY have probability 2 ∗ Q(2) ≈
4.55 ∗ 10−2. This means that roughly 5% of the pixels (on average) lie outside the
10% relative error window, which we believe is tolerable.
The third plot on the same figure shows the reduced to |y − µ| curves for
both the exact PDF and the Gaussian approximation. The reduction is intended
to present the PDFs on a linear scale (by taking logarithm) in order to allow easier
comparison. Thus, when g(y) is a Gaussian PDF with N(µ, σ2), then






. The plot shows that the two PDFs are indeed
very close to each other.
Tables 6.17 through 6.20 show the p-values of 4 hypothesis tests (χ2, Jarque-
Bera, Lilliefors, and Anderson-Darling) for the inverses of 4 types of toy processes,
with 20 signals (realizations) for each type. Each signal (realization) is 360 pixels
(samples) long in order to match the length of one column of pixels of the UPEK
scanners. All 4 types of processes are Gaussians with parameters being all pairs of
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Exactly computed PDF of Y = 1/X, where X ~ N(200, 5 2),     


























































Figure 6.6: Inverse of a Gaussian RV: the exact PDF and the approximate PDF
two extreme means (200 and 100) and two extreme standard deviations (5 and 3,
although the smaller the standard deviation is, the more accurate the approximation
is): N (200, 52), N (100, 52), N (200, 32), and N (100, 32), all generated with the
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MATLAB function randn.m. The original (i.e., before the inversion) of each signal
shown in the tables below has p-values above 0.05 for all hypothesis tests, i.e., all
original signals can be assumed Gaussian. (Note: the largest p-value returned by
the Jarque-Bera and Lilliefors tests is 0.5).
For the original process N (200, 52) (see Table 6.17), only three of the inverse
signals have p-values of some, but not all, of the hypothesis tests below 0.05 sig-
nificance level: signals #02, #11 and #18. The only problematic of the three is
probably signal #02, which has two p-values below 0.01. Signals #12 and #15 have
p-values of a single test slightly below 0.05.
When the mean of the original process is much smaller, i.e., for N (100, 52)
(see Table 6.18), the signals whose p-values are smaller than the 0.05 significance
level threshold are many more: signals #06, #13, and #16 have one test below
the threshold, signals #03, #07, and #15 have two tests below the threshold, and
signals #11 and #17 have the Gaussian hypothesis rejected for all four tests. Still,
the overwhelming majority of tests have very large p-values, well above 0.05.
As for the original process N (200, 32) (see Table 6.19), only one (signal #03) of
the inverse signals has p-values of three of the hypothesis tests below 0.05 significance
level, although these p-values are quite large (close to 0.04). From the 4 types
of toy processes, the inverse signals of this type appear to best conform to the
Gaussian distribution. This is to be expected as its mean is the largest (200) and the
standard deviation the smallest (3), which makes the approximation more accurate
than for the other 3 types of processes. This is very intuitive when looking from the
alternative point of view on the approximation in the preceding section.
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Signal # χ2 Jarque-Bera Lilliefors Anderson-Darling
01 0.408 0.500 0.500 0.944
02 0.066 0.105 0.008 0.007
03 0.368 0.500 0.470 0.525
04 0.631 0.086 0.172 0.089
05 0.730 0.500 0.500 0.896
06 0.230 0.500 0.500 0.524
07 0.262 0.500 0.298 0.392
08 0.107 0.061 0.173 0.035
09 0.725 0.131 0.400 0.519
10 0.775 0.500 0.312 0.749
11 0.049 0.038 0.046 0.094
12 0.515 0.052 0.047 0.142
13 0.775 0.500 0.500 0.924
14 0.151 0.064 0.228 0.195
15 0.573 0.043 0.139 0.311
16 0.614 0.172 0.063 0.297
17 0.612 0.500 0.500 0.784
18 0.057 0.046 0.099 0.045
19 0.256 0.374 0.418 0.504
20 0.571 0.405 0.500 0.726
Table 6.17: P-values of the hypothesis tests for the inverse of a toy process
N (200, 52)
Finally, the results for the original process N (100, 32) (shown in Table 6.20)
is similar to those for N (200, 52): only three of the inverse signals have p-values of
some, but not all, of the hypothesis tests below 0.05 significance level: signals #07
(for one test), #12 and #19 (for two tests). This is also expected because, although
the mean here is half the mean of N (200, 52), the standard deviation is also nearly
half of the standard deviation of N (200, 52), and therefore, the approximation is
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Signal # χ2 Jarque-Bera Lilliefors Anderson-Darling
01 0.325 0.146 0.500 0.328
02 0.087 0.094 0.244 0.268
03 0.137 0.001 0.125 0.028
04 0.684 0.067 0.500 0.385
05 0.108 0.071 0.052 0.060
06 0.122 0.006 0.196 0.128
07 0.268 0.033 0.088 0.027
08 0.102 0.083 0.149 0.165
09 0.529 0.500 0.500 0.903
10 0.497 0.036 0.469 0.137
11 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.001
12 0.063 0.068 0.500 0.142
13 0.648 0.043 0.337 0.403
14 0.308 0.500 0.278 0.440
15 0.055 0.021 0.064 0.009
16 0.588 0.041 0.453 0.362
17 0.011 0.022 0.047 0.008
18 0.580 0.098 0.500 0.381
19 0.631 0.439 0.437 0.529
20 0.142 0.366 0.281 0.269




Signal # χ2 Jarque-Bera Lilliefors Anderson-Darling
01 0.799 0.500 0.500 0.565
02 0.931 0.489 0.420 0.748
03 0.048 0.500 0.039 0.035
04 0.184 0.360 0.448 0.432
05 0.765 0.500 0.500 0.887
06 0.125 0.405 0.189 0.274
07 0.817 0.217 0.500 0.837
08 0.250 0.500 0.254 0.205
09 0.894 0.500 0.500 0.916
10 0.720 0.500 0.500 0.534
11 0.100 0.090 0.299 0.116
12 0.073 0.500 0.346 0.523
13 0.475 0.388 0.500 0.602
14 0.209 0.500 0.167 0.201
15 0.528 0.500 0.500 0.533
16 0.499 0.500 0.500 0.804
17 0.691 0.500 0.436 0.345
18 0.544 0.210 0.478 0.410
19 0.846 0.500 0.500 0.867
20 0.116 0.500 0.125 0.143
Table 6.19: P-values of the hypothesis tests for the inverse of a toy process
N (200, 32)
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Signal # χ2 Jarque-Bera Lilliefors Anderson-Darling
01 0.990 0.500 0.500 0.883
02 0.050 0.447 0.394 0.412
03 0.510 0.303 0.079 0.247
04 0.839 0.500 0.500 0.968
05 0.711 0.255 0.307 0.515
06 0.758 0.500 0.500 0.658
07 0.201 0.069 0.076 0.022
08 0.888 0.341 0.500 0.594
09 0.241 0.500 0.500 0.214
10 0.058 0.331 0.500 0.219
11 0.603 0.358 0.500 0.348
12 0.061 0.006 0.180 0.015
13 0.871 0.420 0.500 0.902
14 0.052 0.500 0.500 0.502
15 0.225 0.449 0.076 0.147
16 0.714 0.500 0.500 0.969
17 0.583 0.500 0.321 0.200
18 0.080 0.210 0.096 0.066
19 0.177 0.038 0.030 0.088
20 0.896 0.494 0.500 0.761
Table 6.20: P-values of the hypothesis tests for the inverse of a toy process
N (100, 32)
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6.6 Linear Approximations for Signal Model A
6.6.1 Linear Approximation for g(i, j)
In this section, we derive a linear approximation for g(i, j) in function of f(i, j).
By neglecting the scanner noise n(i, j, t) in Signal Model A (see Expression 5.9), for
the pixel value at row i and column j, we have:
g(i, j) ≈ s(i, j)
1 + s(i, j)f(i, j)
. (6.3)
To simplify the notation, we work only with a single pixel (i, j) and therefore
omit the indices. We define the function l(f) and use the standard tangent-line






≈ k(f − a) + b













The accuracy of this approximation largely depends on the selection of the
point a. As we discussed in Section 5.5.2, for the UPEK swipe scanners, the pixels
in an image never saturate. We also observed that the pixel values in an image rarely
fall below 100 or even 120. This means that the range of the fingerprint pattern
f is rather small. One possible explanation for this is that since the fingertip has
to be swiped, pressing it hard enough to produce sufficiently large f (much less to
saturate the sensing elements) is difficult. Using Signal Model A (Expression 5.9)












For this reason, we assume that f for the UPEK swipe scanners varies in the range
from 0 (no fingerprint) to about 0.005. Selecting a in the middle, i.e., a = 0.0025
gives the best overall accuracy of the approximation.
Figure 6.7 shows l(f) and its linear approximation at a = 0.0025 for 3 values
of s and the corresponding relative errors. Even in the worst case (when s = 220),
the relative error is at most 12.5%, which happens only near the ends of the range
of f .




















































Figure 6.7: Linear approximation for Signal Model A and its accuracy
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By reinstating the pixel indices, we obtain:
g(i, j) ≈ k(i, j) (f(i, j)− a) + b(i, j), (6.4)
where k(i, j) = − s
2(i, j)
(1 + s(i, j)a)2
and b(i, j) =
s(i, j)
1 + s(i, j)a
. (6.5)
6.6.2 Linear Approximation for s(j)/(1 + s(j).a)
Here we discuss the case specific for the UPEK swipe scanners and for which




≈ const · s(j). (6.6)






for the ranges of parameter values we have in the UPEK swipe scanners. The value
of a is taken from the preceding discussion about the approximation for g(i, j), and
the scanner pattern standard deviation σs is assumed in its very worst case for the
approximation. Since 5 is well above the typical standard deviation of the scanner
pattern, it can also represent the standard deviation of the sum of the scanner
pattern and the scanner noise (see Sections 6.4.3.1 and 6.4.4.1 in this appendix).
The choice of the range ±3σ around the mean µs of the scanner pattern does not





within ±3%, which we believe is sufficiently accurate.
Before claiming the approximation in Expression 6.6, however, we have to
stress that this approximation is good only in our specific processing of b(j) for the
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Factors and parameters Min Typical Max
σs = 5, a = 0.0025 = 1/400
µs 100 200 220
1 + µsa 1.2500 1.5000 1.5500
1 + (µs − 3σs)a 1.2125 1.4625 1.5125
1 + (µs + 3σs)a 1.2875 1.5375 1.5875
1/ (1 + µsa) 0.8000 0.6667 0.6452
1/ (1 + (µs − 3σs)a) 0.8247 0.6838 0.6612
% of difference w.r.t. 1/ (1 + µsa) +3.1% +2.6% +2.5%
1/ (1 + (µs + 3σs)a) 0.7767 0.6504 0.6299
% of difference w.r.t. 1/ (1 + µsa) -2.9% -2.4% -2.4%
Table 6.21: Linear approximation for s(j)/(1 + s(j).a): accuracy analysis
purpose of extracting the variable part of the scanner pattern s(j), not in general.
The reason for this is that the scanner pattern mean µs is variable, i.e., it depends
on the scanner pattern at index j, and therefore it is µs(j). The scanner pattern
s(j) can be represented as its mean µs(j) plus its variable part sv(j). Therefore, by


















We also know that the mean µs(j) is a slowly varying process. Therefore,
when b(j) is processed with a denoising filter, the term µs(j)/(1 + µs(j)a) above is
removed and the only term produced at the output is the processed scaled variable
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part sv(j) of the scanner pattern. Its scaling coefficient, however, still depends on
the index j. Nevertheless, we believe that this is not a problem for the advanced
algorithms for the swipe scanners as both use filters with very short span (a couple
of pixels at most), within which span the mean µs(j) is essentially the same and
therefore the scaling factor 1/(1 + µs(j)a) is constant for the indices j over which
the denoising filters operate at the time of producing the estimate for the variable
part sv(j) of the scanner pattern.
In addition to the previous caveat, it is also important to note that although
this approximation in Expression 6.6 seems to be universally applicable to all sig-
nals of Signal Model A, actually it may not be. In the UPEK area scanners, the
fingerprint pattern f(i, j) can and often do span the whole range (0, 1], especially
for thumb fingers, and thus f(i, j) is not bounded to about 0.005 as in the UPEK
swipe scanners, potentially making this whole approximation framework fall apart.
In summary, we showed that (a) with the characteristics of our signals and
(b) in the context of the denoising algorithms for swipe scanners we propose, the
approximation b(j) ≈ const· s(j), with const varying within only ±3%, is accurate.
This essentially implies that b(j) can be assumed as being the scanner pattern s(j) it
its direct form. Although we did not do a comparative analysis, this approximation
may as well be more accurate than the Gaussian approximation for the inverse of
the scanner pattern (see Section 6.5 in this appendix).
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